Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

98. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

399.

Algiers, January 26, 1981, 1840Z

SUBJECT

• The Implications of the Hostage Agreement for U.S.-Algerian Relations.

1. (Secret—entire text.)

2. Summary. The GOA probably accepted the role of intermediary in the hostage crisis primarily to protect “the Iranian revolution”, to enhance Algeria’s role as a peacemaker, to strengthen the international position of Algerian diplomacy and the domestic position of Bendjedid and Benyahia, and to change Algeria’s image in the U.S. and in the West, bilateral issues were probably of secondary concern, although the GOA undoubtedly hopes that its new image will yield it benefits over time. In discharging what is essentially a moral obligation, the USG may wish to consider a number of steps: renewal of Bendjedid’s invitation to visit the U.S., a rapid resumption of LNG negotiations, action on military training proposals, and a number of other initiatives, some easy, some not. End summary.

3. In discussing their efforts in the hostage crisis with us, Algerian officials have stressed humanitarian aspects, and we understand MFA officials have been told not to respond to questions about Algeria’s mediation except with general statements about its humanitarian concerns. However, the GOA probably undertook the role of intermediary in the hostage crisis for a number of reasons, among which we see:

(A) A strong commitment to protect and support “the Iranian revolution” which Algerians see as similar in many ways to their own struggle for independence. In this context, the GOA probably saw the continuing hostage crisis as dangerous because it (1) invited renewed U.S. military action in Iran, (2) could have led the U.S. toward support for Iraq, (3) hampered the emergence of strong domestic political institutions in Iran, and (4) tempted the Soviet Union to continue exploiting Iranian weakness and the possibility of U.S. military action.

(B) A commitment of principle to the resolution of regional disputes of a strongly destabilizing nature. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the GOA has been sensitive to the destabilization of the Gulf/Indian Ocean region, and it probably saw the hostage mediation as contributing to stability and opening the way to the resolution of other conflicts, particularly the Iran-Iraq conflict.

(C) A strong desire to re-establish the importance of Algerian diplomacy, in the world at large and in the Third World in particular. Since the death of Boumédiène² and the appointment of Benyahia as Foreign Minister, Algerian diplomacy has achieved some modest success on the Western Sahara issue and on relations with France, but there has been no initiative or success spectacular enough to give the Bendjedid regime and its Foreign Minister their own place in the sun. Now, Bendjedid and Benyahia are clearly established on the world scene, and the Boumédiène/Bouteflika³ legacy has been clearly relegated to the past. Bendjedid has been strengthened as President, and Benyahia has been strengthened as Foreign Minister. With the exception of the pro-Moscow Marxists, all elements of the Algerian body politic have probably seen something in Algeria’s role to praise. “Progressive” leftists such as Yahiaoui probably saw this role as supportive of Iran. “Liberals” such as Algeria’s technocrats probably saw it as a natural opening to the West. The middle-of-the road nationalist majority, including most of the military, probably saw it as a healthy reaffirmation of Algeria’s place in the world and of Bendjedid’s place in Algeria.

(D) A desire to change Algeria’s image in the West in general and the U.S. in particular. The GOA has been working hard to make its policy of non-alignment a truly genuine one, and is convinced that the only way to do this is to enjoy good relations with both superpowers. In this context, it has been hampered by its outdated image as a “radical” state that always supported the Eastern bloc and lost no opportunity to attack the West, even to the extent of supporting certain forms of international terrorism. Without changing its rhetoric, the GOA has gradually taken specific policy actions to alter its course and its image. Its mediation effort is the latest of these actions, and perhaps the most eloquent.

(E) A growing commitment of the rules of international diplomacy and genuine shock and embarrassment at the actions of the “Iranian revolution” in this domain.

4. The GOA probably does not expect anything directly from the U.S. as a result of its mediatory role, and it is not likely to make any specific request linked to the hostage agreement. It knows that, now that the hostages have been released, it has little leverage on us beyond that conferred by our intangible moral debt. It is not going to come to us and say “stop selling weapons to Morocco” or “pay more for LNG” instead, it will hope that its improved image in the U.S. will make it possible for U.S. policymakers to respond positively as it tries to strengthen its non-alignment and to respond with understanding as it pursues its national interests in the region and in the world.

