Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

459. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

4844.

Nouakchott, November 10, 1988, 1212Z

SUBJECT

• President Taya Opposed to Western Sahara Settlement.

Ref:

• (A) Nouakchott 3969;²
• (B) Nouakchott 2952.³

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: [less than 1 line not declassified] Mauritanian Chief of Staff Minnih confided that President Taya is worried that a rapprochement may be underway between Morocco and the Polisario.⁴ Minnih stated that the President had asked him whether Mauritania should attempt to derail this incipient rapprochement, which Taya believes would be inimical to Mauritanian interests. Minnih reportedly replied that Morocco and the Polisario are unlikely to reach a lasting agreement and recommended that the GIRM let the current U.N. peace initiative fail on its own. End summary.

3. In a lengthy, private conversation during the week of October 30th [less than 1 line declassified] Mauritanian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ahmed Ould Minnih reportedly said the President periodically consulted him about the Western Sahara conflict. The President believes Minnih possesses a good understanding of the protagonists as a result of his tenure as Foreign Minister (1980–1986) and his earlier service as military attaché in Algeria. Minnih stated that the President is worried that a rapprochement might be underway between Morocco and the Polisario, a development he believes would be inimical to Mauritanian interests. The President recently asked Minnih whether he thought the GIRM should try to derail this incipient rapprochement. Minnih said he replied that Morocco and the Polisario are unlikely to reach a lasting agreement. He predicted that the current U.N. peace initiative will fail on its own and therefore recommended that the GIRM, simply let events follow their natural course. Minnih reportedly told our contact that Taya does not want the conflict to end, since the war is the justification the Mauritanian military uses to remain in power.

4. Comment: We have received several indications in the past few months that Taya is worried about the impact on Mauritania of an eventual peaceful resolution of the Sahara war. In September 1988 he sent a personal emissary to French President Mitterrand to express this concern. The emissary conveyed, in particular, Taya’s fear that a peaceful settlement might trigger an influx of radical Sahrawis into Mauritania, who could threaten GIRM, stability (refs A and B). Minnih’s comments confirm that Taya’s concern indeed runs deep—although the Chief of Staff apparently believes this concern has more to do with a selfish desire to keep the military in power than with larger considerations of Mauritania’s national interest. We cannot tell whether this interpretation is accurate. [less than 1 line declassified] the Chief of Staff is convinced that Mauritania’s successive military governments have failed and for that reason he favors a return to civilian rule. This jaundiced view of military rule might account for Minnih’s cynical interpretation of Taya’s motivations. But regardless of whether Minnih is right or wrong about the President’s motives, this swipe at Taya is nonetheless significant. It is the first indication we have that Minnih’s support for the President may be less than wholehearted. End comment.

Twaddell

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881001–0504. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Bamako, Dakar, Paris, and Rabat.
2. In telegram 3969 from Nouakchott, September 19, the Embassy reported: “According to the French DCM in Nouakchott, President Taya sent a personal message to President Mitterrand expressing the GIRM’s concern about the possible impact on Mauritania of a settlement of the Western Sahara War. Taya fears that a hard core of Sahrawi insurgents might continue its struggle against Morocco from Northern Mauritania. He also fears that Polisario followers of Mauritanian origin might return to Mauritania and destabilize the GIRM.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880832–0377)
3. In telegram 2952 from Nouakchott, July 17, the Embassy reported: “According to the French DCM in Nouakchott, the GIRM has made clear to the French that it fears part of the Polisario might move to Mauritania in the event of a Western Sahara settlement.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880613–0099)
4. In telegram 10922 from Rabat, November 8, the Embassy reported: “In his Green March Anniversary address to the nation, November 6, King Hassan at once reaffirmed the validity and inalienability of Morocco’s claim to the Western Sahara and issued a call to the Polisario for reconciliation with Morocco.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880993–0926) The Green March was a 1975 demonstration organized by the Government of Morocco designed to force Spain to withdraw from the Western Sahara. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976, Documents 99–104, 107, 108, 110, 111, and 114.