113. Memorandum for the Record1
SUBJECT
- Eisenhower Seminar, June 6, 1986
The Eisenhower Seminar was formed by Milton Eisenhower during the years when he was President of Johns Hopkins and his brother was President of the United States. It has had a revolving membership of some 20 people drawn from the Executive Branch, Johns Hopkins, business, the Congress, and from the military. It meets 2–3 times a year on Saturdays to discuss foreign and defense policy issues, economic issues, and domestic/political issues. The most recent meeting took place on Saturday, June 6th. The meeting was chaired by Andy Goodpaster; others present were, Harold Brown, Brent Scowcroft, Joe Fowler, Bob Bowie, Jim Billington, Dick Helms, Sol Linowitz, Bob Harvey, Chairman of the Hopkins Board of Trustees Bill Martin, Kenneth Rush, Walter Stoessel, Steve Soulnier [Raymond “Steve” Saulnier], President Eisenhower’s Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Chris Phillips, General William Y. Smith, Admiral Moody, Senator Russell Long, Senator Harry Byrd, and I.
Goodpaster, Scowcroft and Stoessel reported on a recent trip to Moscow. I could find little new in the information they brought back. Billington criticized their trip on the basis that it included only members of Arbatov’s Institute, Velekov and some of his scientists and other Soviets specifically tasked to deal with foreigners.
In the ensuing discussion I was heavily pressed on the President’s May 27th decision and your and my support of that decision.2 I said the argument that we had had with others in the Executive Branch was principally over the method of presentation and that everyone had agreed that the 131st B–52 bomber conversion should go forward. The question was whether to describe that decision as a necessary “appropriate and proportionate response” pursuant to the President’s 1985 policy statement on Interim Restraint or to use the occasion to announce our freedom from SALT II constraints. The latter formulation was bound to create problems with the Congress and with our allies. [Page 394] As far as the Soviets were concerned, I said I thought it was indeterminate whether the positive results of lifting our feet from the fly paper of SALT II would be more than an offset by the opportunity presented to the Soviets to exploit the resulting fissure between our position and that of our allies. I ran into heavy flack from everyone there on this defense.
I then tried a more fundamental line of explanation. I noted that the President was faced with four concurrent sets of considerations: (1) his concern for the Republican Party and its prospects after 1988; (2) his concern for support for his policies from the Congress; (3) his relations with the allies; and (4) his concern for success in negotiating with the Soviets. I said it was difficult to see how one could have success with the Soviets unless the Executive Branch commanded a degree of support from the Congress and from its allies. Furthermore it was difficult to envisage maintaining support from the Congress in the absence of a consensus within the Executive Branch. The fact was that there was not such a consensus. The President had decided in favor of the decision which he thought would most favor unity of the Party beyond 1988. The Democrats also were exhibiting signs of being affected by the 1988 election. Their leading candidate, Hart, was taking positions wholly inconsistent with bipartisan support of a constructive defense and foreign policy. Therefore, the crucial immediate problem was that of developing a consensus behind a constructive policy within the Executive Branch, and then achieving bipartisan support for it in the Congress. A number of voices together asked whether it was not precisely the responsibility of the President to assure such a consensus.
Russell Long said he was convinced that at least nine Democrat senators would side with the Executive Branch in favor of such a line of approach. The situation in the House he said is much more difficult but if the Senate were firmly behind the President, the situation there should be manageable.
The group strongly supported Russell Long’s position.
- Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, June 1986. No classification marking.↩
- See footnote 8, Document 109.↩
- Nitze signed “PHN” over his typed signature.↩