Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

154. Talking Points Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense¹

Washington, undated

Meeting with the President on ICBM Modernization

Talking Points:

○ We were on the right track with the President’s 1981 Strategic Modernization Decision.

— Develop and deploy 100 MX missiles.

— Initially deploy 40 in Minuteman silos and work on a more survivable basing mode for all 100 missiles.

○ But since 1982, Congress has acted to slow and divert this plan.

○ The recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission in 1983, in retrospect, initially were of limited usefulness and are now overtaken by events. Congress at first seemed to agree with Scowcroft Commission, but later limited MX to 50 missiles, and pushed hard for the Small ICBM.

○ For 1987 Congress has funded:

— Funded production of 12 Peacekeeper (we requested 21).

— Peacekeeper basing at $120M (we requested $389M).

— Development of the Small ICBM at $1.2B (we requested $1.4B).

○ President asked SecDef (NSDD–227)² to recommend the best options:

— Find a survivable basing mode for Peacekeeper;

— Examine the effectiveness of Peacekeeper/Small ICBM mixes (including a MIRVed Small ICBM).

— Make determination by 30 Nov and brief the NSC by 10 Dec.

○ Our decision criteria for selecting the most cost-effective basing options are:

— System chosen must contribute efficiently to our overall deterrence objectives, in a cost-effective fashion, and on a timely basis, without diverting funds from other key elements of our deterrence posture.³

— It should be resilient to changing Soviet threats.

— It should help maintain a diversity of US deterrent forces—a balanced Triad—so that no potential new vulnerability could affect all our forces (“not to put all our eggs in one basket”).

— Possible arms control effects.

○ Of the many peacekeeper mobile options we analyzed, four⁴ look best:

— Garrisoned rail mobile—$10–15B for over 20 years. (Chart I)⁵

— Requires hours of warning for survival like non alert bombers and submarines in port.

— Carry hard—shelter or tunnel—$20–25B for over 20 years. (Charts IIA and B)⁶

— Superhard looks good today ($8–10B), but vulnerable to improving accuracy. (Chart III)⁷

○ All Small ICBM options are inferior from cost-effectiveness point of view to equally survivable Peacekeeper options, although they are technically feasible.

— For example, even the least expensive option, a two warhead Small ICBM based at Minuteman sites would cost $33–39B for 500 warheads, while 500 equally survivable MX warheads would cost between $20B and $25B.⁸

○ Arms control implications:

— The arms control assumptions of the Scowcroft Commission that were adduced in favor of the single warhead Small ICBM are overtaken by events. The assumption was that both the US and the USSR might move toward mobile single warhead Small ICBMs, with the Soviets giving up the multiple warhead large ICBMs. This is an old SALT idea, predating SDI. Now, the Soviets are moving toward multiple warhead mobiles, and in any event, it is SDI and not our Small ICBM that provides the spur for the Soviets to talk seriously about arms reductions. It is in the Soviet interest to have us put our defense dollars in the costly Small ICBM, instead of into programs (such as SDI, stealth, etc.) that are of higher concern to them.

○ Conclusions:

— The Peacekeeper basing modes under consideration appear to have high potential. They offer significant improvements in survivability, at an affordable price, and can respond to a changing threat.

— Of particular interest is the possibility of applying the survivable MX basing mode eventually not just to the next 50 missiles, but to all 100 missiles. (Charts IVA and IVB)⁹

— Small missile is feasible and ready for development, but is much more costly than any of the Peacekeeper alternatives, with no extra benefits for arms control or survivability that would justify the extra $10 or $15B. In current Congressional climate, given pre-eminence of SDI as well as fiscal constraints, we should come out with a clear rationale why the small ICBM has been overtaken by events.

— There are a number of useful measures we could undertake to strengthen our deterrent with a fraction of the SICBM funding. For example, we could include the option of converting 50 Minuteman II to Minuteman III. (Chart V)¹⁰

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 857, Subject File, 1986 ICBM modernization #14–36 (2). Secret. The document notes that the meeting was scheduled for Tuesday, November 7, from 11 a.m. until noon in the Oval Office. Ikle sent the talking points to Weinberger under cover of a November 6 memorandum: “Attached are OSD suggested talking points for your meeting with the President on ICBM Modernization tomorrow. Dick Godwin reviewed the attached, and he will join the meeting scheduled tomorrow at 0830. Dick Godwin’s feeling is that you may not want to get into the last tick on page 3 of the talking points or the discussion of the ‘Congressional climate’ in the penultimate tick. Since it is a restricted meeting at the Oval Office, I feel these political aspects could well have a place. Fred” (Ibid.)
2. See Document 108.
3. Weinberger drew two vertical lines and a leftward facing arrow in the right-hand margin beside this point.
4. Weinberger drew two lines under “four.”
5. Chart I is attached but not printed. Weinberger wrote “1)” in the left-hand margin beside this point.
6. Charts IIA and B are attached but not printed. Weinberger wrote “2)” in the left-hand margin beside this point.
7. Chart III is attached but not printed. Weinberger wrote “3)” in the left-hand margin beside this point.
8. Weinberger underlined “500 equally survivable MX” and wrote “(50 Mis)” in the right-hand margin beside it. He also drew an arrow in the left-hand margin pointing to “$33–39B.” He also drew a bracket in the right-hand margin beside the entire bullet point.
9. Charts IVA and IVB are attached but not printed. Weinberger drew two short vertical lines and a rightward facing arrow in the left-hand margin of this section. He drew an upward facing diagonal line from the end of the section to the top of the page and wrote: “Retrofit [illegible] First 50.”
10. Chart V is attached but not printed. Weinberger drew a rightward facing arrow in the left-hand margin pointing to “SICBM.”