49. Defense Intelligence Estimate1
[Omitted here are a title page and preface.]
Unclassified
NORTH AFRICA: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY (U)
KEY JUDGMENTS
(C) North African stability will continue on a downward trend over the next three years. Pandemic problems, including high population [Page 108] growth rates, agricultural inadequacy, economic constraints and regime legitimacy questions, will plague the North African regimes. Strained relations and the prospects for interstate conflict will contribute to the instability equation.
(S) Each regime faces problems sufficiently serious to topple the leadership given the right catalyst; however, barring such unpredictable events as assassinations, we judge that most incumbent rulers will remain in office over the next three years. The lifespan of Tunisia’s aging President Bourguiba is a major uncertainty.
(S) Tunisia’s future is likely to be increasingly turbulent. The likelihood for an abrupt change of regime will increase greatly once the Tunisian President dies. On the other hand, his continued rule will also increase the longer term prospects for a revolutionary, not evolutionary, transformation of Tunisia.
(C) Over the very long term, Algeria appears to have the prerequisites to support a substantially improved standard of living for its populace. Its success will depend on the implementation of pragmatic economic and social policies over the near term.
(S) Interstate hostilities are a distinct possibility. Although none of the governments seek such conflict, only the catalytic event is missing in the cases of Algeria-Morocco and Egypt-Libya. A substantial military defeat could cause the losing government to fall. Morocco’s King Hassan would not survive the loss of the Western Sahara in a war with Algeria.
(S) The United States will face challenges; the possibilities range from a friendly state distancing itself from the United States, through interstate conflict, to the emergence of an anti-Western regime. The internal threats to Morocco, Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Egypt appear to loom larger than those to Algeria or Libya. The loss of US access to Egypt or Morocco, for example, would seriously affect US contingency deployment planning. Should an Algerian-Moroccan war erupt, improving US-Algerian ties would likely suffer. Any such developments would provide opportunities for the USSR to exploit.
(C) A change in Libyan leadership would not necessarily portend a reversal of Libya’s international behavior or a warming of relations with the United States, especially if the new leadership perceived itself in need of Soviet goodwill.
[Omitted here is the body of the Estimate.]
- Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Defense Intelligence Estimate: North Africa: Prospects for Stability, February 1985. Secret; Noforn. Prepared in the Middle East/South Asia Division, Directorate for Estimates, Defense Intelligence Agency, and coordinated with the Service Intelligence Chiefs, based on information received as of mid-January 1985.↩