Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

111. Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council¹

Washington, undated

TALKING POINTS FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

INTRODUCTION

— Mr. President, the agenda today is a review of the current status of U.S.-Soviet relations and our objectives.

— The U.S. position vis a vis the Soviet Union is now very strong. We need to exploit this subtly but effectively so that we can lock the Soviets into some agreements which protect U.S. interests.

— To do this, we need a strategy which will allow us to:

(1) keep the high ground in public opinion both at home and abroad on the issue of the pursuit of peace;

(2) bring the Soviets out of their shell regarding arms control; and

(3) get down to real give-and-take bargaining in Geneva.

— Our plan for today’s meeting is to ask George to provide his view of the current state of the U.S.-Soviet relationship and where we are going.

— With this as a foundation, I will then offer an assessment of where we might consider focusing work, particularly in the area of arms control, over the month of June to provide greater leverage and options as appropriate for your consideration and use before the summer break in Europe.

— Different approach. Top down versus bottom up.

[Secretary Shultz makes his remarks. Immediately after, pick-up with the following points.]

— Thank you, George.

— The area that is likely to provide the key to a successful U.S. strategy remains arms control.

— This is due to many factors, ranging from the compelling Congressional and public interest this subject generates both at home and abroad to the simple fact that it is in this area in which the Soviets will continue to offer to us the greatest immediate public challenge.

— Since the November summit, the Soviets have attempted to shift the focus from seeking common ground by offering the January 15th plan for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and then backfilling details in many areas.

— This has resulted in a fairly steady Soviet drum beat that gives the impression of steady Soviet movement on arms control across a broad front.

— So far, the basic soundness of our positions have permitted us to stand up relatively well against what largely has amounted thus far in a constant repackaging by the Soviets of a few basic Soviet initiatives.

— However, over time, this Soviet tactic will have an effect—especially if they add new elements every so often and as other international events unrelated to arms control (Libya, trade, etc.) temporarily weakening the cohesiveness of our relations with critical allies.

— The Soviets are certainly going to use the SALT decision to their advantage.

— Therefore, the first proposition that I would like to place on the table for discussion today is that the United States should take steps before the European summer break to both counter the Soviet arms control offensive and to better position ourselves to go on the offensive and achieve U.S. objectives in this area in the fall.²

— Carrying this a step further, and given the broad front upon which we are being challenged by the Soviet Union, the second proposition I would like to offer for discussion is that the U.S. strategy must be equally comprehensive, effectively addressing six general areas: the Defense and Space area and especially the status of the ABM Treaty, START, INF, nuclear testing, conventional force reductions, and confidence building measures.

— In each of these areas, to construct U.S. strategy, we should consider whether we need a priority reexamination of our current position in light of the recent Soviet maneuvers to see if:

(1) a repackaging/restatement of our current position would best serve our interests; and

(2) to see if there are new elements or options that we should consider.

— This done, we also need to consider how the President can present a comprehensive picture, encompassing all these elements to some degree, both to counter the broad front initiative that Gorbachev has launched and to use the linkages implicit in this type of initiative to our advantage.

— I would like to take just a few more moments to talk a bit about a few of the six areas. Not all offer the same challenges, opportunities and risks.

— Defense and Space. Probably the most difficult area we will face is the area of Defense and Space, and especially the treatment of the ABM Treaty, its relationship to SDI, and the linkage that the Soviets are trying to establish between the U.S. commitment to the ABM Treaty and progress in reductions in offensive forces.

— As we all know, the Soviets recently surfaced the offer that if we will agree to negotiate a mutually acceptable definition of what is permitted research under the ABM Treaty and then commit to remain in compliance with the Treaty under this definition for some 15–20 years, they are prepared to move forward with implementing the principle of 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms using roughly the SALT definition of those arms. Of course, this is an unacceptable position for us.³

— Our task is to determine how we can best position ourselves to:

(1) not only maintain near-term support in Congress for SDI, but institutionalize that support so that the program lives beyond this Administration;

(2) avoid commitments that constrain realistic U.S. options for SDI;

(3) press forward with immediate reductions in offensive forces;

(4) establish the foundation for a stable transition to a more defense dominated deterrence; and

(5) figure out a way to share the benefits of strategic defense with the Soviets as the President has said he wants to do.

— In addressing this problem, there are a number of factors—some facts of life, some assumptions—which we need to consider.

— In some sense, these factors are the pieces which we need to rearrange to determine if there is an opportunity here for the U.S.

— First, it is clear that the President’s vision for the SDI program cannot be achieved during this Administration. We are several years away from reaching any deployment decisions. Therefore, we have roughly two years left to ensure that SDI is sufficiently institutionalized so that the President’s vision has a life of its own in subsequent Administrations. This argues for some active strategy being put in place as soon as possible.

— Second, the Soviets have publicly challenged our program expressing concern about its impact on an arms race and stability, and accusing us of violating and preparing to abrogate the ABM Treaty. We must be in a position to handle these charges publicly to be able to maintain support for the program in Congress and in Europe.

