Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

418. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea¹

87650.

Washington, March 24, 1984, 2008Z

SUBJECT

• Western Sahara and the OAU: Sekou Toure’s Next Steps.

Ref:

• Addis 1330 (Notal).²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Last week AF and NEA completed a series of consultations with the Algerian Commerce Minister,³ Peter Onu,⁴ Guy Penne,⁵ and the Nigerian Foreign Minister.⁶ Each discussion dealt with, in varying degrees of intensity, the Western Sahara issue and its effect on the upcoming Conakry OAU Summit. This week Sekou Toure carried his personal OAU diplomacy to Rabat⁷ and Algiers.⁸ The Department believes that now is the time to engage Toure in a searching discussion of the Western Sahara and the prospects for staging a successful summit in Conakry this year.

3. You have seen from the cables reporting the Washington discussions that the OAU appears to be at an impasse over the issue of seating an SDAR delegation at the summit. We remain concerned that Morocco will be isolated in the OAU and, indeed, may be alone in walking out of the summit should the SDAR be seated. At the moment, we do not envision an active role for the U.S. in dealing with this imbroglio; we believe, however, that it is essential to learn Toure’s views and intentions as OAU Summit host in light of his recent consultations in Algiers and Rabat and the need for him and the OAU Secretariat to set a summit date.

4. You should therefore seek an appointment with Toure as soon as possible⁹ and put before him the following questions:

— A) Will the summit take place o/a May 25, as originally scheduled, or will there be a delay? If there is a delay, when will it be rescheduled?

— B) Would a delay help in defusing the dispute over the seating of an SDAR delegation?

— C) Would Sekou Toure allow an SDAR delegation into the country?

— D) Will two/thirds of the OAU members show up in Conakry?

— E) Will the SDAR be seated?

— F) Is there any possibility of a conditional seating of the SDAR that would not prejudice the holding of a referendum?

— G) Is there anything that can be done between now and the summit that could head off the seating of the SDAR?

— H) Might some kind of diplomatic activity (such as shuttle diplomacy by a respected African) provide enough appearance of movement to make the seating of the SDAR less likely?

— I) Has Peter Onu seen Toure since Toure’s visits to Rabat and Algiers (Onu told us here that he planned to spend several days with Toure before returning to Addis Ababa, but that presumably was disrupted by Toure’s travels in North Africa).

— J) Is there a possibility of successfully convening a meeting of the Implementation Committee prior to the summit to deal with the issue of negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario?

— K) What is the potential for the Chad issue to delay or disrupt the summit?.

— L) Is there anything that the U.S. can do to be helpful, in Toure’s view?

5. For Dakar and Addis Ababa: Department would appreciate your posing questions, at your discretion, along the lines of those above to your interlocutors in the GOS and the OAU respectively.¹⁰

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840195–0274. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Scott; cleared by Perkins, Sebastian, Van Gilder, Vincent, and Bishop; approved by Crocker. Sent for information Priority to Algiers. Sent for information to Rabat, Addis Ababa, and Dakar.
2. In telegram 1330 from Addis Ababa, March 20, the Embassy reported: “OAU official with responsibility for Western Sahara tells us that the OAU Secretariat is making plans, under instructions from interim Secretary General Peter Onu, for another Western Sahara Implementation Committee meeting in late April or May. The planning does not yet have the blessing of OAU Chairman Mengistu but Onu will discuss this initiative with Chairman Mengistu when he (Onu) returns to Addis Ababa later this month.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840182–0152)
3. In telegram 77312 to Algiers, March 16, the Department reported that on March 12, Khellef told Shultz “that Morocco’s hardening position on the Sahara, in particular its apparent choice of military rather than political means to achieve a solution, risked further deterioration in Morocco’s already difficult domestic situation.” The GOA, Khellef said, had tried “to promote a political solution by enabling Hassan to agree to the direct negotiations with the Polisario that are necessary for a settlement,” but “the King had chosen not to do.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840173–0806)
4. In telegram 83506 to Addis Ababa, March 22, the Department reported that during a March 16 meeting with Crocker, Bishop, and Lyman, Onu informed them that, with regards to the OAU Ministerial, “there were no prospects for breaking the impasse over the SDAR issue, which is preventing the name of a summit date. SDAR supporters are demanding prior assurances that Guinea allow the SDAR to attend the summit and, if the SDAR is seated, to pose no obstacles.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840186–0566)
5. In telegram 78878 to Addis Ababa and Paris, March 17, the Department noted that during a March 14 meeting with Crocker, French Presidential African Affairs advisor Guy Penne “commented that prospects for holding the Conakry summit were not at all clear because the SDAR recognition issue may constitute a serious obstacle.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840177–0337)
6. In telegram 79210 to Lagos, March 17, the Department indicated that on March 15, Nigerian Minister of External Affairs Ibrahim Gambari told Shultz that “Nigeria wants to see movement” on the Western Sahara, “especially to ensure that it and the Chad question do not prevent the holding of the OAU Summit. As a member of the Implementation Committee, Nigeria is looking for something to implement. It wants to see movement from Morocco and the other parties involved.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840177–0599)
7. In telegram 2520 from Rabat, March 19, the Embassy reported on Sékou Touré’s visit to Morocco indicating that, according to Moroccan officials, “he remains committed to holding the summit on schedule and that his visits to Fez and Algiers are an effort to resolve the diplomatic impasse over the Western Sahara.” Furthermore, “Belkeziz summarized that there were two options for the Conakry summit: either failure on the order of the abortive Tripoli summits or an acceptable formula to manage the Sahara issue. The summit, he said, must convene and study the issue without pre-conditions on admission of the SDAR.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840179–0362)
8. In telegram 1426 from Algiers, March 21, the Embassy reported that Sékou Touré, upon departing Algeria, “proclaimed himself wholly satisfied with his visit” to Algiers, “but said that the two sides had ‘somewhat divergent views on some problems.’” The Embassy commented: “Although GOA still professes its willingness to assist in reconciliation of Western Sahara problem, it shows no sign of falling off its minimum requirement for direct contact between the Polisario and Morocco.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840185–0687)
9. On March 26, Sékou Touré died while undergoing a cardiac procedure at the Cleveland Clinic in Cleveland, Ohio. In telegram 2835 from Rabat, the Embassy commented: “The unexpected death of Guinean President Sékou Touré is a serious blow to Morocco’s diplomatic position on the Western Sahara which has depended in large part on confidence that, with Sékou Touré at the helm of the OAU, Morocco would gain the upper hand in subsequent discussions.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840200–0356)
10. In telegram 3161 from Dakar, March 27, the Embassy reported: “While we are not privy to the details of their conversations,” Senegal “is clearly carrying on an active triangular diplomacy with Morocco, Algeria and the SDAR.” The Embassy continued: “We will do our best to learn the tenor of all these conversations, but the Senegalese clearly don’t wish to share the details with us for the moment, at least.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840202–0315)