Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

373. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Veliotes), the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Wolfowitz), and the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Crocker) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Stoessel)¹

Washington, March 23, 1981

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy Toward Morocco and the Western Sahara Conflict

ISSUE

At a recent IG meeting² a virtually unanimous consensus a emerged that U.S. strategic interests and determination to stick by its friends require a strong bilateral relationship with Morocco, and that these factors, not the conflict over the Sahara, should determine our arms supply toward Morocco. This contrasts with the arms supply policy of the past year and a half, which was based on a linkage between our willingness to supply certain kinds of arms and Moroccan willingness to negotiate on the Sahara dispute.

There was, however, some disagreement in the IG meeting over what kind of a diplomatic strategy would best suit U.S. bilateral and regional interests. To what extent should the U.S. play—or be seen to play—a relatively active role in bringing the Moroccans and their adversaries to the negotiating table? After further exploring relevant issues, we have concluded that we can best define our options for a specific U.S. diplomatic strategy later; meanwhile we should be taking certain intermediate steps.

Two HFAC Subcommittees are holding a joint hearing on our Moroccan arms policy and the Western Sahara conflict on March 25.³ We believe we should publicly state the new basis for our arms supply policy toward Morocco at that time, recognizing that it will be strongly opposed by those Congressmen who have insisted that our willingness to deliver arms to Morocco be linked to positive Moroccan steps to negotiate a compromise political settlement of the Sahara conflict. We should also make it clear at this hearing that we will be reviewing our diplomatic objectives and options, and eliciting the views of other interested parties on prospects for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The relationship of our Moroccan arms policy to the Western Sahara conflict has long been a matter of sensitivity with the Congress, in part because of questions under international and domestic law. These legal questions, and the historical context in which they have arisen, are described briefly at Tab 2.⁴

This memorandum proposes that you (a) approve our recommended basic posture toward arms sales to Morocco; (b) authorize us to base our public testimony at the March 25 HFAC hearing on this posture; (c) authorize us to take certain defined intermediate steps; and (d) agree to our analyzing and defining our diplomatic options for future SIG consideration.

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE

A. Agreement on Fundamentals. At an Interdepartmental Group meeting February 25 there was broad agreement that the following elements of our position with respect to the Western Sahara should be emphasized in articulating our policy:

1. Morocco’s importance to us, already great, will grow in the years ahead. DOD has defined a strategic requirement for DOD access to Moroccan military air facilities to support both Mideast/Persian Gulf contingencies and certain NATO contingencies.⁵ In addition, we value Morocco’s role as a regional strong point and stabilizing force in Africa (Shaba, etc.).

2. Morocco has been a reliable friend over the years, pursuing moderate and constructive policies on many issues that concern us, and demonstrating a readiness to stick its neck out at some risk to its interests. We need to make it very clear that this Administration is determined to stand by America’s friends, both in terms of our Maghreb policy, and to send a clear signal of American reliability to Sadat and others around the world.

3. Morocco’s stability, as well as a stable balance of power in the region, is of great importance to us as well as to other friends like France, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Egypt, and Senegal.

4. We should not, therefore, link our willingness to supply Morocco arms to Moroccan willingness to compromise its political position on the Saharan issue, as we have done in the past. Such a posture directly undercuts our global interest in achieving a stronger security relationship with Morocco and encourages inflexibility on the part of Morocco’s adversaries. (We continue, of course, to retain the right to withhold individual weapons sales to Morocco, as to any other country, at any time.)

5. We should continue to maintain the public posture that a) we favor a peaceful solution of the conflict, involving further expression of the wishes of the indigenous population, as a prerequisite to a future settlement; and b) that we are studying the question of how our diplomacy can best contribute to our objectives in the region, including that of a peaceful settlement. Meanwhile we should solicit views of other interested parties but refrain from active efforts to contribute to a peace process or settlement.

6. We continue to have an interest in strengthening our ties with Algeria and certain other countries in the region and we should do what we can, bilaterally and regionally, to support such interests, but without compromising our primary strategic objective of strengthened ties with Morocco.

B. Agreed Next Steps. There was general agreement at the IG meeting that the following early steps should be undertaken in order to serve one or more of the following purposes: to maintain the level of dialogue with all the interested parties needed to sustain our ability to influence them on matters of concern to us; and to provide the new Administration with an improved base from which to plan its future strategy. We are already beginning to move on some of these measures.

1. Consultations with the French at the working level, specifically on the Western Sahara.

2. A trip to the area by a State Department representative later this month to obtain the views of the parties. A similar mission currently being considered for Sub-Saharan African states in connection with Libya/Chad strategy could also seek African views on the Sahara problem.

3. Meanwhile we will examine how best to approach the Moroccans concerning military access.

4. [3½ lines not declassified] We plan a joint examination by State, DIA and CIA to explore ways to task appropriate collecting agencies with specific requirements at appropriate levels of priority.

5. DOD and State also intend jointly to examine prospects for upgrading the effectiveness of our military program to Morocco without appreciably increasing our profile there (e.g., by helping their military logistic and repair capabilities).