— Third, the Soviets also have other concerns which may privately drive their actions (e.g., fear of success in X-ray lasers, fear of technical competition, fear of expense of competition, concern about effectiveness of mixed US offensive/defensive force). We must be in a position to use these concerns as levers to achieve effectively US objectives with respect to SDI and in offensive force reductions.

— Fourth, during this period of deficit reductions there will be continuing pressure to cut budgets.

— Fifth, the Soviets are proceeding with their own version of a strategic defensive system.

— Sixth, the relationship between the future of the SDI program and the ABM Treaty is complex—subject to opposing assumptions which must be sorted out in a fairly objective fashion.

— Some hold the assumption that a future Administration will not be able to make a decision to move beyond research to full-scale development if the program continues to be constrained under the limitations of either the narrow or broad interpretations of the ABM Treaty as we now know it. Many who hold this view would argue that we should get out from under this treaty now, while this President’s latitude for action is maximized.

— At the same time, others feel strongly that, for the foreseeable future, the SDI program could not survive politically the U.S. abrogation or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

— Seventh, the President has committed that before deployment, and without giving the Soviets a veto, we would discuss and negotiate as appropriate.

— These factors all tend to point to the conclusion that if we remain under the ABM Treaty, at some point, we will have to discuss testing and deployment with the Soviets.⁴

— At some point the Soviets will also come up against the Treaty restrictions.⁵

— Therefore, in this area, we should quietly and seriously evaluate whether we should agree to talk to them now about the ABM Treaty in an attempt to establish conditions under which the program could support a full-scale engineering decision within the Treaty, thus protecting the President’s vision and permitting institutionalization of the program—provided that we can use this to get something significant in terms of offensive reductions for this movement on the ABM Treaty.⁶

— We need to see if there is an option which would permit us to reach an agreement which would permit us to:

(1) begin significant reductions in an equitable and verifiable fashion;

(2) accept an understanding of the ABM Treaty that would not restrict research and testing necessary and sufficient to support a full-scale engineering decision;

(3) Accept restrictions on deployment of SDI (e.g., only deploy a system after some notification or negotiating period of fixed length);

(4) remove restrictions if there is non-compliance with agreed offensive reductions or with the ABM Treaty; and

(5) account for Soviet violation of the existing ABM Treaty as a quid pro quo.

— Nuclear Testing. In the nuclear testing area, we face a similar challenge.

— The US position clearly specifies the conditions under which the US can view a CTB as a long-term goal.

— We have also made it clear that we believe the first step should be to work to resolve the verification aspects of the TTBT and PNET—and have proposed CORRTEX to do this.

— Still, we also should be prepared to discuss what we intend in the period between a ratification of TTBT and the achievement of conditions that would permit a CTB.

— The ideas that have long been proposed tend to group themselves either in limits on the number of tests conducted each year linked to reductions in nuclear arsenals or a gradual lowering of the TTBT threshold over time also linked to progress in offensive force reductions.

— Both of these require analysis.

— Other Areas. Similar work can be done in the other areas mentioned (START, INF, conventional forces and confidence building measures).

— The basic idea is to see if Presidential guidance should be provided the Arms Control Support Group, and the Senior Arms Control Group to work out the details of some proposals and forward them to the NSPG for the President’s use by the end of the month.

— The next round in Geneva ends on June 27th.

— Whatever the result of the quick analysis, the product could be used to make a decision on how to position the U.S.—whether to make a substantive move or just go on a public affairs attack and repackage.

— This could be done perhaps by a letter to Gorbachev, or a Presidential speech, or some combination of diplomatic and public gestures, all of which would be followed up in the appropriate negotiating channels.

— The point, though, is that we need to quietly set the analyses in train so that we move out of the reactive mode and onto the offensive with the Soviets in a manner that:

(1) maintains the high ground needed for public and allied support, and for support of our own programs in Congress;

(2) maximizes the possibility of moving the Soviets in ways that both allow us to institutionalize SDI and pursue reductions; and

(3) clearly positions us to shift the onus onto the Soviets if they fail to respond positively to our initiatives.

— Mr. President, unless you have remarks at this point, I would propose we open the floor for discussion.

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 843, Subject File, 1986, General Arms Control: Set B. Secret; Extremely Sensitive. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for June 6 from 11 a.m. until 11:45 a.m. in the White House Situation Room. All brackets are in the original. Poindexter sent the talking points to Shultz, Weinberger, and Crowe under cover of a June 7 memorandum: “Here are the talking points I used yesterday. Because of their sensitivity I am having them delivered directly to you. Please protect. We have tentatively scheduled a follow-on meeting for Tuesday, June 10, 1986, at 10:45 a.m. in the Situation Room.” (Ibid.) For a record of the June 6 NSPG meeting, see Document 112.
2. Weinberger drew a curved vertical line in the right-hand margin beside this paragraph and placed an X to the right of it.
3. See footnote 2, Document 110.
4. Weinberger underlined “will have to” and “testing and deployment with the Soviets.”
5. Weinberger underlined “Soviets will also come up against the.”
6. Weinberger placed two short vertical lines in the left-hand and right-hand margins of the underlined portion of this sentence.