134. Memorandum for the Record1
SUBJECT
- Visit of Dr. Edward Teller, and Senators Boschwitz and Quayle with Secretary Shultz
Boschwitz said he had been impressed by the briefing he had received from Teller and thanked the Secretary for agreeing to meet with them. He thought it was important that the Secretary have the benefit of Teller’s ideas.
Teller said he had two points to make:
The first one related to the fact that the ABM Treaty permitted the United States to deploy 100 launchers and a number of radars in the Grand Forks area. He thought it was important to utilize this right; it could not only provide limited protection for a significant area of the United States but, more importantly, it would allow us to find out how effective various defenses can be. He would like to deploy at Grand Forks a number of different systems—perhaps as many as 8 to 14—of various types. Our program should not limit us more than does the Treaty.
[Page 461]Secretary Shultz made the point that what Teller suggests would be quite feasible if we were talking about a private corporation. The Government, however, has to operate within political and fiscal constraints. He agreed, however, with Teller’s point that one learns by doing. Shultz made the further point that if this were funded by adding the funds required to SDI, there was the real danger of killing SDI. He noted that there are those in favor of aborting the ABM Treaty, but it was the firm opinion of our military that the Treaty did more for us than it did for the Soviet Union.
Teller then got to his second point. He said the Soviet SA–12 was the focal point of his concern. He said it was excellent against airplanes and could make the airplane leg of our deterrent almost obsolete. The Pentagon thought the Stealth technology could avoid this; he knew something of that technology, and doubted that the Pentagon was correct. Teller went on to say that if our re-entry vehicles achieve 3 to 4 miles per second and if they are MARVed, then there is a question whether the SA–12 can still follow them. Teller said that is why Cap says the SA–12 will not provide them with an effective ABM defense. However, if the Soviets equip the SA–12 with a small warhead with [less than 1 line not declassified]—then the situation would be different. [less than 1 line not declassified] has no damaging effect upon people on the ground. At Los Alamos we are developing [less than 1 line not declassified] which is based upon [2 lines not declassified]. Los Alamos is about to ruin the project by making excessive demands on it; they wish to have it make [less than 1 line not declassified]. Teller thinks this is impossible. To make it accurate within a range [less than 1 line not declassified] is another matter. If the SA–12 were given such a capability it could catch up to a MARV [less than 1 line not declassified] and attack it effectively. The Soviets may have developed such a capability without our being able to detect it. They began building a facility at [less than 1 line not declassified] which we called [less than 1 line not declassified]. They put a [less than 1 line not declassified] or more into it. [less than 1 line not declassified]. It has been [less than 1 line not declassified]. The Soviets can probably now make a [less than 1 line not declassified].
Our SLBMs are our most reliable offensive weapons, and, at the time when they were themselves intending to launch and could expect retaliation, if the Soviets could localize an SLBM submarine within a hundred miles, a sea-based SA–12 would be effective in boost phase intercept.
Teller went on to say that whatever we do re a short range ABM will be effective on the high seas. If we could in the next five years deploy such weapons, the Israelis and Germans could make use of that technology. He said he did not mind taking one or two billion out of the MX program; at least one billion in the first year. Secretary Shultz asked [Page 462] him what the total cost of the program might be. He said it could be anything up to 50 billion. He said he could not make a precise estimate. If he tried to do so, he would be wrong. He mentioned that [2½ lines not declassified].
Secretary Shultz said he thought the basic problem was that we were not appropriating enough for defense or for the general support of our foreign policy; the Congress did not understand the seriousness of the Soviet problem.
Teller said that he thought the President’s decision to concentrate on non-nuclear defenses had made our development program chaotic and uncertain. Soviet efforts in this field may make U.S. attempts at retaliation in the ‘90s obsolete.
After Secretary Shultz left the meeting, I had a further discussion with Teller. He continued to emphasize how wrong he thought it was for the President to talk about the abolition of nuclear weapons. I emphasized that the President was serious about this as a long-term goal. I suggested that maybe the best way to get at what he, Teller, wanted to do was to get much more specific about the program. That would get it away from generalities. Teller said he did not want to do that. He thought that research and development should not exclude any possibilities. I said I had understood him to be recommending a deployment program. I saw no possibility of his getting the authorization and appropriations for such a program unless the SDIO were specific about the systems that he and they thought should be deployed and were persuaded as to their probable effectiveness. I asked Teller which system he thought had the best chance of being effective and therefore should be the first to be deployed. He said he would wish to deploy at least two types; one would be a [less than 1 line not declassified]; the other would be [less than 1 line not declassified]. Senator Quayle spoke highly of [less than 1 line not declassified]. I said I had had heard people in the SDIO also speak well of it. Teller continued to support [less than 1 line not declassified]. (I was told later by Linhard that [less than 1 line not declassified] is a system in which more modern technology has been applied to [less than 1 line not declassified] to reduce its size and cost and to increase its effectiveness.)