Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

110. Electronic Message From Peter Rodman of the National Security Council Staff to Stephen Sestanovich of the National Security Council Staff and the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (McDaniel)¹

Washington, June 4, 1986, 9:55 a.m.

SUBJECT

• S—W—P Breakfast: Arms Control Discussion

This was the exciting part.

Cap asked if anyone had seen the vaunted new Soviet proposal for 50% cuts, in return for which we were to extend the ABM treaty for 20 years;² i.e., did we know what kind of cuts they were now talking about? Shultz said no, there was a general proposal to discuss a 15–20-year extension plus refinement of certain definitions in the treaty, in return for which they would discuss 50% cuts. Weinberger lit into this, saying it was just a backdoor attempt to kill SDI after all frontal efforts had failed. If we were just patient and firm, eventually the Soviets would agree to deep cuts; the President had to educate the American people—even if he had sometimes to put out new language that essentially repackaged our present proposals. SDI wasn’t doing too badly in Congress even though we would end up with less than our request.

The Admiral pointed out the need to institutionalize SDI so it would survive this Administration; we weren’t there yet. Everyone agreed with this—but there was sharp disagreement on how to accomplish it. Cap argued that if we agreed to any restrictions of any kind we would undercut the sense of urgency and commitment and undermine public and congressional support for SDI—in exchange for Soviet promises that probably weren’t worth a lot. Shultz offered an alternative line of thinking (“at the risk of ruining your day,” he said): The decision to deploy was in the hands of a future President in any case; an agreement not to deploy before, say, 1990–1992 wasn’t giving anything away. In exchange we would get deep reductions and a continuing SDI research program that was at the very least a hedge against Soviet offensive cheating. Cap repeated his view that our SDI program would be undermined while the Soviets charged ahead with theirs.

Before silverware started to be thrown, Shultz deflected the conversation by smiling and saying he had to leave early to deliver a speech on the Philippines.³

NOTE TO BOB LINHARD: The Admiral asked me afterward if you could do a paper on what we could safely agree to on the ABM treaty. He feels that reopening the treaty is not necessarily a loser for us; it could legitimize SDI, and the Soviets too should have an interest in preserving this option. He said he was waiting for an answer from SDIO about when our research would become stymied under the broad or the restrictive definitions of research. He could foresee some agreed refinements in the treaty having to do with research, development, testing, and deployment—once we were clear about the practical implications.

1. Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 2615. Secret. Copies were sent to Linhard, Matlock, and Sestanovich. No minutes of the breakfast meeting were found.
2. Reference is to Gorbachev’s June 1 “Oral Communication to the President and Other World Leaders,” which the Department transmitted to all OECD capitals in telegram 174582, June 3.
3. Reference is to Shultz’s address before the Foreign Policy Association in New York. The text of the address is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 1986, pp. 26–30.