Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

164. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, November 25, 1986, 3–4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Interim Restraint (Deployment of the 131st ALCM-equipped B–52) (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President

• State:

  • Secretary George Shultz
  • Mr. Allen Holmes

• Treasury:

  • Secretary James Baker

• Defense:

  • Secretary Caspar Weinberger
  • Mr. Richard Perle

• Justice:

  • Attorney General Edwin Meese

• OMB:

  • Mr. James Miller

• ACDA

  • Mr. Kenneth Adelman

• CIA:

  • Mr. William Casey
  • Mr. Douglas George

• JCS:

  • Admiral William J. Crowe
  • LTG John Moellering

• White House;

  • Chief of Staff Regan
  • Dr. Alton J. Keel
  • Mr. Larry Speakes
  • Mr. Craig Fuller
  • Mr. William Cockell
  • Colonel Robert Linhard

• Special Advisors

  • Ambassador Paul Nitze
  • Ambassador Edward Rowny

Minutes

The meeting opened at 3:00 p.m. in the Situation Room. The agenda was as shown at Tab A² except that Dr. Alton Keel substituted for VADM John Poindexter and conducted the meeting as Acting National Security Advisor.³ (U)

Dr. Keel opened the meeting using his prepared talking points.⁴ He then asked Secretary Weinberger to comment on the status of the 131st ALCM bomber. (U)

Weinberger: The 131st B–52 is finished and outside the hanger. It’s ready to be deployed. We are on a regular schedule and the next bombers will be on schedule. If we delay beyond December 15 we will disrupt the program. With regard to dismantling SSBNs, planning for dismantling has not been done. We have already taken three of these submarines down, the Rayburn, Greene and Hale. We need time for dismantling the rest of them. We could not dismantle them before November or December 1987. We would have to move $400 million to eliminate B–52 ALCM carriage, and $5½ million to cut the capability. (S)

Crowe: Those are not the same numbers I have. The numbers are too high. (U)

Weinberger: It costs $44 thousand per aircraft for a total of $396 million. For 66 aircraft it would cost 5½ million. We can’t dismantle Poseidons for about one year. So we need to get on and press forward. It’s not a good idea to keep pushing on with SALT. The submarines are needed; they are not old enough to destroy. We don’t want to stop ALCM outfitting of B–52 and B–l. Dave Abshire [U.S. Ambassador to NATO] argues that we should roll the 131st bomber before the 11th of December to avoid problems with the Allies. You will be told Congress wants you to stay in limits. Congress was about to order you to comply. But the people who are telling you to do this are like Wright and Pell who will never help us in any case. If we change our minds now and do not break out it will cost us $5 million in backing out of the B–52 conversions. We can’t do the submarines for a year. The submarines we did before are older; we are now dealing with a different type of submarine. [Note: Secretary Weinberger was in error.] There will always be something, an election or something else that will be used to tell you must stay within SALT. The Allies know about your decision; a greater time lag will make it worse not better. ALCMs make older B–52s better. We don’t have that many submarines and we need to hold on to the capability of the C–3 and C–4 missiles. There is no reason to hold the SALT yard stick up to ourselves. The Soviets have violated the Treaty and the Treaty has expired. We can’t use this useless yard stick. We should deploy the systems that seem best to us. The Soviets did not raise the question of 131st bomber at the SCC. In conclusion, Mr. President, we should press forward. (S)

The President: I made the decision to dismantle the submarines last spring because of the age of the submarines. (C)

Weinberger: Yes. They were older submarines. We have submarines now that are different. We will have 194 B–52s with ALCM, even though they too are old. (S)

The President: If we fly B–52s that are that old we may have our dismantling by accident. (C)

Weinberger: The B–52Gs and B–52Hs are OK for some years. The balance between us and the Soviets is such that we can’t give up useful capability. (S)

Keel: No one is advocating giving up B–52s. (C)

Weinberger: The point is that we can’t go ahead and dismantle submarines. We need a year. Thus if we stay within SALT limits, we will have to give up B–52s. (S)

Keel: These are the same type of submarines we talked about this spring. We can save $150 million by not overhauling them. Hamilton was one that at one time we were going to retire. We would not be in technical observance of SALT because of timing, but we would save money. Could we gain anything that way in Congress or the Alliance? (S)

Weinberger: We have not done any dismantlement planning. We cannot dismantle the submarines for a year. There is no gain to this approach. (S)

Shultz: I basically agree with Cap. SALT is behind us. Anything we do should be based on technical considerations. We need a plan to deal with the reactions, however. The sooner we deploy the 131st bomber, the better. I would rather have NATO shoot at us and have us defend our actions than have them go after a decision that you have not made. We are in an excellent position. The Allies are in no position to raise the issue. But they will anyhow. We need to be able to answer the issues they do raise. We need to have the plane come out as soon as possible. Submarines should be handled as the Navy sees fit. We need to be prepared to explain why the boat you didn’t break up differs from the one that you did. We don’t want to be in a position of deliberately going over a limit, but we want to do what’s right militarily. We have Congressional and Allied problems and will get roughed up by the Soviet Union and by the Canadians [Note: refers to Canadian concern with the domestic political problems of testing ALCM over Canada if the US moves beyond SALT II sublimits]. But we are in a good position to handle it. (S)

