Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

16. Talking Points Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

Talking Points on the Offense/Defense Relationship

— In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s the United States developed a view on the relationship between offensive and defensive strategic arms:

— Missile defenses should be limited to the lowest possible level, since deployment of defenses would simply stimulate offsetting expansion of offenses, to the net benefit of no one.

— With defensive systems severely limited, it would be possible to place comparably low limits on strategic offensive forces, and to establish a reliable deterrent balance at reduced levels.

— This thinking underlay the negotiation of the ABM Treaty in 1972. It made sense then. But a number of subsequent developments have caused us to rethink this question of the relationship between offense and defense:

— First, although missile defenses have been held to a low level, we have been unable to get any meaningful constraints on offensive forces. Not only have there been no reductions, agreements have permitted Soviet offensive weapons to reach exceedingly high levels. The number and power of Soviet ballistic missile warheads has grown by a factor of four since the strategic arms talks began.

— Second, the Soviets have put special emphasis on systems which have the capability for a devastating attack on our missile silos and command and control facilities.

— Third, the Soviet Union has not only taken full advantage of the deployments permitted by the ABM Treaty and exploited technical ambiguities, but has also taken steps that are almost certainly in violation of the Treaty—particularly the construction of a large radar near Krasnoyarsk.

— Finally, in 1972 there was not much of an alternative. The defenses we could envision could be offset, at much lower cost, by expanded offenses. Today, new technologies open up the possibility of defenses that may not be easily and cheaply overcome.

— Taking into account this new situation, we are developing a new conception of the offense/defense relationship. Last week in Geneva we began the process of exposing the Soviet Union to our ideas.²

— Since we do not now know whether our research program will result in effective defenses and cannot predict when such defenses might be ready for deployment, our concept includes three phases:

(1) The Immediate Future

— The initial period will probably continue for perhaps 10 years or more. Its duration will depend on the progress of the SDI research program.

— During this period, while we are investigating SDI technologies, deterrence will continue to rest almost exclusively on offensive nuclear retaliatory capabilities.

— Our near term objective is to restore the situation envisioned in the 1970’s: sharply reduced offensive forces, and full compliance with the ABM Treaty.

(2) The Intermediate Period

— We look forward to a period of transition, beginning possibly 10 years from now, when we move toward a more defense reliant posture.

— This transition period would begin once we successfully develop a defensive system that is effective, can survive an attack against it, and is cost-effective. Such a defense could enable us to base our security less on threatening other countries and more on defending our own.

— This period could be of indefinite duration, until both the technical and political conditions exist for the total elimination of nuclear arms.

(3) The Ultimate Period

— Our ultimate goal is the elimination of nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A nuclear free world is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

— Even after the achievement of complete elimination of existing nuclear arms, the technical knowledge of how to make such weapons would continue, and the danger of cheating or irresponsible elements would need to be dealt with.

— For this reason, we stress the importance of development of non-nuclear forces, including non-nuclear defenses. The primary emphasis of the SDI is on non-nuclear systems.

— This approach is feasible only if we are successful in creating defenses that are survivable and cost effective (that is, cannot be offset by lower cost offensive countermeasures). Otherwise they would contribute in instability rather than stability. This is the objective of the SDI.

— While our approach requires a long look into the future, we have offered to begin now to discuss with the Soviets the implications of new defensive technologies.

— We believe both sides have an interest in an answer to the question of whether defensive technologies could make feasible a move away from basing security almost exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation.

— Indeed, the Soviet Union has historically shown a greater interest in strategic defenses than the United States, and deploys the world’s only operational ABM system. They also have a strategic defense research program which is exploring many of the same technologies as the SDI.

— If particular technologies prove feasible, we intend to discuss with our Allies and with the Soviets how they could be incorporated into a more stable balance before we take steps to deploy them.

— The transition to a more stable and reliable strategic relationship based upon greater reliance on defenses should be a cooperative effort between the United States and the Soviet Union.

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament Records, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Lot 01D127, Papers for DepSec Ken Dam, 1983–1985. No classification marking. Drafted on January 15 by Timbie. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the talking points. In a January 15 handwritten note, McKinley wrote: “15 Jan Talking Points for the Secretary’s use at Lunch today. Timbie drafted, Ken Dam and Paul Nitze cleared. BMCK” A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw McKinley’s note. (Ibid.) No record was found of Shultz’s lunch on January 15.
2. See footnote 2, Document 9.