Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

135. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Timing the Point at Which We Pass Out of Technical Observance of SALT (C)

Issue

When is the most appropriate time for us to pass out of technical observance of the provisions of SALT II.

Facts

In making your May 27th decision² that we would base future strategic force decisions on our national security interests and the threat we face, rather than on provisions of the SALT agreements, you noted that we would remain in technical observance of SALT until late this year. To ensure proper control of the timing of any breach of the SALT limits, you directed in NSDD 232³ that you be informed in advance of any action whereby we would no longer be in such technical observance.

We will pass out of technical observance of SALT when the 131st B–52 bomber converted to carry Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM) rolls out of the assembly plant. Previously we had assumed this would not take place until late December. Secretary Weinberger will shortly inform you that it will occur in late October or early November. This timing may soon become public knowledge; Senators Byrd and Leahy have requested an Air Force briefing on the ALCM conversion schedule.

Discussion

For several reasons, I believe our passing out of technical observance of SALT should be delayed until near the end of the year:

— In announcing your May 27 decision, you noted that the delay in our passing out of technical observance gave the Soviets an opportunity to, among other things, respond constructively in the Geneva negotiations. The next round of negotiations, which begins September 18, may well last into November; we should give the Soviets the entire round to see how they respond.

— While we have no agreement on the date, we anticipate a summit will be held in early December. Breaking through SALT limits in the weeks shortly before the summit will generate significant publicity. Such a step could give the Soviets an excuse to walk away from their commitment to a summit this year and, if the Soviets come, decrease the chance of a favorable summit outcome.

— We are uncertain when Congress will complete final action on the Fiscal Year 1987 budget. We should not unnecessarily take a step which will cause a negative reaction on the Hill while the budget can still be impacted by such a reaction. On the other hand, depending on the final Defense appropriations level, we may wish to consider unplanned retirements of older strategic systems for fiscal reasons, thus potentially eliminating or deferring the need to bear the propaganda costs of breaching SALT limits.

— Passing out of technical observance of SALT immediately before the November election will inevitably convert what should be a technical national security issue into a partisan political issue.

No significant military penalties would accrue from delaying rollout of the 131st ALCM bomber until late this year, although there would probably be some cost in production efficiency.

While it is premature for you to make any decision in advance of formal notification by Secretary Weinberger, I have provided the foregoing for your review in the event a decision is required on short notice due to the Congressional request for information.

Recommendation

None at this time.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, END of SALT, 131st Bomber, November 1, 1986. Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Brooks. Reagan wrote his initials in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. See footnote 8, Document 109.
3. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 149.