Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

179. Memorandum From the President’s Acting Assistant for National Security Affairs (Keel) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• ICBM Modernization Decisions

Issue

Modernizing the ICBM Forces

Facts

At yesterday’s NSC meeting² your advisors were unanimous in recommending that future Peacekeeper deployments take place using the garrison rail mobile concept. All urged that we start development of this concept as soon as possible. There were a wide spectrum of opinions regarding the advisability of moving into full-scale development of the small ICBM, but all present seem to share the view that the Congress would not approve further Peacekeeper funding without the small ICBM. Secretary Weinberger expressed strong concerns regarding the cost of the small ICBM. Several advisors recommended that you meet with the key members of both parties to explain the high cost of the SICBM in relation to the austere budgets we now face. Your advisors all agreed that legal and strategic considerations require an announcement of your decision by 30 December 1986.

Discussion

As your Advisors stated in the meeting, there are both pros and cons associated with proceeding further with the small ICBM. The drawbacks are that it is expensive, and this is troublesome because it comes at a time of relative austerity. The small missile does, however, have military utility, as Generals Welch and Kelley pointed out, and as Secretary Shultz noted, it is seen by many to be a stabilizing factor in the international arena. The most compelling argument for the continuation of the SICBM, however, lies in the fact that it has become the symbol of bipartisan support for your entire Strategic Modernization Program. Killing it, or delaying it, or even adapting an administration position of open hostility towards it, will almost certainly destroy the bipartisan support for Peacekeeper and the other important, but costly programs that support our policy of deterrence. Because of this political reality, most of your Advisors support moving the SICBM into full scale development.

In regards to where we go from here, Will Ball and I recommend that we invite key members of Congress that are available to come to the White House on Friday morning³ to hear the same briefing you heard today. Will and I will represent you at the meeting. Our announcement of your decision would come late Friday and would be appropriately low key. We would then have a formal bipartisan leadership briefing in January where you can explain your decisions in the context of the overall budget as Ed Meese and George Shultz recommend.

Finally, with your approval I will send the NSDD at Tab I⁴ to the appropriate agencies today for coordination. Our plan would be to have the NSDD ready for your signature by Thursday afternoon.

Recommendations

OK No

____ ____ That we place both the Peacekeeper garrison rail basing and the SICBM into full-scale development as soon as possible.⁵

____ ____ That Cap and General Welch brief congressional members on your decision on Friday here at the White House and we make a low key announcement on Friday afternoon.⁶

____ ____ That I distribute the draft NSDD at Tab I today for comment.⁷

Will Ball concurs.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–094, NSDD 252. Top Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Douglass. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
2. See Document 172.
3. December 19.
4. Attached but not printed. For the final version, see Document 186.
5. Reagan initialed his approval.
6. Reagan initialed his approval.
7. Reagan initialed his approval.