Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

17. Letter From Senators Steven Symms and John East to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 18, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

A crucial decision point nears for you over whether or not the United States should continue to comply precisely with the unratified SALT II Treaty, which you have already certified to Congress the Soviets are violating in multiple ways.² We believe that an historical evaluation of the purported national security “benefits” of the unratified SALT II Treaty is needed. We have carefully conducted such an evaluation, and we wish to share it with the Executive Branch. In sum, we have found that there is now historical evidence that the Senate Armed Services Committee was correct in December, 1979 when it concluded by overwhelming majority vote that the proposed SALT II Treaty “was not in the national security interest of the United States.”

I. OVERALL SUMMARY

In fact, Mr. President, our analysis confirms that the Soviet Union has built up its strategic forces during the period of the 1979 SALT II Treaty through the end of 1985 to a level much higher than the Joint Chiefs of Staff predicted in 1978 that the Soviets would have by the end of 1985, even if no SALT II Treaty had been agreed upon. In contrast, the U.S. will have strategic forces by the end of 1985 even lower than the Joint Chiefs of Staff predicted in 1978 that we would have by the end of 1985, even within SALT II constraints.

II. SOURCES AND ANALYTICAL ASSUMPTIONS

These significant conclusions about the negative impact on American national security resulting from U.S. unilateral compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty are two of the seven conclusions we have derived from our analysis of authoritative, official, classified documents. Our conclusions confirm your own statement on August 18, 1980: “I cannot, however, agree to any treaty, including the SALT II Treaty, which in effect legitimizes the continuation of a one-sided arms build-up.”³

We have long had in our possession a document written by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 4, 1978 entitled Illustrative U.S. and Soviet Strategic Forces Through 1985 (With and Without a SALT II Agreement),⁴ classified Top Secret Sensitive. This is an important historical document, because it was used in 1978 and 1979 in the U.S. decision-making and negotiating on SALT II. We can now in 1985 evaluate retrospectively how accurate U.S. intelligence and planning assumptions were in 1978, and make an overall assessment of the actual national security effects of SALT II from an historical perspective. This JCS document is Attachment A. We also have various classified DIA estimates of Soviet strategic force structures, and classified Defense Department tabulations of U.S. strategic force programs. Our chart and footnotes based upon our classified DIA and DOD documentary sources are Attachment B.⁵

We recognize that our estimate of Soviet forces at the end of 1985 differs somewhat from agreed Executive Branch National Intelligence Estimates. This is largely because we believe we have tried to take account of certain of the military effects of some of the Soviet SALT II violations. Regrettably, we have still not received the Executive Branch’s assessment of the military implications of Soviet SALT II violations which we requested last March 1, 1984. Accordingly, we have done our own assessment, which we believe to be reasonable and soundly based on classified documents.

Several assumptions underlying our charts should be specified at the outset. First and most significantly, we are counting 382 Backfire bombers and their weapons in the Soviet force totals for the end of 1985. We believe this is completely reasonable because you yourself stated in the nationally televised debate on October 30, 1980:⁶

SALT II is illegal, because the law of the land, passed by Congress, says we cannot accept a treaty in which we are not equal, and we’re not equal in this treaty for one reason alone: our B–52 bombers are considered to be strategic weapons; their Backfire bombers are not.

This is a strong indication that the Reagan Administration should count the Soviet Backfire bomber in its SALT II estimates, as well as in START and umbrella talks proposals. Moreover, the 1981 edition of the official DOD Soviet Military Power⁷ states on page 63 that the range of the Backfire bomber is in excess of 8,900 kilometers, and on page 62 it states that the range of the Bison bomber is only 8,000 kilometers. The Bison counts as an intercontinental bomber in SALT II, and the longer range Backfire should therefore also count. Further, the Soviets tried to deceive the U.S. on whether the Backfire was an intercontinental bomber, despite its range and refueling capabilities, another reason for counting it.

Second, we are counting in Soviet forces at the end of 1985 at least 40 SS–16 mobile ICBM launchers, because on January 23, 1984⁸ you informed Congress that the mobile SS–16 ICBM is “probably deployed” operationally.

