Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

458. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

325045.

Washington, October 5, 1988, 0046Z

For Chargé from Crocker. Subject: My Exchange With King Hassan on the Western Sahara.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Herewith is my report of the salient points that emerged on the Western Sahara during my one-on-one with King Hassan on October 2. Generally, Hassan took a line consistent with what we had heard from Foreign Ministry State Secretary Cherkaoui.² I opened the topic by indicating our support for UNSYG Perez de Cuellar’s diplomatic initiative and our hopes that the optimistic noises we were hearing are based on reality. I then asked Hassan how he viewed the UN process and how he assessed Algerian decision-making on the unresolved issues.

3. Hassan responded warmly to our support for the diplomatic process and expressed confidence in Perez de Cuellar’s efforts. He made it clear that, from the Moroccan perspective, the ball lies in the Algerian court and that he doesn’t expect a basic decision that would nail down an agreement before the Algerian Party Congress in December. Continuing, Hassan stressed his belief that President Bendjedid is fully committed to Maghrebian rapprochement across the board, including such fields as economic cooperation, opening of borders, the construction of a regional political framework and a Saharan solution. Hassan spoke enthusiastically, for example, about the impact on Algerian public opinion of first-hand experience by hundreds of thousands of Algerians who had visited Morocco recently and witnessed its relative prosperity. That said, he strongly implied that Bendjedid had further homework to do in his own ranks before the next formulas would emerge to assuring a pre-cooked outcome of a Saharan referendum.

4. In response to my blunt question as to whether time was on Morocco’s side in this matter, Hassan said it was, and he indicated that there were no deadlines that had to be kept. In sum, if takes a few months for outstanding issues to be clarified and for Bendjedid to sell some face-saving formula to his colleagues, that is acceptable to Morocco.

5. In informal conversations, Cherkaoui expanded on Hassan’s thinking by stressing that the principal obstacle to necessary Algerian compromises lies in certain unspecified party hardliners and especially in the Algerian Foreign Ministry, which has acquired a long-standing vested interest in the all-or-nothing diplomacy of backing the SDAR’s cause. Cherkaoui repeated well-known Moroccan positions to the effect that the removal of Morocco’s military presence and civil administration during the settlement process was out of the question. As to the prospects for a UN resolution in the Fourth Committee, Hassan and Cherkaoui both felt that a polarizing resolution could be avoided. Cherkaoui was reluctant to see an Algerian hand in supporting extreme Polisario language in New York. Hassan claimed there was evidence of Cuban support for a confrontation in the UN.

6. Overall, Hassan left me with the clear impression that he is relaxed and confident about the course of events about the Maghreb generally and the Sahara question specifically. He added with a smile that global events favored our common interests in the region and that, in any case, one had to be an optimist when dealing with the affairs of state.

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880885–0598. Secret; Immediate, Exdis. Drafted and approved by Crocker; cleared by Casey and Jim McVerry (S/S–O). Sent for information Priority to Algiers.
2. In telegram 9690 from Rabat, October 3, the Embassy reported that in an October 1 conversation with the Embassy political officer, Cherkaoui indicated: “The outcome in the Fourth Committee was not only a crucial test of Algerian intentions, but would prefigure results of the December FLN Congress—i.e., whether Bendjedid could assert his authority, take out the hardliners, and end of the influence of the MFA, which had always opposed normalization.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880880–0718)