Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

153. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, November 5, 1986

SUBJECT

• Presidential Meeting on ICBM Modernization

In the memo at Tab III,² you proposed that the SecDef and yourself brief the President in early November on our options for basing Peacekeeper missiles and our options for the various configurations of the small ICBM. You further proposed that this meeting be followed by a more formal briefing in early December. The SecDef replied on 31 October (Tab IV)³ concurring with your recommendations and proposing that the December meeting take place in a luncheon meeting with the Chiefs at the Pentagon.

The first meeting with the President has now been scheduled for 11:00 a.m. this Friday,⁴ on NSC time. An appropriate meeting memo is at Tab I. Your talking points for the meeting are at Tab II and have been structured to place the President’s ICBM decisions in the context of the recent events in Iceland.

I have not yet developed the Schedule request for the more formal meeting in December. I believe that the meeting should be held here, not at the Pentagon, to ensure that all the appropriate senior members of the White House staff can attend. The Air Force expressed extreme sensitivity to the idea of the M–X and small ICBM decisions being the subject of a JCS meeting with the President. They have no problem with the Chairman, but did not feel that this decision is appropriate for a full meeting of the Chiefs. I spoke to Mike Donley about this, and he concurs.

We have scheduled an hour of your time tomorrow to discuss the details of our strategy for ICBM modernization and the sequence of events for Friday’s meeting with the President.

Also attached, at Tab V,⁵ for your information are the briefing charts used by the Air Force to brief the SecDef on these issues on 4 November 1986.

Bob Linhard, Bill Cockell, Mike Donley and Ron Sable concur.

Recommendations

1. That you sign the Meeting Memorandum at Tab I.⁶

2. That you approve of the concept of having the more formal meeting on NSC time in December, here at the White House.⁷

Tab I

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan⁸

Washington, undated

MEETING ON ICBM MODERNIZATION

I. PURPOSE

To meet with Secretary Weinberger to discuss the options for basing additional Peacekeeper missiles and the options for developing the small ICBM.

II. BACKGROUND

In 1984 your Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission) recommended that we place 100 Peacekeeper missiles in Minuteman silos and initiate development of a new small ICBM. Congress ultimately approved 50 of the 100 Peacekeepers, but refused further funding until we develop a more survivable basing mode. The results of our research on new basing modes is now complete. Secretary Weinberger will outline for you the top four candidate basing modes.

Our initial research on the small ICBM is also now complete. Secretary Weinberger will outline our options for developing this missile with one, two, or three warheads.

After these preliminary discussions on the 7th of November, the Secretary will return in early December with a more formal briefing and his recommendations.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President, Vice President Donald T. Regan, Secretary Weinberger, Admiral Crowe, John Poindexter, Al Keel, Bill Cockell, Bob Linhard, and John Douglass.

IV. PRESS PLAN

None.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

John Poindexter will open the meeting by outlining the issue and will call upon Secretary Weinberger to explain the options that will be presented to you more formally in December. After Secretary Weinberger’s remarks, you would respond with the remarks at Tab A. A general discussion would follow.

Tab A

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁹

Washington, undated

— Cap, I’m very pleased with the technical progress that you’ve made on both the Peacekeeper and the small ICBM.

— Our problems in ICBM modernization, however, have always been more political than technical.

— I believe that we must keep our Research and Development on all our ICBM and SLBM programs healthy until we see how far the Soviets will go towards the elimination of all ballistic missiles.

— Anyone else have any comments?

Tab II

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council¹⁰

Washington, undated

Talking Points for Adm. Poindexter
on
Peacekeeper/Small ICBM Options

— Mr. President, Cap and I thought it would be helpful if we spent a few moments outlining the decision process that will lead up to your decisions on Peacekeeper basing and the configuration of the small ICBM.

— Before Cap runs through the alternatives, however, I felt it might be helpful to quickly discuss how our ICBM programs will be affected by the Arms Control situation we see after Iceland.

— Some opponents may try to use Iceland against us to assert that since we are proposing zero ballistic missiles by 1997, we should stop our ballistic missile research programs, i.e., the Peacekeeper, the small ICBM, and the D–5.

— We, of course, need to continue these programs to give incentive to the Soviets to reach agreement, and we may want to deploy limited numbers of these new systems prior to 1996 even if we reach an agreement with the Soviets to eliminate all ballistic missiles by 1996.

— Cap and Admiral Crowe are analyzing our options in this regard now and will have a position prepared on this later this year.

— Cap, why don’t you run through the options on both the Peacekeeper and the small ICBM for the President.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Alton Keel Files, Subject File, ICBM Modernization. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
2. Attached but not printed; see Document 145.
3. Attached but not printed; see footnote 5, Document 145.
4. November 7.
5. Not found attached.
6. Printed from a version on which Poindexter neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.
7. Printed from a version on which Poindexter neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.
8. Secret. Prepared by Douglass. Printed from an uninitialed copy. The document notes that the meeting was scheduled for November 7 from 11 until noon in the Oval Office.
9. No classification marking.
10. No classification marking.