Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

386. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Recipients¹

281066.

Washington, October 22, 1981, 0038Z

Nouakchott for Asst Sec Crocker. Subject: Western Sahara: Moroccan-Mauritanian Tensions. Ref: A) Rabat 7641,² B) FBIS NC 2022041,³ C) Nouakchott 5020,⁴ D) State 277390 (Notal),⁵ E) FBIS NC 211500,⁶ F) State 280002.⁷

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Tensions caused by the Oct 13–16 battle between Moroccan and Polisario forces at Guelta Zemmour in the Western Sahara have now spread to include Mauritania. King Hassan has warned the Mauritanians against use of its territory by the Polisario (ref A) and Morocco’s General Dlimi has reportedly claimed that Morocco’s Air Force has struck at Polisario forces inside Mauritania (ref B). Mauritania’s President Haidalla has denied both the King’s allegations and Dlimi’s claim. (Ref C.)

3. These developments increase the urgency of action on the part of the OAU Implementation Committee to begin negotiations on the cease-fire envisioned at Nairobi II. The Secretary has already recommended that Kenya’s President Moi take the lead in this regard. (Ref D.) We are aware of press reports that Moi has sent a message to the Polisario (and presumably other parties) urging an end to the fighting (ref E) in reply to which the Polisario has reiterated its demand for direct negotiations. We believe that the Implementation Committee itself provides a viable forum for negotiations to this end, and that the Polisario’s demand, and Morocco’s refusal, to negotiate a cease-fire directly should not rpt not delay the opening of negotiations.

4. For Nairobi. Citing the increasing tensions between Morocco and Mauritania, you should once again raise our suggestion that the Implementation Committee convene to begin negotiations towards a ceasefire. You should seek information on and express appreciation for efforts President Moi has undertaken and encourage the Kenyans to persist despite procedural obstacles, i.e. direct vs. indirect talks. (You may share with the Kenyans indications we have from the Algerians that they would not rpt not support the Polisario demand for direct talks. (Ref F.)

5. For Bamako, Conakry, Dar es Salaam, Khartoum, Lagos and Freetown. Based on public information, such as ref E, of renewed call for ceasefire negotiations you should reinforce at appropriate levels in Foreign Ministries the approach we are making to the Kenyans, if you believe it will be helpful. You should not rpt not characterize Kenyan effort as US initiative.

6. For Rabat: Septel provides guidance for urging Moroccan restraint in dealing with Mauritania.⁸

7. For Algiers. You should encourage the Algerians to use their influence with the Polisario to calm the situation in the area and to encourage Polisario participation in negotiations under Implementation Committee auspices (i.e. indirect talks) to bring about a ceasefire.

8. For Nouakchott. Express our hope that Mauritania can remain a non-belligerent and take all measures within its capabilities to insure that its territory is not exploited by any foreign forces.

9. For Dakar and Jidda: You should describe to Governments of Senegal and Saudi Arabia diplomatic efforts USG is taking to help prevent further deterioration of situation. Since SAE and GOS were recipients of special pleas from King Hassan, which GOM has shared with us, we would like to work with them in any way they feel useful to help defuse situation. While the exact situation on the ground is a subject of contradictory reports, it is clear that tensions have dramatically escalated and we hope friends of Morocco and Mauritania can be helpful in resolving the problem.

Clark

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810498–0751. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent to Rabat, Nouakchott, Algiers, Nairobi, Bamako, Conakry, Dar es Salaam, Khartoum, Lagos, Freetown, Dakar, and Jidda. Drafted by Edmund Hull (NEA/AFN); cleared by Flaten, Bishop, Kaplan, and Richard Sherman (S/S–O); approved by Veliotes. Sent for information Priority to Madrid, Paris, and USUN.
2. In telegram 7641 from Rabat, October 20, the Embassy reported that Hassan had received a warning that “while after the Guelta Zemmour attack the King had restrained Moroccan forces from hot pursuit of Polisario units escaping into Mauritanian territory, the GIRM will be held liable for any future Polisario incursions into the Western Sahara. The warning was in the form of an open letter” to Mauritanian President Ould Haidallah. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810496–0678)
3. Not found.
4. In telegram 5020 from Nouakchott, October 20, the Embassy reported that Haidallah replied to Hassan’s open letter. According to the Embassy, Haidallah responded that it was “‘clear that Your Majesty’s accusations were aimed at justifying an aggression against our country . . . in case this should unfortunately happen, Your Majesty will bear the entire responsibility and should know that our army and our people will be in a position to defend our territorial integrity.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810496–0756)
5. In telegram 277390 to Nairobi, October 17, the Department instructed the Embassy “to seek urgent meeting with Foreign Minister to convey Secretary’s concern” about an escalation of the Western Sahara conflict and “urge Kenya as Chairman of OAU to take urgent measures to counter current threat to OAU mediation efforts, possibly by immediately reconvening the Implementation Committee in order to begin negotiations toward cease fire called for in Nairobi II Resolution.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810490–0728)
6. Not found.
7. In telegram 280002 to Algiers, October 21, the Department reported on Malek’s October 20 meeting with Veliotes. Malek “agreed that OAU Implementation Committee was a logical forum for negotiations involving the belligerents. He did not repeat not press Polisario demand for direct talks with Morocco, but rather agreed that indirect negotiations were more practical.” Malek also claimed “Saharans alone were involved in the Western Sahara fighting and said he knew from his experience in Moscow that Polisario contacts with the Eastern bloc were limited.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810495–0503)
8. In telegram 281064 to Rabat, October 22, the Department instructed the Embassy to inform the Moroccan Foreign Minister of the U.S. démarche to the OAU (see footnote 5 above), adding: “In light of October 21 statement that its forces have gone into Mauritanian territory, you should also express our concern that the situation not be permitted to escalate further.” The Department continued: “You should reassure the Moroccans that we continue to support His Majesty’s initiative toward a ceasefire and a referendum. We are most concerned that further military operations in Mauritania may unravel the process so hopefully begun in June.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810498–0344)