Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

335. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State (Rodman) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Murphy) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 29, 1985

SUBJECT

• The Future of U.S.-Tunisian Relations

SUMMARY: We thought it might be useful to examine the implications of recent developments in U.S.-Tunisian relations for the near-term succession process and our interests in post-Bourguiba Tunisia. Any successor regime is bound to distance itself from the United States. Our reaction to the Israeli raid has accelerated this development and temporarily undermined Tunisian leaders who favor closer relations with us. However, Tunisia’s need for U.S. aid and support against Qadhafi, combined with its desire to counterbalance its growing dependence on Algeria, will limit the degree to which Tunis strays from its American connection. END SUMMARY.

The Outlook for Tunisia

It is likely that there will be a constitutional succession to Bourguiba and, at least initially, an orderly transfer of power. There is little reason to assume, however, that Prime Minister Mzali will have the prestige, as Bourguiba has, to manage all of Tunisia’s challenges or that he will be able to consolidate power. Moreover, it is doubtful that Tunisia’s underdeveloped political institutions will be able to mobilize the political groups that were excluded from political participation under Bourguiba to support the new regime.

Indeed, the underlying political, economic, and social trends suggest that the potential for significant instability is very high and that Tunisia may well experience severe turmoil even before Bourguiba’s death. Among the more serious problems are: a high level of political alienation, especially among the country’s youthful population; the ruling party’s loss of support and declining effectiveness; severe unemployment and underemployment particularly in urban areas; rapid population growth; a stagnating economy; and enormous regional economic disparities.

The Succession and U.S. Interests

Faced with these problems, the successor regime will likely pursue a foreign policy that is more responsive to Tunisian public opinion, which was expressing growing opposition to the government’s support for U.S. Middle East policies even before the Israeli raid. In addition, the regime will wish to avoid any moves which would add to its domestic problems or limit its room to maneuver. Thus, even a regime committed to maintaining Bourguiba’s pro-U.S. policy will adopt a more publicly nonaligned posture and adhere more closely to the Arab consensus on regional issues.

Nonetheless, as long as Tunisia perceives a serious threat from Qadhafi, the desire to establish a more independent foreign policy will be tempered by Tunisia’s continued dependence on U.S. military and economic aid. While Tunis will express more vocal opposition to U.S. Middle East policies, our security programs and joint military cooperation should remain largely intact, although the GOT may act to limit the visibility of our military presence in the country.

Implications of the Israeli Raid

Our reaction to the Israeli raid will only hasten what was bound to happen anyway—pursuit of a more nonaligned posture, at least publicly, toward the United States. We have temporarily weakened the position of Tunisian leaders who support a closer relationship with us. Moreover, it will take considerable time to restore Tunisian trust in us. Nonetheless, our actions have contained much of the damage caused by the Israeli raid and overt Tunisian anger has already begun to dissipate as it refocuses on the Libyan threat.

Indeed, Tunisia’s crisis with Qadhafi has brought about a major change in its policy toward Libya that may not be significantly affected by recent events. Until recently, Tunisia followed a policy of accommodation designed to expand economic and commercial interests in Libya. As part of this policy Tunisia sought to publicly distance itself from our anti-Libya policy.

Despite their doubts about U.S. credibility, Tunis seems determined to maintain its firm line toward Qadhafi. Our reaction to the Israeli raid has probably slowed down, but not arrested, the trend toward closer U.S.-Tunisian ties set in motion by the current crisis with Qadhafi. Tunisia’s tougher stance toward Libya enjoys the broad support of the Tunisian people. Although Mzali’s position towards Qadhafi has been sometimes ambivalent, his room to maneuver on this issue will be limited. Thus, while Mzali may tone down anti-Libyan rhetoric, the GOT likely will use our common opposition to Qadhafi and our reaction to the Israeli raid as levers to obtain more assistance from us.

Our handling of the Israeli raid will, however, impel Tunisia to reduce the visibility of its American connection for some time. Instead, Tunisia will probably seek even greater security cooperation with Algeria and Egypt. This is a sensible policy for Tunisia to follow given the political costs of close association with us and our own constraints in meeting all of Tunisia’s security needs.

We should not push Tunisia in the direction of more visible military cooperation despite our desire to enlist Tunisian support for our Libya policy. Such cooperation could further inflame Tunisian public opinion and weaken more pro-American Tunisian leaders. Tunis is obviously the best judge of what the political traffic will bear. We should not complicate its already serious public opinion problem, however, by making statements that heighten popular perceptions that the Bourguiba government is a U.S. client incapable of conducting an independent foreign policy.

We should look for additional ways to quietly support Tunisia and thus restore its confidence in the credibility of our security commitments. Such low-key steps as upgraded intelligence sharing and contingency planning will reassure the GOT without posing domestic and regional problems that attend overt cooperation with us. In addition, we should give even greater emphasis to expanding cultural, educational, and economic ties in ways that will directly benefit the Tunisian people. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we should go the extra mile to increase our aid to Tunisia even though we face serious budgetary constraints.

It is perhaps too early to evaluate the full impact of the Tunis raid on U.S.-Tunisian relations. The political fallout and Tunisian mistrust will linger for some time. But while the present strains are serious, they are probably not permanent. Indeed, after the Tunisian leadership assuages public opinion and overcomes their own feelings of hurt and disappointment, they may well resume their search for a greater U.S. security commitment that was started several months ago. In the last analysis, Tunisia’s vulnerabilities, coupled with its strong distrust of Algeria and political constraints on cooperation with Egypt, give it a strong stake in preserving its American option.

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985: Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, October 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on October 22 by Richard Sokolsky (S/P); cleared by Raphel and Zweifel. A copy was sent to Whitehead. Quinn initialed the memorandum and wrote: “10/29.”