296. Memorandum From Raymond Tanter of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)1

SUBJECT

  • Memcon of Weinberger Meeting with Tunisian Prime Minister Mzali on April 27, 1982

At Tab A is a memorandum of conversation from the Secretary of Defense regarding his meeting with Prime Minister Mzali of Tunisia.

A key point in the memorandum concerns Foreign Military Sales credits. The Administration has requested $140M for FY–83, half of which would be on favorable (concessional) terms, i.e., at interest rates lower than commercial rates. I believe that the Administration should push very hard to obtain favorable rates for the Tunisians.

The Tunisians, however, should not be given the impression that Congress will approve the $140M request nor the proposal for $70M on concessional terms. Indeed, State informally has indicated to the working level Tunisians that they should anticipate receiving only about $85M instead of $140M.

The Secretary of Defense’s memo states that the Tunisians: “hope that in addition to the $70 million in FMS, the other $70 million could be provided ‘as you do for Israel’ (i.e., forgiven). Secretary Weinberger said that ‘essentially, this is the formula we are urging on the Congress.’ We hope Congress will approve this, but we cannot make such a promise.”

Unfortunately, this exchange suggests that the Administration is requesting that $70M be forgiven, which is not true. To clear up this confusion, I suggest that Michael Wheeler send to State a copy of the Secretary of Defense’s memcon and let State straighten out this matter. Otherwise, the Tunisians will go into the meeting with the President with the false idea that the Administration has asked for the Congress to approve $70M in forgiveness for the Tunisians.

Another issue is the Tunisian request to seek another U.S. Navy ship of similar displacement to the current Tunisian flagship. The Prime Minister will be raising this issue directly with the President.2 The Navy has advised the Secretary that no ship is presently available for transfer. [Page 613] The Secretary promised to see if anything suitable can be found and said he will have further information before the Prime Minister meets with the President on Thursday, April 29. The Secretary will send under separate cover a paper addressing the request for another flagship.3

Chris Shoemaker concurs.

Recommendation

That Michael Wheeler send a copy of the Secretary of Defense’s Memcon to State.4

Tab A

Memorandum of Conversation5

SUBJECT

  • Meeting between Secretary Weinberger and Prime Minister Mzali of Tunisia (U)

Principal Participants

  • US

    • Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense
    • Ambassador Walter Cutler, U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia
    • MG Carl Smith, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
    • Mr. James Woods, Director, Africa Region, ISA (Notetaker)
    • Mr. Alec Toumayan, Dept of State (Interpreter)
  • Tunisia

    • Mohamed Mzali, Prime Minister
    • Slaheddine Baly, Minister of Defense
    • Mahmoud Mestiri, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
    • Habib Ben Yahia, Tunisian Ambassador to the U.S.
    • Colonel Mokhtar Gmati, Military Attache
    • Colonel Brahim Boudabous, Chief, Liaison Bureau, MOD

(U) Prime Minister Mzali opened the meeting by noting Minister of Defense Baly’s invitation to Secretary Weinberger to visit Tunisia. Secretary Weinberger said that he had not thus far had the opportunity to visit Tunisia but would very much like to do so. The Prime Minister said “You will be most welcome.”

(C) Secretary Weinberger noted that Tunisia occupies a strategic and important location and that the U.S. is very conscious of this. Prime Minister Mzali responded that Tunisia has noticed with pleasure [Page 614] an “increasing interest” on the part of the Government of the U.S. in Tunisia, especially since President Reagan came into office. The Tunisian people and President Bourguiba personally are very grateful for this. Secretary Weinberger said that this was a very correct perception and that President Reagan is a great admirer of President Bourguiba. The U.S. appreciates Tunisia’s importance and its support, in the UN and elsewhere, of the same principles as the U.S. President Reagan is looking forward to meeting the Prime Minister, he emphasized.

