15. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Courtney) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)1
SUBJECT
- Scowcroft and Komer on Defense Policy
Following my debate with Brookings’ Mike McGuire this morning at the Williamsburg Seminar for New Members of the 99th Congress,2 Brent Scowcroft, Bob Komer, and others discussed defense policy. Several comments were of interest.
Brent Scowcroft. Except for the B–1, Reagan’s strategic program is almost identical to Carter’s. Executive-Congressional relations are poor: Congress is not brought in early by DoD in defense planning, and it reacts by micro-managing. The Scowcroft Commission got “wonderful cooperation” from Congress, but government by commission is a “lousy way” to do business. SDI research is a good thing, but the purpose of Reagan’s program is unclear. Is it to: 1) make nuclear weapons obsolete, 2) limit damage, 3) provide thin defense against small attacks, or 4) defend offensive forces? Nuclear-armed SLCMs will put the U.S. at a net disadvantage in five years since our coastline is open and our cities are near it; the opposite holds for the USSR.
Bob Komer. Actual defense spending by Reagan has been less than what Carter had planned. We are spending too much on strategic forces: we don’t need a B–1 and a Stealth, nor MX on top of Trident and B–1. Defense investment by Reagan is four times greater for nuclear than for conventional forces. Congressional funding for readiness, sustainability, mobility, and bases is inadequate. Defense management under Reagan has been the “weakest in history;” Weinberger simply adds up the requests of the services. We need a thorough defense reform, including a professional defense procurement agency to replace the “amateurish” efforts of the services. Our NATO allies and the USSR have such agencies; only we don’t. For 25 years we have overinvested in airlift at the expense of rapid sealift: a C–5 carries only one Abrams tank, a rapid sealift vessel carries over 150. We’ve got to stop thinking unilaterally, and think about alliances. In our last two unilateral efforts—Korea and Vietnam—we tied one and lost one.