6. Further develop diplomatic strategies to be considered by the SIG. This should be done promptly so as to minimize chances that passage of time might foreclose any individual options.

C. Defining a Diplomatic Strategy. At the February 25 meeting and in subsequent discussions, three possible basic approaches emerged:

(a) Play a relatively active role in contributing to efforts to reach a peaceful solution. This approach holds that a continuation of the war in the Western Sahara runs directly counter to U.S. strategic interests, both regional and global. Our strategic interests are engaged in Morocco; we need to move forward on military access to Moroccan facilities in connection with RDF. Morocco is a strong point in our strategic network, yet the war in the Western Sahara affects negatively both Morocco’s stability and our offensive on the Chad/Libya issue, complicates our relations with Algeria, raises new problems with Mauritania and exacerbates general problems of public and Congressional acceptance of our arms supply policies. The issue is therefore of such importance to our interests that the U.S. must be seen as contributing to a peaceful solution.

(b) Proceed somewhat more cautiously than the above option, beginning with the next steps indicated in the previous section of the memorandum, but refraining meanwhile from any significant commitment of U.S. influence or prestige pending further review. Underlying this option is the assumption that we may well conclude that a more active role in bringing about a peace process has some chance of being effective, in which case we will be predisposed to give it a try since our regional interests can best be served by a stance that gives us some influence over how a peace process develops, and keeps us talking to Morocco’s adversaries as well as to Morocco itself.

(c) Follow a policy that would stress bilateral relations with the countries of the region (especially Morocco) while avoiding an activist posture toward the Western Sahara dispute. Under this option, U.S. strategy would give priority to our support for Morocco, and compensate with Algeria and others by being forthcoming within the framework of these bilateral relationships. We would deliberately forego U.S. emphasis on achieving a near-term negotiated settlement of the Western Sahara dispute on the grounds that: (1) the conflict is not amenable to diplomatic solution at this time; (2) the level of violence has been tacitly reduced by the parties; and (3) the U.S. could not pursue an active intermediary role without exerting intense pressure on Morocco, and simultaneously alienating Algeria and Nigeria, both countries of considerable importance to us.

It became clear during our discussions that before choosing among these options we needed a better data base. Most importantly:

— It was felt that the DOD requirement for military access facilities in Morocco needed to be refined and reviewed from the point of view of its political implications, and a scenario developed for approaching the Moroccans. In addition, we need a better sense of the relative importance of alternative facilities for enroute access, and the best available estimate of the cost of necessary improvements to the Moroccan facilities.

— It was generally acknowledged that more information is needed on the actual conduct of the war, morale and aims of the Polisario, Libyan and Algerian roles and support, and certain related issues.

On balance, therefore, we have concluded that our most sensible course of action at this time, if you approve, is to accord priority to our bilateral relationship with Morocco and go ahead with the immediate steps we have described, while undertaking a thorough analysis of possible diplomatic options for SIG consideration.

Recommended Action:⁶

1. That you approve the following statement of policy:

• “U.S. strategic interests and our determination to stand by American friends require a strong bilateral relationship with Morocco. These factors, along with Morocco’s legitimate military requirements, rather than the conflict over the Sahara, should be the principal determinants of our arms supply policy toward that country.”⁷

Or, alternatively, defer public announcement of a policy until we have a request from Morocco for Sahara-related weapons.⁸

2. That you approve the talking points at Tab 1⁹ as the basis for the Administration’s public statement at the March 25 HFAC Subcommittee hearing.¹⁰

3. That you approve the six specific intermediate steps described above.¹¹

4. That you agree in principle that (a) we should plan to hold a SIG when we have adequately defined our options for a diplomatic stance vis-a-vis the Saharan conflict; and (b) that until a decision is made as to what our stance should be we should refrain from diplomatic initiatives or other moves that would tend to commit us to any specific course.¹²

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Africa General (03/10/1981–04/14/1981). Secret. Drafted on March 19 by Coon; cleared by Burt, Pelletreau, Palmer (JCS), Rentschler, Ames (CIA), Smith, John Maresca (EUR/WE), Richard Baker (P), Joseph Montville (INR/NESA), Flaten, and James Michel (L).
2. In a March 21 memorandum to Stoessel, Veliotes noted that on February 25, the IG recommended that the United States “delink our arms policy from progress toward negotiations on the Saharan issue.” (Ibid.) No minutes of the meeting have been found.
3. See footnote 4, Document 372.
4. Not attached.
5. See Document 372.
6. Stoessel drew a bracket in the left-hand margin from “Recommended Action” to the bottom of the memorandum.
7. Stoessel initially checked the “Approve” option, then checked the “Disapprove” option, then struck through both and wrote: “nothing marked” in the left-hand margin.
8. Stoessel checked the “Approve” option. It was stamped “24 MAR 1981.”
9. Not attached.
10. Stoessel checked the “Approve” option. It was stamped “24 MAR 1981.”
11. Stoessel checked the “Approve” option. It was stamped “24 MAR 1981.”
12. Stoessel checked the “Approve” option. No record of the SIG meeting has been found.