Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

438. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

1319.

Rabat, February 7, 1986, 0934Z

SecState pls pass White House for Vice President Bush. Dept also pass to USUN and AmEmbassies Algiers and Dakar. Subj: February 7 Audience With King Hassan—Initiative on the Western Sahara. Ref: (A) Rabat 1178² (B) SecState 26510.³

1. Secret/Nodis—Entire text.

2. Summary: During my February 7 audience with King Hassan on other subjects, I referred to the Vice President’s message (ref B) exploring possibilities of direct Moroccan-Algerian talks on the Western Sahara, emphasizing the U.S. did not want to interfere but was willing to be helpful. Hassan expressed thanks for the Vice President’s interest. He said that he was willing to enter into a direct dialogue with Algiers, and would initiate one. He cautioned, however, that past experience had shown Algiers is increasingly opposed to self-determination in the region, and said that talks without a third party as witness allowed Algiers to intentionally misconstrue to others the tough positions they took with Rabat. Hassan said the U.S. could advance the process by encouraging OAU Chairman Diouf to link up with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar’s efforts, and backing Morocco’s calls for a referendum of self-determination for the region. End summary.

3. Following discussion of other subjects with King Hassan at my February 7 audience in Marrakech, I raised the issue of the Western Sahara. (Prior to the audience I had lunched with Foreign Minister Filali, who noted to me the “interesting letter” from Vice President Bush to the King (ref B) regarding contacts with Algeria on the Western Sahara which had been delivered the day before. He encouraged me to raise the issue with Hassan, noting that it might be time to again seek to move things along on the subject.) I emphasized to Hassan that the US had no desire to insert itself into the process of resolving the issue, but wanted to be helpful if it could. I explained to him that Algeria had been very active diplomatically, and had told the U.S. Government of its desire and readiness to resolve the issue if Morocco was interested in renewing the bilateral dialogue that has been dormant since early 1985.

4. Hassan expressed appreciation for the Vice President’s interest, noting that for a variety of reasons, it is only natural that the United States should take an interest in the Saharan issue. He emphasized that Morocco was willing to renew the bilateral dialogue. Morocco is in a strong position, he explained. Like a lawyer who knows he has a strong case, it is not interested in who pleads first. Thus, Morocco would not stand on protocol, and was prepared to seek renewed contacts with Algeria but did not specify a time frame.

5. He cautioned, however, against expecting too much from such contacts. Algeria is not interested in the solution of self-determination for the Sahraoui people through a referendum, and in fact appears to be gradually backing away from that solution. Moreover, Algeria has to date insisted on face-to-face talks with Morocco rather than with a third party (other than the Polisario) because it “wants no witnesses.” He explained that Algeria portrays one thing as its position to third countries, while in its actual contacts with Morocco, it says something entirely different. Hassan recalled that King Fahd of Saudi Arabia had in early 1985 proposed Moroccan-Algerian talks at his palace in Marbella with the Saudis acting as facilitators, and that Algeria would have nothing of it.

6. Hassan said the U.S. could help facilitate a solution to the Western Saharan question, however, by helping to move along the efforts currently underway with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar in New York (ref A). He asked if the US could “push” OAU Chairman Abou Diouf to cooperate with Perez de Cuellar. He emphasized his high esteem for Diouf, and said he had spoken on several occasions recently “on the phone and through emissaries” with Diouf. He noted that Diouf’ s mandate as OAU head runs out in mid-1986, and expressed fear that Diouf could be followed “by some leftist” who would complicate more than help matters. At the same time, he said, the U.S. would be useful if it helped push for a referendum of self-determination of the Saharan population. He emphasized that only a referendum would serve as the basis for a lasting settlement in the area, and that the sooner both sides moved toward that position, the better.

7. Comment: Hassan seemed somewhat less enthused about the efforts under way in New York than Filali had been just two days earlier (ref A) but sees usefulness in pursuing that path and would appreciate U.S. help in encouraging it. He has no illusions, however, about the difficulties any of the negotiating options will face.

Nassif

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Lot 95D23, 1986 Nodis Telegrams, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. In telegram 1178 from Rabat, February 5, Nassif reported that during a February 4 meeting, Filali “briefed me on current prospects for renewing dialogue with Algeria on the Western Sahara.” Nassif also reported that Filali said “Morocco is also following closely current soundings on the issue by the UN Secretary General and OAU Chairman and believes that progress could also be made through those channels” and “expressed interest in U.S. thinking on a Saharan settlement.” (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 26510 transmitted the Vice President’s message. See Document 436.