323. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of
State (Platt) to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1
Washington, February 27, 1985
SUBJECT
- Request by Tunisian President Bourguiba for Private Call on President
Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba
February 16 asked that Ambassador Sebastian convey Bourguiba’s desire to make a visit to the U.S. later
this spring. The centerpiece of such a visit would be a private call on
the President. Bourguiba, at
least eighty-three, is increasingly anxious to pay his respects to the
President; Bourguiba for health
reasons was unable to accept the President’s invitation for a private
meeting two years ago.
Since suffering heart troubles last November, Bourguiba has seemingly become more conscious of his
advancing age and the need to set in place as firmly as possible the
future direction of Tunisia’s foreign policies. One of his concerns is
to solidify further U.S.-Tunisian relations, which under Bourguiba have always been close and
productive. If the visit materializes, we assume that Bourguiba’s entourage would include
several of his ministers who would pursue substantive meetings here.
Even though Bourguiba’s health is
fragile and may ultimately preclude a visit, the Department strongly
recommends that the President agree to receive Bourguiba during a private visit to
Washington in late spring. The Department proposes sending the attached
draft cable conveying this message to the GOT.2
Attached also is Tunis 1467, which expresses Ambassador Sebastian’s strong views on the
desirability of a visit.
Nicholas
Platt
Executive Secretary
[Page 672]
Attachment
Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of
State3
1467.
Tunis, February 16, 1985,
1259Z
Pass White House. Subject: President Bourguiba Asks to Meet President Reagan. Refs: Tunis 13864 and previous.
- 1.
- (Secret/Nodis—Entire text.)
- 2.
- Summary. President Bourguiba wants to make a symbolic sentimental
visit to Washington to meet with President Reagan. He has suggested May.
His intimates and physicians remain opposed to the idea given
his health but have proved unable or unwilling to dissuade the
President. We do not see, now, how we can refuse Bourguiba’s request, which was
couched in all the warm feelings this devoted friend holds
towards the U.S. We recommend that we promptly respond with an
agreement in principle for a private visit at a date in the
spring to be agreed upon later. End summary.
- 3.
- This is an action message (see para. 9 and 10).
- 4.
- President Bourguiba
asked to see me this morning (February 16). We talked for about
twenty minutes. Prime and Foreign Ministers were present.
- 5.
- President Bourguiba
said that he had last been in the United States two years ago.
It had been a private visit and he had gone to consult an
eminent dentist—Dr. Amsterdam of Philadelphia. President
Reagan had been kind
enough to invite him to stop by to see him then, but he
(Bourguiba) found
himself in bad oral shape (“my teeth were mush”) and had had to
decline. “Now I am 81, Bourguiba said, and cannot live much longer” (et
la mort n’est pas loin). He had met virtually every President
since Eisenhower (FonMin was sent off to find
Ike’s photo with a warm dedication) and “If President Reagan wants to see me” he
(Bourguiba) would
have closed the circle, viz, seen the last President likely to
be in office before his own passing. May seemed like a good
month for his trip, Bourguiba continued. It would be warmer then and
the President would have a clearer calendar than at
present.
- 6.
- I told Bourguiba that I
felt certain President Reagan would be delighted to receive him at the
first mutually convenient moment. I knew that as a dean of world
leaders and a staunch friend of the U.S. since prior to
Tunisia’s independence, the President held him (Bourguiba) in high esteem—as
witness also his 1982 invitation to stop by. I would report his
desire promptly. Bourguiba then said that he “and my wife” really
looked forward to the trip and sent the President his warm good
wishes “for a second term as pace-setting (retentissant) as the
first term had been.”
- 7.
- Comment: Before I was taken in to see the President I had a
few minutes in the ante-chamber with Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi. The latter knew
the Prime Minister had seen me and may well have known what was
said (reftel) but I cannot be sure. Operationally, we shall have
to ascertain ASAP whether the
Prime Minister’s request is or not overtaken. In any event we
will wish to shape our responses in ways which do not/not make
it appear that the sending of physicians is in anyway a polite
substitute for the requested meeting—or, worse, a checkup to see
whether President Bourguiba seems likely to survive pending this
possible trip to the U.S.
- 8.
- Foreign Minister Caid
Essebsi, in alerting me to the likely tenor of
President Bourguiba’s
démarche, agreed that any visit which might materialize would
need to be structured to allow a maximum of flexibility. This
suggests a private visit at an agreed date undertaken pursuant
to assurances that during it, the President would be most
pleased to receive President Bourguiba for, say, lunch (FYI—lunch with Bourguiba and visitors at
Carthage usually lasts one hour from start to finish). The
likely (and, indeed, necessary) presence of Wassila Bourguiba would also permit a
more intimate get together—should the White House prefer—to,
say, tea in the family quarters. In short, assuming we are
prepared to accept a visit on some such terms, the format would
need to meld personal contact between the principals with
settings responsive to the limitations imposed on Bourguiba by his infirmities.
End FYI.)
- 9.
- Recommended action—President Bourguiba’s request speaks for itself. He made
clear in his comments this morning that he feels keenly the
passing parade of Arab leaders through Washington (“the
President has seen the Saudi King, Chadli Bendjedid is going and Mubarak. . . so if he wants to
see me. . . etc”). In his eyes these men are all much his
juniors and have far to go before their friendship for the U.S.
and what it stands for can compare with his. Of course, all
those who benefit from the status quo here will be reluctant to
see him go, given the inherent risks, but arguably Bourguiba probably draws more
vitality from his continuing sense of political centrality and
relevance than from the cautions of his physicians or
intimates.
- 10.
- I do not see how we can decently do other than welcome him at
a mutually convenient date for a private visit. As the date
approaches he either will or will not be able to travel. If he
can, we buy some risk but surely should the trip prove too much
for him the world will place responsibility for its effects on
those who let him go rather than those who would honor and
receive him at his request during a “private” sojourn.
Alternatively, we could, of course, temporize or refuse to
accept him, but he has an old man’s tenacity and, justifiably, a
view of his own achievements which would lead him to perceive an
overly delayed or less than welcoming response as a serious and
undeserved slight. Our relationship would suffer the
consequences. Given this cost-benefit calculus, therefore, I
hope that President Bourguiba’s request will be granted and would
welcome an early favorable reply in principle pending agreement
on a mutually acceptable date “this spring.”