Weinberger: We are ginning up two to three pages of arguments. (U)

Shultz: You supply the arguments and we will put them out. (U)

The President: What about our friends over there facing elections? Are we in conformity with what the Soviets are doing on SALT II? I know we are not up to them on numbers. (S)

Weinberger: The Soviets have 70 SS–25s deployed. Each is a violation of the Treaty. That’s much more than what we are doing. (S)

Crowe: In the past decisions were made based on a mix of politics, arms control and strategy. Now the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Naval Operations agree we should go ahead with overhauling submarines. We are below our DE [damage expectancy] requirements on soft targets. We will get at least six years from the submarines after overhaul. The B–52s are also needed. The submarines involved will be in overhaul for 30 months. Their military contribution will be a modest one once they come out, but it is important. Yes, we want to go forward. (S)

The President: We will have to make a statement. We should talk about restraint. SALT II was never ratified. We and the Soviets made certain agreements but the Soviets went beyond the limits they had agreed to. Yes this will put us above SALT II, but we are beyond the overages of SALT just as the Soviets are. We will match what they do. (S)

Weinberger: Our actions must be compared to what they have done with the SS–25s. We can provide analysis on this. (S)

Crowe: What we are doing is proportionate and appropriate. We clearly can do this. (C)

Miller: Are they really appropriate responses? (U)

Shultz: We made the SALT decision. Our modernization and our military plans have to press forward. We should avoid comparisons with SALT. (S)

The President: I never liked SALT. (C)

Crowe: Both the Navy and the Air Force want to go forward irrespective of SALT. Both looked at the issue with no SALT in mind. (C)

The President: We can say it’s hypocritical to continue to talk about SALT when the Soviets abandoned it long ago. (C)

Crowe: The Soviets have increased well above the 2504 level of SALT II. (C)

Shultz: We will draft a statement. We will [have] problems with the Congress and the Allies and will need to work with Congress. (C)⁵

The President: This will be an interesting fight with Congress. It was a Democratic Senate that refused to ratify the SALT II Treaty. (U)

Shultz: The best way is to argue that the United States has a strong modernization program and a new arms control proposal. Our strategy is working. Reykjavik got placed on the table stuff that we had never been able to put on the table before. (S)

Keel: We can put together the arguments. We need to inform the Allies and Congress. Senators Nunn and Warner and Congressmen Wright and Aspin have all asked for material on this subject. We need to go to them first. (C)

Shultz: It is important that we be able to explain how we differentiate the submarines of last May from the submarines of this November. (S)

Crowe: That isn’t easy to explain. (U)

Weinberger: We can do so on a broad basis however. (U)

Crowe: We are not modernizing the Poseidon (C–3) missile; we are just keeping it in existence. It has less range, accuracy, etc. than we need. (C)

Weinberger: The argument is a platform with 16 tubes of deterrence. We have got all the material we need; we have got lots of material. [Note: Comment appears to be a non sequitur and may have been improperly recorded.] (S)

Adelman: We should not speak in terms of violating SALT II. We made a political commitment the Soviets were not willing to match. Now we are moving past that commitment. Arms control should look forward not backward. The Soviets assume that SALT II is over. A good line for us to take is that we “hope this is the last treaty they ever violate”. (S)

Miller: Our concern must be national security. What does this do to Cap’s [Weinberger] budget next year? What will happen to the DOD budget? (C)

Weinberger: We are not going to get any more by following the wishes of those who don’t support us. There are no increased dollars to be gained by reversing the President’s May decision. (U)

The President: If the submarines are not going to be able to come back on line for 30 months, do we have to deal with this issue now? (U)

Crowe: Yes we must make a decision now. (U)

Regan: We should get a decision paper now. It should include Congressional strategy. (C)

The President: Yes, meetings with Congress are needed. (U)

Keel: We will have a decision paper for you tomorrow. (U)

Weinberger: I will get our arguments over tonight. (U)

The President: Gorbachev opened a wide door to make public opinion aware of the actual facts on this subject. (U)

Dr. Keel then drew the meeting to a close.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–111, NSPG 0140, 11/25/1986. Secret. Prepared by Brooks. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. All brackets, except those indicating added material, are in the original text.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. At 12:05 p.m. that day, Reagan spoke to reporters in the Briefing Room, where he discussed preliminary findings of Meese’s review of the National Security Council’s role in Iran Contra, and announced the resignation of Poindexter and North. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1986, Book II, pp. 1587)
4. Attached but not printed. See Tab II, Document 159.
5. Brackets added by the editor.