(C) President Bourguiba’s attitude is not dictated by events, but is a constant attitude based on principle, the Prime Minister said. President Bourguiba has always supported and been supported by the United States, since independence. Tunisia would always be on the side of the West and of the United States, and attached to peace and freedom. Tunisia would never attack the United States, like some states which regrettably find it “fashionable” to do so. Secretary Weinberger said that the U.S., and President Reagan personally, were quite aware and appreciative of this. We are, in turn, anxious to be as helpful as we can. We are happy to have been able to provide more FMS credits in FY82 and want to do much more in the future. But to do so we must first persuade Congress. I have had very fine reports on Tunisia from Mr. Carlucci and Mr. West following their visits there,6 said the Secretary, and these only add to my desire to visit Tunisia myself; I hope that I can therefore accept Minister Baly’s kind invitation soon.

(C) Prime Minister Mzali then explained that Tunisia has, since independence, devoted the bulk of its resources to development—health, education, etc. Over 40% of the Tunisian national budget goes to development. Tunisia had not emphasized defense, but the Libyan-inspired attack on Gafsa (January 1980)7 reminded Tunisia that an effective military force was needed as a deterrent. But military equipment is very expensive, and while Tunisia must do more for its military it cannot thereby jeopardize its commitment to development. In this light, “we appreciate your credits very much, but the terms are heavy, and we hope they can be made lighter in the future.”

(C) Secretary Weinberger said that the U.S. understood that good social conditions make for good soldiers; however, it is also true that we must maintain our deterrence against mischief-makers like Libya and the Soviet Union. The terms of FMS are a disappointment to many countries. [Page 615] We are seeking in FY83 to make a larger part of the program concessional, with much better terms. But the Congress is not yet fully persuaded. We are glad that FY82 is at $85 million and hope we will get our full $140 million in FY83, as requested; we “know it will go to a good cause.”

(C) Prime Minister Mzali responded that, with respect to FY83, they are interested both in the proposed increase in volume (to $140 million) and in improving the terms, since “current terms are draconian.” They hope that in addition to the $70 million in FMS, the other $70 million could be provided “as you do for Israel” (i.e., forgiven). Secretary Weinberger said that “essentially, this is the formula we are urging on the Congress.” We hope Congress will approve this, but we cannot make such a promise.

(S) Prime Minister Mzali said this was all the more urgent since “our Saudi friends, on whom we count so heavily, have not given us an answer on more help.” He had talked with Prince Fahd after the Gafsa incident, and Fahd had promised $500 million in financial support for military purchases. $50 million was provided soon after, but nothing for the past two years. Prince Fahd is “personally benevolent” and says that the security of Tunisia is closely linked to the security of Saudi Arabia, but “we see slowness in their responding to our request which is, after all, only a drop in the ocean to them.” The Prime Minister said he had discussed this problem previously with Mr. Carlucci and with Mr. West and now wanted to discuss it personally with Secretary Weinberger.

(S) Secretary Weinberger noted that, unfortunately, the situation described was becoming typical of the Saudis with respect to several countries. We will, he said, encourage them to fulfill their plans to support your country. We hope too that they will find persuasive the arguments we make with our own Congress, in seeking higher support for your program.

(S) Prime Minister Mzali said that he wanted to give an example of how the Tunisian development effort is linked to defense. Our main enemy is unemployment, he said. After the recent visit by Colonel Qadhafi, Tunisia reopened its border with Libya.8 In one month, 34,000 young Tunisians crossed into Libya in search of jobs. So countries like Libya will receive our youth, and train and arm some of them and send them back by infiltration. This, not tanks and missiles, is our main threat. For example, only last month, we picked up seven young Tunisians who reentered from Algeria, after military training in Libya. So our main problem is subversion and infiltration; development is the answer and harsh FMS terms handicap our efforts to improve the economy!