Third, as required by Article VI 1. of the SALT II Treaty itself, we are counting at the end of 1985 those Soviet weapons “in the final stage of construction” and “undergoing overhaul, repair, modernization, or conversion.” There are indications of silo and mobile deployment of the SS–25, and SS–11 silo conversion for the SS–24. Thus about 100 more SS–25 mobile ICBMs and 50 SS–24 silo-based ICBMs are estimated for the end of 1985 in the final phase of construction, modernization, or conversion.

Finally, we have used the maximum demonstrated warhead capacities for MIRVed Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs, because we believe that this is the only rational way to measure the real Soviet threat. It should be noted, however, that we are not counting large numbers of refire and stockpiled missiles, so our estimates do in fact significantly understate the full Soviet threat.

Comparing the JCS document and the DIA/DOD chart attached, we have reached the following summary conclusions expressed in tabular and in percentage statement format:

III. SUMMARY OF THE EFFECTS OF SALT II ON U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES AS PREDICTED BY JCS IN 1978

1978	U.S. Forces Soviet Forces	SNDVs9	Warheads
Maximum Estimated in 1978 for 1985, with SALT II	U.S. Forces Soviet Forces	[column not declassified]	[column not declassified]
Maximum Estimated in 1978 for 1985, no SALT II	U.S. Forces Soviet Forces
End of 1985 estimated	U.S. Forces Soviet Forces

Summary Statements

1. In 1978, the JCS estimated that Soviet SNDVs would decrease 12% with SALT II, and increase 17% without SALT II. In actuality, they probably increased by about 25%.

2. In 1978, the JCS estimated that Soviet warheads would increase by 95% with SALT II, and increase by 153% without SALT II. In actuality, they probably increased by about 206%. This is our most important conclusion.

3. In 1978, the JCS estimated that U.S. SNDVs would increase by 2% with SALT II, and increase by 18% without SALT II. In actuality, they decreased by 9%.

4. In 1978, the JCS estimated that U.S. warheads would increase by 51% with SALT II, and increase by 95% without SALT II. In actuality, they remained almost constant, rising only 2%.

Our summary conclusions are consistent with what Defense Secretary Weinberger stated in the Washington Times on December 20, 1984:

Improvements and additions to the Soviet missile force continue at a frightening pace, even though we have added SALT II restraints on top of SALT I agreements. The Soviet Union has built more of the big nuclear warheads capable of destroying U.S. missiles in their concrete silos than we had initially predicted they would build, even without any SALT agreement. We now confront precisely the situation that the SALT process was intended to prevent.

IV. DETAILED CONCLUSIONS

We would now present seven more detailed conclusions derived from a careful comparison of the 1978 JCS document and our own DIA/DOD chart. First, we estimate that by the end of 1985, when the unratified SALT II Treaty is due to expire, the Soviets will have about [number not declassified] Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, carrying about [number not declassified] warheads. But the 1978 JCS document reveals that the JCS estimated then that the highest force levels that the Soviets could achieve by the end of 1985, in the absence of the SALT II Treaty, was only [number not declassified] strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, carrying only [number not declassified] warheads.

The JCS were evidently relying upon CIA estimates of Soviet forces in 1985 unconstrained by SALT II. These CIA estimates, as throughout the 1960s and 1970s, turned out to significantly understate the force levels the Soviets probably will have achieved by late 1985. Comparing the JCS document to our estimate table, we find that the Soviets will probably be about 207 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 2,278 warheads above the highest levels that the JCS in 1978 estimated for the Soviets at the end of 1985 without a SALT II Treaty.¹⁰ We believe a new Team B critique of CIA estimates is needed because the 1976 competitive estimates evidently did not improve the accuracy of CIA estimates.

