Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

410. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

214438.

Washington, July 30, 1983, 2257Z

SUBJECT

• Crocker-Yaker Meeting on Western Sahara.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Following is summary of Western Sahara portion of memcon of July 29 conversation between AF Assistant Secretary Crocker and Algerian Ambassador Yaker.

3. Yaker cited King’s speech of July 9² and large scale military operations triggered by Moroccan attacks³ as “showing Morocco in contradiction with spirit and letter” of Addis OAU Saharan resolution. He urged the U.S. to use its influence on Morocco in favor of compliance with OAU resolution.⁴ He noted in passing, that American political, diplomatic, and military support for the King fueled the war. Hassan’s July 9 statement, Yaker asserted, prejudges referendum thus voiding it of its content. This and Moroccan military activities creating increasingly “risky” situation which could expand, drawing in other countries, transforming conflict into an East-West confrontation, and ruining opportunities for regional cooperation. Though claiming not to speak for Polisario, Yaker stated his belief that once good faith negotiations began “between the parties and with help of Implementation Committee” the level of violence would seriously diminish.

4. During the course of the eighty-minute conversation Crocker, accompanied by AF DAS Bishop and NEA/AFN Peter Sebastian, countered that it is not Morocco which is responsible for the current fighting. Those with influence on Polisario should make that organization realize that current attacks make it more difficult for the OAU process to proceed. We are not about to press the King to participate in a negotiating process which both he and the U.S. have already welcomed as providing for a resolution of the conflict. We tend to read the King’s recent speech as designed for the many audiences which he, as any statesman, must address. It could of course be read simply as an expression of Moroccan confidence that the referendum will produce a result favorable to its interests. In our view, the ball is in the court of the OAU Implementation Committee whose mandate we support.

5. Yaker agreed that the OAU Committee could play an important role in indirect encounters between Morocco and the Polisario to clear away the underbrush. But indirect talks, he insisted, could only be useful in the initial stages of negotiation. Unfortunately, GOA has yet to see Morocco take steps to begin process of implementing Addis OAU resolution. Crocker responded that pragmatism is key. Progress will require compromise. If Polisario objective is limited to form, viz., to appear as co-equal party, progress will be difficult. Yaker closed with reiteration that Morocco needs to begin to talk to other party. GOA cannot negotiate for Polisario but desires to help and remains committed to OAU solution and process of rapprochement with Morocco.

6. The meeting was a cordial one. Crocker invited Yaker to meet with him again next week to continue the conversation and to discuss Chad. The brief exposition of Algeria’s position on Chad which Yaker provided in the July 29 meeting seemed rigidly wrong-headed.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830435–0385. Confidential. Drafted by Jeffrey Davidow (AF/I); cleared by Thomas Williams (AF/W), Sebastian, and Bishop; approved by Crocker. Sent for information to Lagos, Addis Ababa, Bamako, Cairo, Conakry, Dar es Salaam, Dakar, Freetown, Khartoum, Nairobi, Paris, Rabat, and USUN.
2. In telegram 5547 from Rabat, July 15, the Embassy reported: “Morocco is now fully engaged in a display of unanimity on the Western Sahara question. The campaign to put forward a united front received new impetus from the King’s July 9 address, in which he announced postponement of parliamentary elections to focus on the referendum on the Western Sahara.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830404–0347)
3. Reference is to the July 10 Polisario attack at M’Sied, near Tan-Tan in Morocco proper. In telegram 1731 from Casablanca, July 15, the Consulate reported that it “was the most significant military action in the south in well over a year.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830404–0470)
4. See footnote 3, Document 408.