Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

125. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, July 25, 1986

SUBJECT

• Relocatable Targets

The report at Tab II from the SecDef to you was prepared in response to NSDD–178.² Don Hicks and Don Latham have both told me privately that they are embarrassed by the report’s vagueness and that the report is not indicative of the real concerns in OSD or the Air Force about the relocatable target problem.

The difficulty the DOD technical staff and the Air Force face is that the long-term response needed to solve the mobility problem is very expensive and not properly assessed at this time.

As I noted to you in a separate memo,³ this has broad implications for our strategic force structure requirements and for the basing of our future ICBMs. We must come to grips with the dilemma that allows U.S. analysts to rate Soviet mobile targets as very survivable and similar U.S. systems as not very survivable.

Despite my disappointment with the DOD report, I have prepared an upbeat reply that tells the SecDef that I should be a member of their steering group.

Bob Linhard and Jack Matlock concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the SecDef at Tab I.⁴

Tab I

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger⁵

Washington, July 31, 1986

SUBJECT

• Relocatable Targets (U)

I appreciate your recent report on relocatable targets in response to NSDD–178. (C)

The difficulty of attacking mobile targets in both the Soviet Union and the United States has profound implications for the future of our deterrent force structure. (S)

As you develop your relocatable target master plan, I feel it would be appropriate for a member of my staff to work with your team that is writing the plan. (C)

I have asked John Douglass on my staff to contact Don Hicks with this in mind. (U)

Thanks again for the report. I’m sure the President will find it most helpful as we make the ICBM basing decisions which we plan to make this fall. (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:⁶

John M. Poindexter⁷

Tab II (A)

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)⁸

Washington, July 21, 1986

SUBJECT

• Relocatable Targets (U)

(S) The attached report, “Initial Report on Attacking Soviet Relocatable Targets,” responds to NSDD–178 tasking of the Department of Defense to develop a program to identify the sensors, C3I assets and strategic nuclear force structure necessary to attack Soviet mobile forces and support elements. Our studies to date have made it clear that the problem of holding these Soviet relocatable targets (RTs) at risk is a difficult one. Development of a viable solution will require sizable expenditures of time, effort and resources.

(S) The forthcoming revision of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) in October will contain dedicated operational resources—albeit a very limited number—to attack selected relocatable targets. Although modest in terms of committed warheads and operational sophistication, this first step is the product of an extensive study and test effort by DoD and the intelligence community to bound the Soviet RT problem and to identify the operational procedures, equipment and force structure necessary to place more of these targets at risk. As the attached report indicates, much has been done to date but much remains to be done in the future.

(C) I have established a senior-level steering committee to guide and oversee DoD RT efforts to develop a master plan that will guide our future efforts to meet the RT challenge. We will provide the NSC with updates on our progress as we identify, evaluate and implement additional measures to cope with these targets.

Cap

Tab II (B)

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense⁹

Washington, June 2, 1986

Initial Report
on
Attacking Soviet Relocatable Targets

Introduction (U)

(S) This report responds to NSDD–178 tasking which directed the DOD to “. . . develop a program to provide a capability to attack relocatable targets with strategic forces . . .” and to recommend “. . . an appropriate program to develop as soon as possible the sensors, C3I assets and strategic force structure required to attack relocatable targets.” The report which follows: (1) defines what is meant by the term “relocatable target” (RT) and bounds the problem as we understand it today; (2) briefly summarizes efforts to date by the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community; (3) outlines ongoing actions being taken to place at risk certain RTs in the near term (remainder of the 1980s); and (4) describes our initial approach for solving—to the extent possible—the problem of locating and striking RTs in the 1990s and beyond.

(U) The concept of “mobile” weapon systems is as old as warfare itself, and the effective use of mobility as a tactic historically has been a major contributor to battlefield success. Over the past few years, we have become increasingly concerned about the Soviet Union’s introduction of new forms of mobility onto the strategic nuclear battlefield, particularly with the deployment of mobile ballistic missiles and command elements.