This is the clearest evidence yet that the Soviets did not allow their strategic programs to be affected in any way by SALT II, and that since 1979 they have been “Breaking Out” of SALT II. We recall [1½ lines not declassified] that the SALT I Interim Agreement of 1972 similarly did not affect the Soviet ICBM and SLBM production and deployment plans throughout the 1970s. But some of this evidence was long suppressed within the Intelligence Community, and the analysis is not widely known. We call your attention to the June 1978 CIA intelligence study entitled The Soviet Strategic Planning Process and SALT, [less than 1 line not declassified]. This document has been made available to us, and we urge you to become familiar with it as well. It also indicates that the late Soviet President Brezhnev himself negotiated deceptively in order to protect Soviet programs from constraint, while at the same time misleading the U.S. into believing that SALT I would constrain Soviet programs. The JCS and Congress were not aware of this evidence in 1972, consequently the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement were ratified under false pretenses.

Second, we estimate on the basis of secret Defense program data that by late 1985, the U.S. aggregate of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles will be only about [number not declassified] carrying only about [less than 1 line not declassified]. But the JCS estimated in 1978 that if the U.S. complied with SALT II, the lowest our strategic nuclear delivery vehicle aggregate would go was [number not declassified] by 1985.

We are thus now about [number not declassified] strategic nuclear delivery vehicles below the lowest U.S. force level estimated for 1985 to be in compliance with SALT II. Moreover, this strategic nuclear delivery vehicle aggregate will carry only about [less than 1 line not declassified] by the end of 1985, which is only [less than 1 line not declassified] above our January 1978 level, and [less than 1 line not declassified] below the lowest U.S. warhead aggregate projected for the U.S. for the end of 1985 in compliance with SALT II.

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

By complying unilaterally with an unratified SALT II Treaty which you have certified the Soviets have violated in four ways, the U.S therefore forfeited potential deployment over the six years of SALT II of about [number not declassified] SNDVs carrying about [less than 1 line not declassified]. This is a measure of the security costs of our unilateral compliance and de facto unilateral disarmament and appeasement. These [number not declassified] SNDVs carrying [less than 1 line not declassified] could have bolstered deterrence and mitigated the Soviet build-up.

Fourth, it is interesting to compare these U.S. forfeitures through SALT II compliance with the force levels the Soviets will probably achieve by the end of 1985 by SALT II breakout. Considering the highest SNDV/warhead aggregate that the JCS projected in 1978 for the Soviets by the end of 1985 within SALT II constraints, the Soviets have added about [number not declassified] SNDVs and [number not declassified] warheads above those levels. Thus the Soviets are much higher than estimated even if they were adhering to SALT II. Moreover, the Soviet increment above SALT II ceilings is comparable to the increment the U.S. forfeited by agreeing to comply unilaterally with the unratified SALT II Treaty.

Fifth, considering SNDV/Warhead levels estimated for the Soviets by the JCS as of January, 1978, the Soviets will have added [number not declassified] SNDVs carrying [number not declassified] warheads during the 1979–1985 period of SALT II. This is a very significant increase in the threat to America. As you stated in your January 9, 1985 press conference, “SALT II is nothing but a limitation on how fast you increase weapons.”¹¹

Sixth, the Carter era General Davy Jones JCS document reveals that the Carter JCS planned to retain all U.S. Titan II ICBMs and B–52D bombers in the U.S. SNDV aggregate through 1985 under SALT II. But in addition to the above forfeiture, the JCS under the Reagan Administration will have unilaterally scrapped almost all of these systems by end of 1985, and in addition all [less than 1 line not declassified], for a total of [less than 1 line not declassified] the U.S. unilaterally deactivated during U.S. unilateral SALT II compliance. Moreover, the Carter JCS planned [number not declassified] MX ICBMs, and you plan only [number not declassified]. And the Carter JCS projected deployment of [number not declassified] SS–16s. This may turn out to be indeed accurate.

Seventh, the January 4, 1978 JCS document reveals several more important CIA underestimates. For example, the CIA estimated that by 1985, each Soviet SS–18 would carry only 10 warheads if SALT II were in force, yet DIA now estimates that each SS–18 carries 14 warheads. This is another example of important CIA underestimates of Soviet force capabilities illustrated in the JCS document, such as in the low number of warheads estimated for new Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs.

