Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

133. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Paper on Restraints Associated with Your Proposal on Strategic Defense

ISSUE

Should you authorize me to issue amplified guidance on the proposal made in your July 25th letter to General Secretary Gorbachev?

DISCUSSION

In preparing the instructions² for the next round of the Nuclear and Space Talks which begins on September 18, some confusion has arisen on how to present the restraints that would operate if your recent proposal to Gorbachev on Defense and Space were accepted. To correct this, we have developed the paper attached at Tab A and worked it with the various agencies.

State would prefer no further guidance be issued at this time. This is largely because Paul Nitze believes that we should simply stay under the terms of the ABM Treaty all the way through the two years of negotiations called for by your new treaty. All others feel we need to be able to do some additional developmental work (currently not permitted by the terms of the ABM Treaty) during that two year negotiating period which would likely occur beginning in 1992. Because of this, I think that the paper makes a needed contribution and should be issued.

Within the paper, the only issue remaining is that the Secretary of Defense continues to feel that the correct interpretation of your letter is that we propose one treaty, negotiated now, that covers all aspects of the proposal—vice an agreement that has embedded in it a treaty which would be negotiated now, but not triggered until certain conditions are met after 1991. Cap argues that his interpretation is simpler both to explain and to implement. He has made this argument with you before. He is correct that it may simplify the explanation a bit. In theory, it also would make the mechanics of implementation more direct since we would seek to negotiate one treaty covering all aspects of the proposal applying to defenses and then work to ratify it as a treaty. The main problem with his approach is that it increases the likelihood of the headline “President proposes scrapping the ABM Treaty immediately” while decreasing our ability to deal with such an interpretation.

Cap would also like more elaboration of what you mean by a plan for eliminating ballistic missiles. This is a good idea. However, I think we need to issue now this guidance on restraints. Therefore, I would offer to Cap to have his staff (Richard Perle) work with ours (Bob Linhard) to develop a companion elaboration on what we have in mind in proposing the elimination of ballistic missiles, which we would issue as soon as it’s ready.

Tab A is the paper that I would recommend you authorize as guidance on restraints. If you agree, I would propose that I forward this paper under a cover memorandum from me in your name that informs agencies to treat this as guidance.

Attached at Tab B³ is an annotated rewrite of the SAGE 30 paper produced by OSD staff showing where material would be deleted (as indicated by [ ]) and where specific material would be added (as indicated by underlining) to conform the paper to Cap’s point of view on the issue of whether we want an agreement and a treaty (our current understanding of your proposal) or just one larger treaty (Cap’s understanding of your proposal). It is provided so you can fully understand what Cap has in mind.

RECOMMENDATION

OK NO

____ ____ That you authorize me to issue the paper at Tab A as guidance on this subject in your name.⁴

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁵

Washington, September 17, 1986

RESTRAINTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRESIDENT’S PROPOSAL ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE (U)

Purpose. This paper provides an elaboration of the restraint provisions implicit in the President’s proposal made in his July 25th letter to General Secretary Gorbachev. (U)

What the President’s Letter Proposed. The President’s letter proposes an agreement which would have the following elements:

(a) While it may take longer to complete such research, both sides would confine themselves for five years, through 1991, to a program of research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, to determine whether, in principle, advanced reliable systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Such research and development could include testing necessary to establish feasibility. In the event either side wishes to conduct such testing, the other side shall have the right to observe the tests, in accord with mutually agreed procedures.

(b) Following this five year period, or at some later future time, either the United States or the Soviet Union may determine that advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Either party may then desire to proceed beyond research, development, and testing to deployment of an advanced strategic defense system. In anticipation that this may occur, we would be prepared to sign a treaty now which would require the party that decides to proceed to deploy an advanced strategic defense system to share the benefits of such a system with the other providing there is mutual agreement to eliminate the offensive ballistic missiles of both sides. Once a plan is offered to this end, the details of the sharing arrangement and the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles would be the subject of negotiations for a period of no more than two years.

