Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

4. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria¹

77983.

Washington, March 27, 1981, 0318Z

SUBJECT

• Tension Between Morocco and Mauritania.

Refs:

• A) Rabat 2113²
• B) Rabat 2153³
• C) Nouakchott 1349.⁴

1. (S) Entire text.

2. We appreciate Embassy Rabat’s alert (ref A) highlighting Moroccan charges that the recent Polisario attack on Guelta Zemmour was launched from Mauritania and Moroccan reference to possible retaliation and hints of possible pre-emption of future attacks. We have also noted Moroccan Prime Minister’s reference to “right of hot pursuit” (ref B) while continuing charges and counter-charges may simply be posturing, we agree with Embassy Nouakchott (ref C) that it is only prudent to encourage restraint before the situation gets out of hand.

3. We have asked INR to assess the situation on the ground, but we understand that varying local perceptions may ultimately determine policy. In any case, the U.S. position should be made clear ASAP. Therefore Charges should make the following points at the highest possible level in the MFA:

4. (For all action posts) The USG shares the concern of many states and regional organizations (notably the Arab League and OAU) about a possible escalation and widening of the Western Sahara conflict. In the past, the U.S. has worked evenhandedly to limit the fighting. (For Rabat: We have urged Algeria, with some success, to discourage attacks by the Polisario into undisputed areas of Morocco from Algerian soil.) (For Algiers: We have discouraged any policy of hot pursuit by Morocco into Algeria.) While we regret any fighting anywhere in the region, it is particularly important to avoid confrontations between the states of the region.

— We welcome the Arab League’s Secretary General’s reported intention to visit Mauritania and Morocco to establish a dialogue on this subject.

— At this stage, we believe it would be helpful for all parties to reduce the level of public statements and pursue their concerns through private channels.⁵

— Your government should be aware that we have made our concern known to the other two governments bordering the Western Sahara.

5. For Rabat only. In addition to general points above, you should inquire about Moroccan intentions re hot pursuit in a way which expresses our concern. Also stress the following point:

— The U.S. has publicly announced its support for the independence and territorial integrity of Mauritania. We note that Morocco has reiterated its respect for Mauritanian sovereignty and territorial integrity. We strongly discourage any action which might put into question Moroccan policy in this regard.

6. For Nouakchott only. While we are expressing our concern to Morocco about acts that could enlarge the conflict, we are also concerned about recurrent reports of Polisario movements in Mauritania. We consider it imperative that GIRM make every effort to ensure that its territory not be used for Polisario attacks into the Western Sahara or for refuge and resupply. Share our concern with GIRM and make the following point:

— Mauritania has assured us that it intends to maintain a policy of neutrality towards the Western Sahara conflict and opposes use of its territory for attacks on Moroccan forces by the Polisario. We welcome all measures within GIRM’s power designed to underscore Mauritania’s neutrality and oppose violation of Mauritanian sovereignty by any outside forces.

7. For Algiers only. In discussing this issue with the GOA, ask about reports that Algeria has provided arms to Mauritania and seek clarification of the type of arms and intent of these shipments.

Haig

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810044–0751. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Edmund Hull (NEA/AFN) and Edward Brynn (AF/W); cleared by Coon, Veliotes, George Harris (INR), Draper, Morton, Seitz, Borg, and W. Scott Butcher (S/S–O); approved by Stoessel. Sent for information Immediate to Tunis, Dakar, and Paris.
2. In telegram 2113 from Rabat, March 25, the Embassy reported that the Moroccan press had published “the unequivocal official statement” by the GOM “that the Polisario units launched their attack on Guelta Zenmour from Mauritanian territory, Morocco’s reservation of the right of self-defense and attribution in advance of responsibility for any consequences to the Mauritanian leadership, and the publication of the instructions to Foreign Minister Boucetta in Tunis to include this development in the Moroccan complaint against Mauritania to be presented at the League of Arab States Ministerial meeting.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810141–0420)
3. In telegram 2153 from Rabat, March 26, the Embassy reported that according to an AFP item, Bouabid had warned Bneijara “that Morocco ‘has information at its disposition which permits it to affirm without risk of error that the (March 23 attackers on Guelta Zemmour) crossed the Mauritanian border from the locality of Bir Moghrein, situated in Mauritanian territory.’ Such acts belied Mauritanian claims of neutrality including those made by Bneijara to King Hassan at Ta’if.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810143–0384)
4. In telegram 1349 from Nouakchott, March 25, the Embassy reported: “It is saber-rattling time in the continuing war of words (with considerable risk of escalation) between Morocco and Mauritania. For past nine days, listeners to Mauritanian radio have been treated to non-stop condemnation of Moroccan ‘perfidious aggression’ ordered by the ‘bloodthirsty King Hassan II’ whose ‘immoral maneuvers bring shame to the Moroccan throne.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810142–0720)
5. Not further identified.