453. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State1
7560.
Algiers, December 12, 1987, 1152Z
SUBJECT
- Western Sahara: Prospects and Policy.
- 1.
- Secret—Entire text.
- 2.
- We are impressed, but remain unpersuaded, by the general surge of optimism on the prospects for settlement of the Sahara question and/or an improvement in Algeria/Morocco relations.
- 3.
- Our skepticism is rooted in the following fundamentals:
- A)
- Algeria is not about to abandon the Polisario. Even the most moderate AL would insist on a settlement which would include the return of the Sahrawi refugees to the Western Sahara with some form of local autonomy.
- B)
- There is no sign that Hassan is prepared to accept any kind of compromise. His strategy is clearly designed to buy time for the permanent implantation of the imported Moroccan population in the Western Sahara. If, as is unlikely, the Saharans are ever allowed back, it will be as a minority group in a Moroccan Sahara with no special political status as an indigenous people.
- C)
- A Moroccan-run referendum would be won by Morocco. A referendum of the Saharan people would be won by the Polisario. Hence, the two sides will never likely reach an accord on terms for a referendum.
- D)
- The 180,000 Moroccans now living in the Sahara are not going to quietly allow Hassan to compromise their privileged and dominant status for the sake of peace with the Polisario. They certainly have no intention of giving the Saharans political control even as an autonomous part of Morocco.
- E)
- The U.N. process will eventually confront these realities and will stall or be scuttled, probably by Morocco. (The Algerians have the U.N. clout to shape the process their way.)
- 4.
- The current round of optimism does not alter these fundamentals, and therefore, we believe it is unlikely to yield lasting results. The military balance in the Sahara will fluctuate depending on tactical or weapons improvements by one side or the other. The Morocco-Algeria relationship will also ebb and flow but will not improve fundamentally as long as the Saharan war continues.
- 5.
- As to U.S. policy, it will (and should) continue to be ambivalent
because:
- A)
- This is not a critical issue for the U.S.
- B)
- We would like to preserve good relations with both Morocco and Algeria. Taking sides works to our disadvantage by inviting the Soviets to play a greater role.
- C)
- We cannot support Moroccan absorption of the Sahara without violating our own views on rights of self-determination.
- D)
- We cannot support true self-determination without destabilizing Morocco and risking the creation of a nuisance mini-state.
- E)
- Playing it the way we have, we get our cake and eat it too. The only price we pay is occasional Moroccan and Algerian whining and a perpetual state of nervousness in Mauritania. As desirable as it would be to see a settlement of the conflict, this is beyond our reach. Given this, our current policy is the best we can do.
Johnstone
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D871019–0603. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Tunis, Rabat, Paris, Madrid, Nouakchott, and Riyadh.↩