Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

109. Memorandum From Robert Linhard and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, May 24, 1986

SUBJECT

• SALT I Issue

In working the Q&As associated with this decision,² due to the concentration of effort on addressing SALT II, there was some confusion with respect to the impact of the decision on SALT I.

Tab A³ provides a quick summary of the SALT I limits and a comparison of the legal status of both SALT I and SALT II. The SALT I Interim Agreement which covers offensive forces was never a Treaty per se. It was an Executive Agreement with a specific 5 year limited duration which was subsequently endorsed by a Joint Resolution of the Congress. It expired as a legally binding document in 1977. At that time, observance of it was continued by political commitments made by Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko for the duration of the SALT II negotiations. In making those commitments, side intentionally did not use exactly the same statements so that there would be no question of these commitments having the weight of legally binding international agreements. After SALT II was negotiated, SALT I was in a rather ambiguous status, especially after our clarification provided to the Soviet Union in 1981 that the U.S. did not intend to ratify SALT II—which also ended any formal obligations we had under customary international law with respect to SALT II. In 1982, when the President announced his policy of not undercutting existing agreements, SALT I and SALT II were both again included together in that political commitment. We have no legal impediment to ending observation of the expired SALT I agreement at this time if we so choose.

Tab B⁴ provides the text of both Article 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act and the Jackson Amendment. Article 33 provides the basis of the Hollings’ suit that has bothered the President. The Jackson Amendment was spurred by the basic inequities in the SALT I Agreement. In considering what we do, we should not forget that while SALT I does provide some protection for the U.S. (i.e., limits growth of heavy missiles to some extent, provides some constraint on Soviet systems, provides dismantlement procedures), it does so at the price of letting the Soviet Union retain more SLBM and ICBM launchers than the United States. Given the nature of the President’s decision with respect to SALT II, this would have indicated to us that he would want to distance himself from the risk of institutionalizing the inequities of SALT I at the same time—rather than extend them.

Tab C⁵ shows the likely impact of SALT I on US forces. The bottom line here is that if no additional POSEIDON submarines are retired after JACKSON and GREENE, we will once again hit the SALT I limit on SLBMs in May/June 1989.⁶

Tab D⁷ addresses Soviet compliance with the SALT I agreement. We have found them to be in unambiguous violation on one issue (the use of “remaining facilities” at former SS–7 sites). We have also expressed our concern about the conversion of a YANKEE to cruise missile carriage.

Although not addressed directly in either the Presidential Statement or in NSDD 227, we were postured to distance ourselves from both SALT II and SALT I in implementing this decision. If asked about the SALT I agreement, the proposed response we have developed is as follows:

— Alternative A: U.S. interim restraint policy since 1982 has always involved both the SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms and the SALT II Treaty. Both agreements have expired, and both have been violated by the Soviet Union. As the President announced, we will make future decisions about our strategic forces on the basis of U.S. and Allied security needs as affected by the size and magnitude of Soviet forces, rather than on the basis of the terms of the expired SALT I or SALT II agreements. However, in doing so, the President has emphasized that the U.S. will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, does not anticipate appreciable U.S. force growth, and will not deploy more Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

The alternative would be to attempt to isolate the President’s decision to SALT II. Ken Adelman has long supported this approach, and the JCS would likely also be more comfortable with this. If accepted by the Soviets in practice, it would provide some continuity with the past and some constraint on Soviet action. On the other hand, it does risk institutionalizing a very unequitable set of limits. If the President wished to reverse our view of his intention, the way we would characterize the U.S. position on SALT I would be as follows:

— Alternative B: The SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms has expired, but the United States will, for the time being, continue its policy of not undercutting this agreement to the extent that the Soviet Union exercises comparable restraint. We do so noting that the Soviets have violated this agreement, and we call on them once again to correct these violations. [If asked, we are continuing our policy with respect to SALT I because the Soviet violations are less significant than those associated with SALT II.]

Recommendation

Having taken the step with respect to SALT II, and given the considerations outlined above, that we attempt to put this entire matter behind us by using the approach outline in Alternative A; and that you seek Presidential approval for this approach.⁸

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–093, NSDD–227. Secret. Sent for action. All brackets are in the original. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates Poindexter saw it.
2. See Document 108.
3. Attached but not printed is an undated paper.
4. Attached but not printed.
5. Attached but not printed are an April 1986 paper prepared in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; an undated paper, “SALT I and II Dismantlement Requirements;” and an undated paper, “Strategic Modernization vs SALT II Fact Sheet.”
6. Linhard wrote “TENTH TRIDENT” below this sentence.
7. Attached but not printed is a paper, “Unambiguous Soviet Violations of Arms Control Agreements.”
8. Poindexter approved the recommendation on May 27 and wrote below the “approve line”: “President agrees.” Linhard wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “UNODIR—I will set up the material with SALT I included with SALT II.” Later that day, the White House released a statement from President Reagan announcing that “in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure, which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance, and especially in a flawed SALT II treaty, which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.” (“Statement on Soviet and United States Compliance with Arms Control Agreements,” May 27; Public Papers: Reagan, 1986, Book I, pp. 678–681)