Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

163. Electronic Message From William Cockell of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, November 25, 1986, 10:51 a.m.

SUBJECT

• NSPG on 131st Bomber

Re Bob’s note,² on the SSBN issue we are potentially subject to criticism on several points:

— That it is unilateral, uncompensated force reduction. (Answer is that, without dismantlement, the boats remain accountable forces for which we would get credit in any subsequent negotiated reduction. We should not make this prominent part of rationale; but it answers the conservative argument.)

— That there is valid, continuing and significant military requirement for the boats. JCS are the key here. The argument is a weak one unless you accept all the premises which underlie our current targeting concepts. JSTPS will find a use for every warhead and still complain there aren’t enough. Whether the two SSBNs fill a “real world” requirement is another question, however.

— That the warheads concerned are “cheap.” They are “cheap” only to the extent that they fill a valid military requirement; so the outcome of this argument hinges on the outcome to the prior one.

— That we shouldn’t give up SLBM warheads so long as SSBNs remain the most survivable TRIAD leg and we have problems with B–1 penetrability and ICBM survivability. However you put it, the issue is still one of military requirement for the particular type of capability which the warheads in question offer. This is the sort of issue that NSDD–250³ response should shed some light on. Meantime, it is a valid observation, but doesn’t help much with the decision on these two boats.

In addition to Nitze, Perle feels strongly that the boats should be retained, and he claims that with the replacement of Watkins by Trost, the Navy now supports retention.

Bottom line is that Bob’s advice is sound. I would not go for a decision today but use the NSPG to get exposure of all positions, then review the bidding and make a decision. If the President is going to go against military advice on this issue (assuming the Chiefs do, in fact, oppose decommissioning) it should be done with thoughtful consideration of how to present the decision so it does not contribute to the perception of White House/JCS dissension, or waffling on the interim restraint decision.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–111, NSPG 0140, 11/25/1986. No classification marking. Copies were sent to McDaniel, Linhard, and Keel.
2. Not further identified.
3. See Document 152.