(U) The deployment and proliferation of such Soviet forces do not require a change in U.S. nuclear policy. Our national policy continues to state that U.S. nuclear forces (both strategic Triad and theater forces) must hold at risk the full range of enemy military capabilities that threaten the United States and its Allies. What must change, however, if we are to comply fully with this policy, is our capability to hold this growing relocatable element of Soviet forces at risk.

What are RTs? (U)

(S) RTs (which tend to mean different things to different people) represent a category of targets—just as hardened ICBM silos, nuclear capable airfields and submarine ports represent categories of targets—that must be held at a certain level of risk. To maintain nuclear deterrence, we must be able to threaten retaliation against mobile strategic targets just as we threaten fixed strategic targets. The specific level of risk at which we should hold Soviet RTs is yet to be determined. However, our capability must be realistic in terms of being sufficient, achievable and affordable.

(S) RTs include those enemy forces or war-supporting functions that are expected to relocate and, in some cases, “fractionate” in crisis or wartime. Targets that fractionate are those that divide into multiple RTs. Examples are SS–25 road-mobile units, which could separate into units of three missiles or fewer on transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and armies out of garrison which would disperse into smaller and smaller units.

(S) RTs can generally be classed as one of two types: predictable—those basically limited to certain known dispersal locations, such as bombers to airfields, submarines to known dispersal areas and leadership elements to underground bunkers; and unpredictable—those with a virtually unlimited set of possible deployment locations—such as mobile ICBMs. [2 lines not declassified]

(TS) To appreciate fully the magnitude of the problem posed by this overall class of targets, one must first understand the size of the RT target base. [6 lines not declassified]. The RT threat also includes, among other things: dispersed long-range aircraft; airborne, road-mobile and rail-based command and control units; dispersed naval facilities; imprecisely located underground leadership bunkers; army forces dispersed beyond the reach of tactical forces; and other mobile strategic targets.

(S) Because of the variety of RTs and the differences between their operational modes, there is no single force employment option suitable for placing all of these targets at risk. It is a difficult, multifaceted problem for the intelligence community as well as the operational forces—but it must be addressed now if we are to deny the Soviets sanctuary and to ensure a continued high level of Soviet uncertainty in achieving their warfighting goals.

Previous and Ongoing Investigations of the RT Problem (U)

(C) The Department of Defense and the intelligence community have been working for the past several years to define and to develop concepts for solving the RT problem. Senior-level managerial, technical and operational involvement has fostered a dialogue as well as investigative efforts by a number of key groups—such as the Director of Central Intelligence’s (DCI’s) Critical intelligence Problems Committee, a Defense Science Board Task Force and the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. These initiatives complement ongoing work by the individual Services and by organizations across a wide spectrum.

(S) A number of studies have been conducted which address the RT problem from various complementary perspectives. Some of these studies are fairly comprehensive. [13 lines not declassified]

(S) Of particular significance is the fact that the RT issue is being addressed not only by extensive study efforts but also through practical applications, experiments and demonstrations in the [2 lines not declassified]. For example, the Air Force has conducted such tests using [1½ lines not declassified]. The targets used in the tests included Pershing IIs during maneuver and concealment exercises and Minuteman transporter-erecters. More recently, sensors were tested against [less than 1 line not declassified] designed and built to simulate operational configurations. The Air Force also has completed a proof-of-concept demonstration of Minuteman flexible targeting that could significantly reduce the time required for replanning and retargeting (see “Engaging Mobile Missiles with ICBMs” on page 5 for further details).

(S) In addition, we are pursuing experimental development and testing of supporting systems in the areas of mission planning, data base fusion, predictive target planning, command support and targeting sensors. As these efforts mature and prove effective, we will modify our programs and budget requests accordingly.

Current and Near-Term Capabilities and Far-Term Possibilities (U)

(S) Our current ability to hold RTs at risk is limited, and there appears to be no quick fix to the problem. To hold Soviet RTs of all types at risk, a coordinated, funded effort will be required to improve a number of intelligence and operational elements:

• Peacetime and wartime intelligence collection by national systems.

• Near-real-time fusion of various kinds of intelligence information.

• Rapid replanning of strategic offensive forces employment.

