Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva¹

330272.

Washington, October 22, 1986, 0311Z

SUBJECT

• (S) Additional Guidance for Defense and Space Negotiating Group.

REF:

• (A) State 291909;² (B) State 293566.³

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Following is additional guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group for Round VI, based on U.S. proposals made to the Soviet Union in Iceland meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev on October 11–12. This guidance is in addition to, and does not replace guidance for, D&S Negotiating Group of reftels (A) and (B) and previous rounds, except as specifically noted below.

3. The existing U.S. proposal as contained in previous guidance and in the President’s July 25 letter to General Secretary Gorbachev remains on the table.

4. Paragraph (4A) contains the initial Soviet proposal made in Reykjavik on the first day of the discussions. Paragraph (4B) provides the text of the first U.S. alternative proposal made by the President to General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik on the afternoon of the second day of discussions. Paragraph (4C) provides the text of the Soviet counterproposal made that same afternoon. Paragraph (4D) provides the text of the second and last U.S. alternative proposal made in writing by the President. These are provided for the information of the Negotiating Group.

A. Soviet proposal, a.m. October 11. For the purpose of strengthening the regime of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, which is of unlimited duration, an understanding shall be reached that the USSR and the USA undertake not to exercise their right to withdraw from that treaty for a period of ten years, and to strictly comply with all its provisions throughout that period. Testing in space of all missile-defense space elements shall be prohibited except for research and testing carried out in laboratories. This would not entail a ban on the testing of such fixed land-based systems and their components as are allowed under the ABM Treaty. Subsequently, within several years, the parties shall negotiate further mutually acceptable solutions in this area. The parties deem it appropriate to undertake additional efforts with a view to achieve mutually acceptable agreements banning anti-satellite systems.

B. First U.S.-proposal, p.m. October 12. Both sides would agree to confine themselves to research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, for a period of five years, through 1991, during which time a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals would be achieved. This being done, both sides would continue the pace of reductions with respect to all remaining offensive ballistic missiles with the goal of the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of the second five year period. As long as these reductions continue at the appropriate pace, the same restrictions will continue to apply. At the end of ten year period, with all offensive ballistic missiles eliminated, either side would be free to deploy defenses.

C. Soviet proposal, p.m. October 12. The USSR and the United States would undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions. The testing in space of all space components of missile defense is prohibited, except research and testing conducted in laboratories. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, the remaining 50 percent of the two sides’ strategic offensive arms shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated.

D. Second U.S. proposal, p.m. October 12. The USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, all remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated. At the end of the ten-year period, either side could deploy defenses if it so chose unless the parties agree otherwise.

5. Guidance on the U.S. proposals made at Reykjavik is under consideration in Washington, including additional analytical work. In the interim, the Negotiating Group should avoid discussion of the specifics of either of the U.S. proposals.

6. If questioned about the U.S. proposals made in Reykjavik, the U.S. Negotiating Group should respond that the U.S. intends to build upon the positive accomplishments of the Reykjavik meeting, and that the U.S. will be making a proposal in Geneva based on these accomplishments shortly. If asked whether the additional commitments suggested in the U.S. proposals discussed in Reykjavik depend upon other conditions, the Negotiating Group should note that in Reykjavik it was clear by the terms of the proposals made that the additional commitments included in the proposals tabled by the U.S. were strictly conditioned on the two sides’ reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement now on a schedule of reductions resulting in 50 percent reductions in the strategic offensive forces of both sides to equal levels by 1991 and total elimination of the offensive ballistic missiles of both sides by 1996.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy, Electronic Telegrams, D860801–0090. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted in the White House; cleared by Timbie, Vigdor Teplitz (ACDA/SP), Linhard, Pearson, and in S/S and S/S–O; approved by Adelman.
2. In telegram 291909 to NST Geneva, September 17, the Department transmitted the Defense and Space instructions for Round VI. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860705–0290)
3. In telegram 293566 to NST Geneva, September 18, the Department transmitted additional guidance for Round VI Defense and Space negotiations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860708–0824)