V. RESTATEMENT

In sum, the Soviet strategic build-up from 1978 through 1985 occurred ostensibly within SALT II, but was in fact, much greater than that projected for the Soviets without SALT II. Our conclusion confirms Defense Secretary Weinberger’s statement in the FY1985 Defense Posture Statement: “The SALT II Agreement would have codified that unilateral Soviet buildup and allowed additional growth in Soviet forces, thereby permitting even further deterioration of the military balance.”

As a Soviet foreign policy expert wrote in 1979:

. . . signing of the (SALT I) Interim Agreement (was a) victory of the Soviet Union in the arms race. . . (the) 1972 Moscow agreements, like the Vladivostok agreement, noted the defeat of the American strategic arms race policy.

Because the Vladivostok agreement was the basis for the SALT II Treaty and was incorporated into SALT II, the Soviets believe that both SALT I and SALT II were victories for the USSR and defeats for the U.S.

Finally, although we recognize and fully support the need to protect intelligence sources and methods and defense information about our own forces, we also believe that it is imperative for the American people to have a general understanding of the massive increase in Soviet nuclear arms which has occurred during the period of alleged Soviet adherence to SALT II, and that they know also the enormous advantages which the U.S. has denied itself through a policy of vacillation based on strict compliance with an unratified treaty our opponents are known to be violating at will. Continued silence on these matters is intolerable. The adverse balance entails both political and military risks. As relative Soviet power continues to increase, the Soviets expect the U.S. and its allies to move increasingly toward appeasement.

VI. REQUESTS

In conclusion, we have several questions and requests. First, we ask whether you and your departments and agencies are concerned about our analysis and conclusions. We request their comments. Second, we request that our analysis, data, and conclusions be incorporated into the March 1985 forthcoming unclassified fourth edition of the Defense Department’s Soviet Military Power volume in order to more realistically portray the Soviet threat. We intend to sanitize and declassify this letter and elements of the accompanying documentation ourselves, for public release soon, before the Senate’s MX debate. Third, we request that you consider our analysis, conclusions, and amendments in your forthcoming decision about whether to continue U.S. unilateral compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty. Fourth, we request that your Administration prepare witnesses to send to hearings on the Constitutional aspects of the treaty-making powers as applied to arms control. We are considering holding such hearings. We also intend to seek another Senate test vote on the merits of U.S. compliance with SALT II. (See attached amendments.)¹²

We seek to support your defense budget request and your strategic modernization program, including MX, but in the context of U.S. disavowal of unilateral compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty which you have confirmed the Soviets are violating in multiple ways. We are extremely concerned that the Soviets have built up their strategic forces during the period of SALT II through late 1985 to a much higher level than we thought they would even without SALT II.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

• Steve Symms
  United States Senator
• John P. East
  United States Senator

1. Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1985, 20051–40100. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to McFarlane, Shultz, Weinberger, Vessey, Meese, Casey, Leonard Perroots, Adelman, Kirkpatrick, Graham, Armstrong, Campbell, Thurmond, Baker, Byrd, the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Judiciary, Intelligence, and Energy Committees, the Chairman of the Senate Defense Appropriation Subcommittee, the Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, the Members of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, and the Chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, Foreign Relations.
2. The President’s January 23, 1984, message and accompanying fact sheet are printed in Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book I, pp. 72–76.
3. Portions of the speech are printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 8.
4. Attached but not printed is a paper prepared in the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “Illustrative U.S. and Soviet Strategic Forces Through 1985 (With and Without a Salt Two Agreement),” January 4, 1978.
5. Attached but not printed is an undated chart: “Comparative U.S.-Soviet Strategic Force Structure.”
6. The debate was on October 28, 1980; the transcript is in Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book III, pp. 2476–2502.
7. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981).
8. See footnote 2, above.
9. Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles. [Footnote is in the original.]
10. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Documents 136–174.
11. Reference is to the President’s January 9 news conference. See Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book I, pp. 23–30.
12. Attached but not printed are the proposed amendments.