5. The obvious terrain on which the GOA will hope to elicit more cooperation from U.S. policymakers is military. The GOA has standing requests for training and equipment which it has justified explicitly in terms of lessening its dependence on the Soviet Union. It undoubtedly hopes that its new image will make it possible for U.S. policymakers to respond positively in spite of continuing disagreement on some areas of bilateral and regional affairs.

6. The GOA will also hope to elicit a more truly neutral U.S. policy on the Western Sahara. In recent months, it has increasingly come to fear that the USG would support King Hassan in anything he did because of the idealized reputation he enjoys as America’s friend. Now, the GOA will hope that it too will be seen as ready to collaborate with the U.S. on certain (but by no means all) issues and will thus also have a claim on America’s friendship. Such friendship would, in the GOA’s view, argue for the U.S. to find ways to support King Hassan short of espousing his claims to the Western Sahara in theory or in practice.

7. Other issues such as the Middle East crisis and the North-South dialogue, while important to Algeria, are not current issues of burning concern in Algerian-American bilateral relations, and in any case the GOA certainly understands that American policy on such fundamental questions cannot be guided by considerations related to U.S. relations with Algeria.

8. Against the background, we believe it would be in the U.S. interest to demonstrate our gratitude and our desire to improve relations by taking several of the following actions, some of which should not be difficult provided we do not renounce the accords through which the hostages were freed:

A) Renew the invitation issued to President Bendjedid by President Carter to visit the United States.⁴ Such a gesture would not only demonstrate our gratitude over Algeria’s role in the hostage crisis, but would also show that the new administration is interested in the Third World and would encourage the trend toward more moderation by a key non-aligned leader. This would be particularly important given reported plans for Bendjedid to visit the Soviet Union as early as this March.

B) Promptly put forward a new proposal in the LNG price negotiations,⁵ one which would be as forthcoming as possible but consistent with our fundamental criteria based on market factors. The most recent round of talks in Washington appeared to show such a new U.S. proposal is possible.

C) Authorize cash sale of some military training, thus improving our ties to the dominant element in the Algerian political system. This proposal has already been considered with some care within the Department of State, but no decision has been taken.

D) Consider the sale of C–130 aircraft to Algeria, as the GOA has previously requested and we had previously shelved.⁶ This would admittedly be a difficult policy decision.

E) Promptly act to facilitate GOA rental of purchase of a much-needed larger Chancery in Washington. We have held up such action pending resolution of a property dispute in Algiers, but could now go ahead in Washington and trust the GOA to arrive at a fair settlement of our claim in Algiers. This gesture would be especially pleasing to Ambassador Malek, one of the three Algerian negotiators.

F) Expand educational and cultural exchanges particularly by offering additional Fulbright scholars and facilitating an exhibition of Algerian arts and crafts in the U.S.

G) Review our decision not to participate in the 1981 Algiers International Fair (i.e., institute the biennial cycle of attendance agreed informally with the Department of Commerce in 1981 instead of 1982).

H) Invite Minister of Planning Brahimi and his senior subordinates to Washington for a symposium organized by the Department of Commerce on business opportunities in Algeria following approval of the new five-year plan (Brahimi and his colleagues participated in such a symposium in London following Queen Elizabeth’s visit to Algeria).

I) Consider participation in the reconstruction of the El Asnam region through grant aid to private voluntary agencies such as Catholic Relief Services for assistance to the handicapped and the orphaned.

8. The above are preliminary ideas. We will be happy to elaborate on any of them at the Department’s request.

Haynes

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810038–0924. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. Houari Boumédiène, the second President of Algeria, a proponent of Western Saharan self-determination and of non-alignment in foreign policy, died in 1978.
3. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1965 to 1978.
4. Carter extended the invitation to Bendjedid in a February 9, 1979, letter. For text of the letter, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, Document 71.
5. See Document 99.
6. In telegram 327 from Algiers, January 29, 1980, the Embassy informed the Department about Algeria’s request to purchase C–130 aircraft. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D800051–0664) In telegram 56446 to Algiers, March 1, 1980, the Department informed the Embassy that “time is not rpt not propitious for C–130 sale.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D800108–0312)