Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

415. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

490.

Rabat, January 17, 1984, 1130Z

Rome please pass to Codel Lantos. Military for Polads. Subject: King Hassan’s Views on the Western Sahara Issue. Ref: A) Rabat 407 (Notal),² B) Rabat 404 (Notal).³

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Codel Lantos spent January 12 in Casablanca where the Congressmen had lengthy meetings with Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani and many members of the Moroccan Government followed by a long meeting with King Hassan II (see reftel A). This cable reports on King Hassan’s comments on the Western Sahara.

3. During the meeting with Codel Lantos, Congressman Pickle of Texas asked what the United States might do to help resolve the Sahara problem. He also asked what would help Morocco most, MAP, FMS or to have the United States say publicly that it is on Morocco’s side.

4. The King responded that the problem of the Sahara is a political one and its neighbors have made it a military one. He explained that when Morocco wanted a solution it went to the United Nations, the International Court of Justice and noted that the Treaty of Madrid had been sanctioned by the United Nations. He said that as Morocco’s neighbor insists on military solutions, he had to react in a military manner although the final solution could only be political.

5. Turning more directly to the question of what is expected from the United States, the King said that he hopes that the United States will give him the “oxygen” he needs to be able to keep hold militarily of the situation. He added that even more important was the political support of the United States. He said the United States should state that Morocco is correct because it wants to hold a free and fair referendum. “Here we need the help of the United States.” He noted that the adversary who asked for a referendum for years no longer wants it despite all guarantees by the OAU and UN observers. The King said that he believes the referendum should take place now. He argued that the opposition has opted for a subversive war because they want Morocco to have a financial hemorrhage. Pointing out that with its natural gas Algeria earns $15 billion per year and Morocco does not have $500 million. “Algeria wants to lead us to bankruptcy.” The King added that Morocco is very troublesome to some countries because it has freedom of the press, labor unions, a constitution which guarantees freedoms and in two months will hold legislative elections. The King wryly remarked that Morocco is a subversive state in the other direction. He concluded his answer by saying that Morocco was in an undeclared war Morocco must win, and to do that it must be strong on the field.

6. Congressman Seiberling asked the King what was preventing Morocco from going ahead with the referendum without waiting for Algeria and others to support it.

7. The King responded that the reason is simple. When he went to Nairobi and made the offer for the referendum, he made it clear that he wanted to have no responsibility in organizing it. For the referendum to take place the Implementing Committee had to come to determine when and where it would be held and to agree on questions, and to put in its observers or UN observers. “When I say that it is time to have a referendum, the other side says no.” The King said that Morocco has no role to play in organizing a referendum but that he would make resources available to the OAU. The King closed by saying that Morocco’s adversaries now pose arbitrary and trumped up reasons why the referendum cannot be held at this time.

8. Minimize considered Nouakchott.

Reed

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840033–0602. Confidential. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Casablanca, London, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Tunis, Rome, USUN, Tangier, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, USDOCOSOUTH, and USCINCEUR.
2. In telegram 407 from Rabat, January 13, the Embassy reported on the “extraordinary effort by King Hassan and the Moroccan Government to demonstrate their interest in the Codel and their friendship for the United States.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840026–0244)
3. In telegram 404 from Rabat, January 13, Reed reported that he had conveyed the talking points to King Hassan contained in telegram 8877 (see footnote 3, Document 417). (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840026–0051)