Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

429. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 17, 1985

SUBJECT

• (1) Reported Moroccan Request for Soviet Arms
• (2) Algeria’s View of the Western Sahara

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Shultz
• Foreign Minister Ibrahimi
• Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun
• Ambassador Newlin

Foreign Minister Ibrahimi said the Soviets had informed the Algerians, on the eve of President Bendjedid’s visit to Washington,² that King Hassan had sent a message to Gorbachev requesting T 72 tanks and helicopters. According to the Foreign Minister the King said he wanted Soviet arms “in order to be free of American pressure.”

On the Western Sahara, Ibrahimi said President Bendjedid had sent him to see King Hassan shortly after the OAU decision to seat the Polisaro. He had asked the King for his views on how to find a solution.

The King reportedly asked if Algeria had territorial ambitions in the Western Sahara. To which, Ibrahimi assured him Algeria had no territorial ambitions whatsoever and was content with the boundaries it had inherited at Independence. He said the King had asked him this question on ten separate occasions.

(Ibrahimi then recounted the February ’83³ meeting between Hassan and Bendjedid. At that time, Bendjedid asked for the King’s views on how to proceed with a referendum as called for by the OAU. King Hassan reportedly on this occasion opposed a referendum on the ground that it would result in a victor and a vanquished. It could also leave a lasting wound in Algerian-Moroccan relations. Instead, the King proposed a formula under which Morocco would have “the flag and the postage stamps” and the Saharans would have wide autonomy. Secretary Shultz noted the idea of a referendum had been proposed by the King.)

When in late ’84 Ibrahimi reminded the King of the flag/stamp formula, the latter authorized Ibrahimi, Filali and Guerdira to draw up such a plan. When a document was presented to the King on February 6, he rejected it citing the example of New Caledonia.⁴ Once autonomy was achieved, the Saharans could then demand independence.

Ibrahimi replied Algeria was ready to guarantee autonomy; Morocco would also have to guarantee not to annex the Western Sahara.

While rejecting the flag and postage stamp proposal, and stating that Morocco would never meet with the Polisaro, the King sent a secret emissary to meet with the Polisario in Lisbon. About the same time, critical articles appeared in the European press inspired by Morocco concerning the “Algerian proposal.”

Ibrahimi said Algeria had tried to fathom why the King had changed his mind and had come up with the following factors:

(a) The policy of the French Socialist Party in power was different from that of the French Socialist party in opposition.

(b) Saudi money enabled the King to continue the war.

(c) The Qadhafi factor.

(d) Some Moroccan opposition parties were more royalist than the King on this issue.

Despite the fact contacts on this issue had been interrupted since February 6, 1985, Algeria intended to continue its efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985: Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Cleared by Jonathan Benton and Quinn. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Family Quarters of the White House.
2. See Document 147.
3. The two leaders actually met in March 1983. See Document 20.
4. Reference is to the French Overseas Territory of New Caledonia, located in the South Pacific. Residents enjoyed French citizenship and representation in the French Parliament and were governed by French laws and regulations.