Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

161. Memorandum From Linton Brooks and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, November 24, 1986

SUBJECT

• NSPG Meeting on Interim Restraint, Tuesday, November 25, 1986—Talking Points on Presentation

Attached at Tab I are some suggestions on presenting a possible approach, which we understand you have discussed with Al Keel, to decommission, but not to dismantle HAMILTON and USS WOODROW WILSON, rather than to overhaul them. Talking Points for explaining this approach are at Tab II.

Recommendations

That you approve the approach provided at Tab I.²

That you use the talking points at Tab II in explaining the approach during the NSPG.³

Will Tobey concurs. Steve Steiner and Sven Kraemer are on travel.

Tab I

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

Announcement and Presentation Strategy

Basic message to convey:

— We made a military/fiscal decision not to overhaul two older submarines in order to free funds for other uses.

— We did not make a SALT compliance decision; there is no SALT Treaty to comply with.

Sequence of Events:

— Tuesday 25 November—NSPG Meeting, Presidential decision

— Late Wednesday 26 November—Calls by Keel/Poindexter to key Congressional leaders

— Friday 28 November—Speakes make (or post) following announcement:

“After consulting with his senior advisors on Defense funding needs for the remainder of this fiscal year, the President has decided to retire rather than overhaul two Poseidon ballistic missile submarines, USS ALEXANDER HAMILTON (SSBN–617), previously planned for overhaul this month, and USS WOODROW WILSON (SSBN–624), previously scheduled for overhaul in June 1987. This decision reflects the President’s May 27, 1986 decision that current and future decisions reflecting our strategic forces must be based on overall U.S. military requirements and the threat we face. The retirements will free approximately one-quarter of a billion dollars to be applied to high priority personnel and readiness needs. Retirement of these 23-year old submarines is consistent with the long-standing U.S. policy to exercise utmost restraint in strategic forces. Since the submarines will not be dismantled incident to their retirement, this decision does not alter U.S. plans to pass out of technical observance of SALT II when the 131st ALCM-equipped B–52 deploys later this year.”

Additional details would be provided by DOD.

— Friday 12 December (NAC)—Secretary Shultz mention to his counterparts that 131st bomber will deploy in next few days, stressing that (1) we cannot technically observe a treaty the Soviets have violated, but (2) the President’s November decision to retire Poseidon submarines demonstrates our restraint and (3) the President remains committed to his May 27th pledge not to deploy more SNDVs or ballistic missile RVs than does the Soviet Union.

— Monday 15 December—DOD include in their routine press handout (the one that announces contracts, etc) that the 131st ALCM-carrying B–52 has rejoined the operational forces.

Additional Considerations

Both in response to questions and in background discussions we will need to be consistent in dealing with two questions:

Since dismantlement costs so little more, why not dismantle these submarines?

We should not imply there is an operational reason or that we are preserving these ships as a hedge against recommissioning; we are not. Rather we should face the issue squarely and say that the President was unwilling to spend money to establish a dangerous precedent for the future by appearing to reverse the May 27 decision not to remain in technical observance of SALT II. We should then rehearse all the reasons why selective compliance with parts of a treaty is bad.

Why did we dismantle the submarines in May, since the same logic applies?

We should state that dismantlement was part of those planned retirements and we elected not to disrupt the process by changing established plans. We are changing the process now to avoid the dangerous precedent noted above.

Tab II

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁵

Washington, undated

Announcement and Presentation Talking Points

— I would like to turn to how we might present an approach such as we have been discussing. I think we would need to convey two basic messages:

— We made a military/fiscal decision not to overhaul two older submarines in order to free funds for other uses.

— We did not make a SALT compliance decision; there is no SALT Treaty to comply with.

— I would foresee the following sequence of events:

— Late tomorrow Al Keel or I would make calls to key Congressional leaders explaining the decision and ensuring it was seen in context of the messages we want to convey.

— Friday Larry Speakes would make (or post) a brief announcement, relating this to the Defense Department need for supplemental funding for personnel and readiness. He would note that, since the submarines will not be dismantled incident to their retirement, this decision does not alter U.S. plans to pass out of technical observance of SALT II when the 131st ALCM-equipped B–52 deploys later this year. Additional questions would be referred to DOD.

— At the NAC on 12 December Secretary Shultz would mention to his counterparts that the 131st bomber will deploy in next few days, stressing that (1) we cannot technically observe a treaty the Soviets have violated, but (2) the President’s November decision to retire Poseidon submarines demonstrates our restraint and (3) the President remains committed to his May 27th pledge not to deploy more SNDVs or ballistic missile RVs than does the Soviet Union.

— On 15 December—or whatever the appropriate time is after the NAC—DOD would include in their routine daily press handout a statement that the 131st ALCM-carrying B–52 has rejoined the operational forces.

— I think we will also need to ensure we are all consistent in dealing with two questions:

— Since dismantlement costs so little more than decommissioning, some will ask why do we not dismantle these submarines.

— We should not imply there is an operational reason or that we are preserving these ships as a hedge against recommissioning; we are not. Rather we should face the issue squarely and say that the President was unwilling to spend money to establish a dangerous precedent for the future by appearing to reverse the May 27 decision not to remain in technical observance of SALT II. We should then rehearse all the reasons why selective compliance with parts of a treaty is bad.

— We might then be asked, why we did dismantle the submarines in May, since the same logic applies?

— I think we should state that dismantlement was part of those planned retirements and we elected not to disrupt the process by changing established plans. We are changing the process now to avoid the dangerous precedent noted above.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–111, NSPG 0140, 11/25/1986. Secret. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Cockell.
2. Poindexter approved the recommendation.
3. Poindexter approved the recommendation.
4. Secret.
5. Secret.