(C) Secretary Weinberger agreed that the example was a good one. We understand and this is another reason we want to be as helpful as [Page 616] we can. We want the economies of our friends to be healthy, and that is why we extend economic as well as military assistance. We know the strains that FMS puts on your economy. We see the internal danger you face, and the threat of infiltration.

(S) The Prime Minister continued his example. Of the 34,000 young men, six or seven thousand came back soon after; they found that Libya was “no El Dorado.” Jobs are short there too, and Libya is going through economic difficulties. Libya has laid off many Tunisian workers from the oilfields. But there is also an ideological dimension: the Libyans appeal to these young, unemployed men to join in “just causes,” such as the cause of the PLO. This is tempting to some of these unemployed men, and may cause them to join the Libyan military forces.

(S) Prime Minister Mzali then turned to a new subject. He wanted to state how pleased he was with two of our efforts in particular. The first was military training. The U.S. has assisted Tunisia for years in this area, and it has been of great benefit to all the services; he hopes it will be continued. Second is “that confidential area we don’t discuss in public,” namely joint exercises. He approves of them and they are very helpful. The Secretary replied that we are pleased to hear this and we certainly want both training and military joint exercises to continue; we are grateful to Tunisia for the opportunity for joint training.

(C) Prime Minister Mzali then said he had been instructed by President Bourguiba, to seek a replacement of the Tunisian flagship, The President Bourguiba, with another U.S. Navy ship “of the same displacement,” about 700–1,000 tons. He was instructed to raise this personally with both Secretary Weinberger and President Reagan. President Bourguiba has made this a very personal matter; “he feels it deeply as a matter of personal prestige.” Secretary Weinberger responded that President Reagan has a deep appreciation for President Bourguiba and would certainly want to help. Unfortunately, Navy has advised that no ship is presently available for transfer. We will pursue this to see if we can find anything at all suitable. New construction might be a possibility; if Tunisia were to have a ship built in Europe, we would of course like to see American equipment on it. The Prime Minister thanked the Secretary for this information.

(U) At this point, the formal meeting ended, and a signature ceremony took place, with Secretary Weinberger and Minister of Defense Baly signing the FY82 FMS loan agreement for $85 million.

(S) After the signature ceremony, a working luncheon was held, with an extensive exchange between the Prime Minister and Secretary Weinberger. Principal points were:

Continuing heavy pleas, by Prime Minister Mzali, for better FMS terms in the future.
A further strong request for help on the problem of a replacement for flagship President Bourguiba; Secretary Weinberger said that he would ask the Navy to make an immediate further review of this matter, so that he would have their further advice before the Prime Minister met with President Reagan on Thursday.
Agreement on the very serious situation in the Middle East at the present time, particularly with respect to the Iran-Iraq war. Prime Minister Mzali voiced the strong fear that, if this war is not settled soon, the results could be destabilizing to the entire Gulf.

(U) The luncheon ended at 1:40 p.m. with Prime Minister Mzali again urging that Secretary Weinberger plan to visit Tunisia soon.

James L. Woods9
Director, ISA Africa Region
  1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Tunisia (04/28/1982–04/29/1982). Confidential. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Tyson. Wheeler initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
  2. Mzali did not raise the issue of the Tunisian flagship during his meeting with Reagan. See Document 297.
  3. Not found.
  4. Poindexter approved the recommendation for Clark. Tab I, a memorandum from Wheeler to Bremer, is not attached.
  5. Secret. Drafted by James Woods, (DOD/ISA); approved by Weinberger. The meeting took place at Blair House. Also sent under an April 28 covering memorandum from Weinberger to Clark.
  6. For West’s conversation with Bourguiba, see Document 288. Records of West’s May 23 and 24, 1981, conversations with Mzali and at the Ministry of Defense, respectively, as well as Carlucci’s July 14, 1981, conversation with Guiga, are in Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 26, Tunisia.
  7. See footnote 2, Document 288.
  8. See Document 13.
  9. Woods signed “J.L. Woods” above this typed signature.