(c) If, following the initial five year period and subsequent to two years after either side has offered a plan for such sharing and the associated mutual elimination of ballistic missiles, the United States and Soviet Union have not agreed on such a plan, either side will be free to deploy unilaterally after six months’ notice is given to the other side. (S)

Additionally, while there already are agreements in force that address this subject, to meet continued Soviet concerns and in the context of the approach outlined above, the U.S. would also be prepared to discuss additional assurances that would further ban deployment in space of advanced weapons capable of inflicting mass destruction on the surface of the earth. (S)

Finally, significant commitments of this type with respect to strategic defenses would make sense only if made in conjunction with the implementation of immediate actions on both sides to begin moving toward our common goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The process must begin with radical and stabilizing reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union. (S)

Elaboration. The following is supplemental guidance on the letter. (S)

Restraint During Negotiations. What the President proposes is to negotiate as soon as possible (in 1986 if possible) the treaty referenced in item (b) above which would have to include agreement on: (1) the mechanism that triggers the treaty’s provisions; (2) the specific negotiating activities that would occur during the two year period; (3) the alternative outcomes that could result from such negotiations; and (4) the restraint that both sides would exercise during the negotiating period with respect to ballistic missile defenses. In each of these areas, the USG has a proposal. (S)

— The mechanism that would trigger the treaty’s provisions is the occurrence of the following conditions: (1) after 1991; (2) either side decides to move to the deployment of defenses not permitted by the ABM Treaty; and, having made such a decision, (3) offers to the other side a plan that addresses, as a minimum, the elements outlined in the President’s letter. (S)

— The negotiating activities that would then occur for a period of no more than two years would be focused upon the elements of the proposed plan. (S)

— The outcome that the U.S. hopes will occur would be a successful negotiation in which such a plan is adopted. This plan would guide a jointly managed transition to increased reliance on defenses. Should, after two years, the negotiations not yield a successful outcome, either side would be free to begin deployments of ballistic missile defenses currently not permitted by the ABM Treaty, after providing six months notice of its intent to do so. (S)

— The restraint regime which we would propose be implemented during this two years would entail altering the conditions of the ABM Treaty so as to permit, during the negotiations, research, development and testing (but not deployment except as permitted by the ABM Treaty) of ballistic missile defense to include both those based on new physical principles and those based on more traditional approaches. (S)

Restraint Prior to Triggering the Treaty. Until the provisions of this new treaty are triggered in 1992 or later, there would be no change from the restraint regime proposed for the 1986–1991 period described in item (a) on page 1 of this paper. (S)

Relation to Transition. The President’s proposal provides a concrete framework for agreement on the terms for a jointly managed transition. For the next negotiating round, the U.S. delegation should focus on the President’s proposal in this context, illustrating its consistency and continuity with past U.S. proposals. (S)

Relation to the ABM Treaty. The President has said that the U.S. will observe the limitations of the ABM Treaty. The President’s proposal does not alter that commitment. When the new treaty, negotiated as soon as possible and hopefully in 1986, is triggered as specified above, it would not automatically replace the existing ABM Treaty, which would continue to be operative except for those provisions altered (by novation) by the new treaty. With respect to such provisions, the new treaty would take precedence. (S)

The President proposes that the new treaty specifically address conditions under which ABM deployments currently not permitted by the ABM Treaty could occur. Once agreed, deployments under such conditions would be made under the provisions of the new treaty and, therefore, would not require further modification or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. (S)

Summary. Under the President’s proposal, the U.S. and the Soviet Union would confine themselves to activities permitted by the terms of the ABM Treaty through 1991, and possibly beyond, until such time as the program of research, development and testing demonstrates effective defenses to be feasible and until a plan is submitted for “sharing the benefits” and “eliminating offensive ballistic missiles.” At that point, a new treaty regime, to be negotiated as soon as possible, and hopefully in 1986, will be triggered. Under the new treaty regime, the sides will negotiate on the plan for “sharing the benefits” and “eliminating offensive ballistic missiles.” If agreement is reached, then deployment will proceed according to that agreement. If agreement is not reached after two years of such negotiation, either side will be free to deploy after providing six months’ notice of its intention to do so. (S)

This proposal is consistent with past assurances that the U.S. will conduct its activities consistent with the ABM Treaty regime until such time as effective defenses are shown to be feasible. Moreover, it demonstrates our continuing commitment to stability in indicating our willingness to refrain from deployment for two additional years beyond the time when defenses are judged to be feasible while negotiating with the Soviet Union on how the benefits of such defenses could be shared and ballistic missiles eliminated. (S)

Impact on Current Policy. The President’s proposal does not change U.S. policy with respect to the correct legal interpretation of the ABM Treaty (as stated in NSDD 192, 11 October 1985). Pursuant to NSDD 192, although not restructuring the U.S. SDI program now, the U.S. may choose to restructure the SDI program, in accordance with the correct legal interpretation of the ABM Treaty, if needed at some time in the future. The President’s proposal also does not alter the criteria for effective defenses. (S)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, September 1986 Chron File. Secret. Sent for action. All brackets are in the original. Prepared by Linhard.
2. For the instructions for NST Round VI, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Documents 154 and 55.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. Poindexter approved the recommendation on Reagan’s behalf, and wrote below the recommendation line: “Discussed verbally.”
5. Secret.