• Rapid relay of retargeting data to the forces.

• Improvements in strategic weapon systems and military reconnaissance forces, coupled with viable operational plans and exercises to tie all elements together.

[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

(S) Despite these difficulties, positive action is already being taken to improve our ability to attack certain RTs using all three legs of the Triad. The next revision of the SIOP (to be implemented this fall) will contain provisions to strike selected RTs [less than 1 line not declassified]. In addition, [7 lines not declassified].

(U) A more detailed description of the operational actions being undertaken by the Air Force and the Navy follows:

• (S) Engaging Mobile Missiles with Bombers. The Air Force is planning to use B–52s to search out visually and attack selected known SS–25 operating areas during daylight conditions. This capability could be enhanced with [10 lines not declassified].

• [1 paragraph (15 lines) not declassified]

• (TS) Engaging Mobile Missiles with ICBMs. This concept—to be implemented in the FY87 SIOP revision—[2½ lines not declassified]. The Air Force is considering an additive program (Minuteman Flexible Targeting) that would improve this approach by shortening the time required for ICBM retargeting [less than 1 line not declassified]. Presently, real-time data needed to retarget ICBMs against RTs comes from collection devices with limited search capability. In the future, advanced intelligence collection and planning systems (coming on line in the early 1990s) will allow us to improve our ability to take full advantage of the rapid retargeting flexibility and time-on-target responsiveness of ICBMs. In the mid-to-late 1990s, [9 lines not declassified].

• [1 paragraph (21 lines) not declassified]

(TS) Finally, as with SIOP planning, important “first steps” are also being taken in the C3I arena. New high technology reconnaissance and intelligence collection satellites are being developed and placed (in very limited numbers) into orbit. New initiatives in the areas of intelligence collection, exploitation and fusion—as well as adaptive planning and battle management—are ongoing. [3 lines not declassified]. In the operational planning area, [6 lines not declassified].

Conclusion (U)

(S) Although these are substantial efforts, much remains to be done so that we will have the necessary capability to hold all classes of RTs at risk in the 1990s and beyond. There are many questions still to be answered before we can develop a comprehensive, long-term approach to the RT problem, and it is therefore premature to recommend a unified program at this time. However, sound planning and extensive coordination among all elements of the DoD and the intelligence community promise to bring a viable and enduring solution within our reach—both from a technical as well as resource point of view.

(S) In summary, our approach to solving the RT problem will consist of three phases and, as mentioned earlier, it will be evolutionary in nature:

• (S) For the near term, we will use the capabilities we currently have to increase steadily our ability to hold all Soviet RTs at risk. In the next SIOP revision, [2 lines not declassified].

• (S) For the mid-term, we will continue to test and exercise alternative operational concepts and technologies to determine the most promising ways to improve our capabilities. At the same time, we will develop an RT Master Plan to guide our longer-term efforts, incorporating data from tests and exercises as they become available. Because of the enormity of the potential tasks associated with attacking RTs, it is important not to commit large expenditures until we understand the advantages and disadvantages of alternate methods and technologies.

• (S) For the longer term, we will use the RT Master Plan as a point of departure for a comprehensive program that integrates all of the essential elements (sensors, C3I, platforms, weapons, etc.) and provides a time-phased development and procurement plan for achieving a survivable capability to attack RTs.

(U) This three-phased approach takes into account where we are today and what we can do with available assets; it recognizes the difficulty of the RT problem and adopts a deliberate, incremental approach to finding the optimum solution; and it is geared to consider fiscal realities carefully. Thus, it is a reasonable plan which, given the necessary priority, will provide the capabilities to maintain deterrence in the face of the expanding Soviet relocatable target base.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–090, NSDD 178. Top Secret. Sent for action.
2. See Document 51.
3. Not further identified.
4. Poindexter approved the recommendation.
5. Secret. Poindexter crossed out “Caspar” in the recipient line and wrote “Cap” above it.
6. Poindexter crossed out “FOR THE PRESIDENT:”
7. Poindexter signed the memorandum “John” above his typed signature.
8. Secret. Weinberger wrote “John” over the recipient line.
9. Top Secret.