Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

308. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

1352.

Tunis, February 16, 1983, 1652Z

Dept. for S/AL. Khartoum please pass Ambassador Walters. Subject: Visit to Tunisia of Ambassador Walters.

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Summary. During visit here February 13–15, Ambassador Walters reassured President Bourguiba and his principal advisers that, despite severe congressional cuts in FY–83 security assistance funding, the administration was committed to seeking additional funds for Tunisia and to pursuing the long-term military modernization program worked out by our two governments. Bourguiba reacted very positively to President Reagan’s message² which, like Walters’ presentation, struck just the right note in both substance and tone. While the Tunisians remain anxious regarding the pending shortfall and only cautiously hopeful as to prospects for a supplemental, Walters’ visit was notably successful as a timely demonstration of our continued political as well as material support of a long-time friend and ally. End summary.

3. Ambassador-at-large Vernon Walters’ visit to Tunisia February 13–15 included separate meetings with Prime Minister Mzali, Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi and Defense Minister Baly; a working lunch with Caid Essebsi, Baly, Interior Minister Guiga and Military Security Chief, Gen. Balma; and a meeting with President Bourguiba in the southern oasis of Nefta, in which Mzali, Caid Essebsi and Baly also participated. The visit was given prominent coverage by Tunisian media.

4. In his meetings with the ministers, Walters reconfirmed the bad news they had already received: that because of severe congressional cuts in global security assistance funding for FY–83, the amounts available for a number of our key friends and allies, Tunisia included, are less than what the administration had sought or anticipated. Walters stressed, however, the administration’s determination to work hard to obtain from Congress supplemental funds adequate to carry on our assistance programs at levels originally programmed. He made clear this effort would not be easy and offered no predictions as to results; but he assured the Tunisians that the administration was committed to do its very best. We fully recognized, he said, the security problems facing Tunisia, particularly with respect to Qadhafi, whose policies of terrorism and attempted subversion of neighboring countries had in our view not changed. It was inconceivable that the U.S. and other friends of Tunisia would remain indifferent should Tunisia’s security be seriously menaced.

5. The Tunisians, for their part, made clear their disappointment and dismay with regard to the reduced level of U.S. assistance. Prime Minister Mzali said that he had been “astonished” by the reduction, that he did not know how the GOT could fill the large, unexpected cash gap which that reduction had created. On the other hand, all of Walters’ interlocutors were low-key in making their points—friendly regret rather than irritation or anger—and all responded very favorably to his assurances, both general with regard to the steadfastness of our overall support and specific with regard to our doing all possible to secure additional funding for FY–83.

6. This same general reaction of disappointment with action taken, understanding of why it was necessary, and hope that it will soon be rectified carried over into Ambassador Walters’ meeting with the President. Bourguiba greeted Walters warmly as the old friend that he is, and was obviously pleased by the special attention which Walters personified. In this respect, Bourguiba commented that it seemed like a long time (i.e., last September)³ since he had received any personal communications from our President. As is his custom, Bourguiba read President Reagan’s letter slowly and out loud, interjecting at several points his own words of satisfaction with the assurances of support it contained. Upon finishing, Bourguiba said, I understand. You have had difficulties in supplying all the help we need, but you will do all you can to provide what is not now available. That’s good. I will count on your assurances.” He went on to recount what those needs are—planes, tanks, missiles—and to note the importance of strengthening however, press for accelerated deliveries of the M60 tanks, perhaps reflecting the counsel of his advisers. (Essebsi had told Walters beforehand that the GOT’s raising the tank-delivery issue with the Egyptians was not rpt not a viable option; and that, in any case, it would serve only to advance deliveries to Tunisia by a few months.)

7. In response to Mzali’s prompting, Bourguiba did raise the issue of a U.S. replacement for the aging flagship Habib Bourguiba. Baly recalled for Bourguiba that last year the U.S. had identified five possible replacement ships, none of which had been deemed suitable, and that discussions were continuing with Tunisian representatives in Washington. Walters noted some of the problems we had encountered, including the shortage of diesel-powered ships appropriate to Tunisian needs, and the possibility of the GOT’s acquiring third-country manufactured hulls for fitting with U.S. armament. Walters assured Bourguiba that we would keep this matter under active review and said he would look into it personally. Bourguiba expressed his appreciation, noting with a half smile that each year his birthday is celebrated with salvos from his flagship equivalent in number to his age, and that the number is getting to be pretty high.

8. Bourguiba also raised the Middle East peace effort, expressing concern about the slow pace of the Lebanon negotiations and Israeli defiance of our call for a freeze on additional settlements in the West Bank. He blamed Begin for this intransigence, which jeopardized prospects for peace negotiations. Walters assured Bourguiba that the U.S. remained serious in its determination to move ahead quickly in Lebanon and expressed optimism that this could be accomplished. The problems of the occupied territories and the eventual status of Jerusalem were difficult and would require patience and hard work by all parties to resolve. But the very fact that President Reagan had lent his own name to the September 1 proposals meant that he fully intended them to succeed. Bourguiba could count on our persisting.

9. There was a final discussion of the GOT’s program, instigated personally by Bourguiba, to increase dramatically the number of Tunisian students studying at U.S. universities. Caid Essebsi noted that, despite language and other obstacles, the overall academic performance of these students was excellent. Bourguiba noted the high cost of this program to the GOT and appealed for greater U.S. assistance in the form of scholarships. I observed that the USG had limited resources in this field, but that private sources, such as foundations and U.S. companies with interests in Tunisia, could be of some help. For example, a U.S. company, Jacobs Engineering, soon to be involved in developing Tunisia’s phosphate resources, had already offered to sponsor training of Tunisian engineers.

10. Comment. Ambassador Walters’ visit provided just the right touch at the right time. The Tunisians have been worried by rising domestic problems, both economic and political, and by continuing tensions with Qadhafi next door. They have been aware of the attention we have been according Algeria and Morocco (Bourguiba mentioned the latter specifically) and have noted in contrast the relative absence of high-level visitors coming to Tunisia. The severe cut in our FY–83 FMS/MAP program to levels well below FY–82 came as an unexpected jolt and threatens to create a serious financial problem for them at a time when their own budget is stretched thin. The fact that they received Ambassador Walters with such cordiality, refrained from any table-pounding, and responded favorably to his presentations reflects not only the solid rapport he has long enjoyed with Tunisian leaders but also the notable effectiveness with which he handled the sensitive issues now before us. The Tunisians of course understood beforehand that Walters was not in a position to bear good news of any concrete nature. But there is no question that they were genuinely pleased by his visit and encouraged by President Reagan’s personal assurances that we would strive to do our best by them. While we do not believe they are under any illusions as to the difficulty of securing supplemental funding (and Walters was careful not to raise expectations in that regard), tactically they will be looking to the administration to fulfill its assurances to do its best before they start considering alternative financing options. This, we believe, explains their lack of interest in discussing such options during Walters’ visit. From the standpoint of strengthening the long-standing political bonds between the U.S. and Tunisia Walters’ visit was an outstanding success. As I have already recommended, following up this visit with further high-level demonstrations of U.S. support would serve our interests well.

11. This message was drafted following Ambassador Walters’ departure from Tunis.

Cutler

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830089–0164. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers and Rabat. Sent for information Immediate to Khartoum.
2. See Document 307.
3. No record of a personal communication between Reagan and Bourguiba in September 1982 has been found.