Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

291. Defense Estimative Brief Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency¹

DEB–118–81

Washington, November 12, 1981

Defense Estimative Brief: Tunisia (U)

(U) Summary

(S/[handling restriction not declassified]) Tunisia’s aging President Bourguiba, who has maintained tight control over the country’s political life, is expected to pass from the scene within the next few years, and a struggle for power within Tunisia’s predominant political party is likely. Additionally, there are serious socioeconomic problems—especially the alienation of Tunisia’s youth—that provide fertile ground for political exploitation, particularly by Libyan President Qadhafi and Islamic fundamentalists. Tunisia will continue to rely on close relations with its two principal Western friends, France and the United States, while also strengthening relations with Algeria as a counter to the Libyan threat. The key to domestic security will be the loyalty of the Armed Forces, which seems assured; however, care will be required in dealing with them to avoid politicizing their ranks and to retain the Government’s legitimacy in the eyes of Tunisians. The continued expansion and modernization of Tunisia’s Armed Forces will enhance their effectiveness but fall short of providing the capability of countering aggression by Libya. Overall, we expect Tunisia to face serious challenges over the next several years, but we believe the country will overcome them.

1. (S/[handling restriction not declassified]) Political Situation. Tunisia’s aging and chronically ill President Habib Bourguiba will likely pass from power within the next few years. Although he periodically displays remarkable vigor, stamina, and activity for an octogenarian, Bourguiba suffers from senility. Nonetheless, Bourguiba is likely to continue to maintain control over Tunisia’s political system through his well-organized Destourian Socialist Party for as long as his faculties permit. Although the President has placed Prime Minister Mzali in a position to succeed him, many conservatives in the party hierarchy are not fully reconciled to Mzali’s liberal views. Mzali has appointed men he trusts to key positions in the Government and party; however, if Bourguiba does not actively back him or if his liberal policies meet setbacks, opportunists like former Party Director Mohamed Sayah will attempt to unseat the Prime Minister. Considering the many socioeconomic challenges facing Tunisia, it is likely that, without Bourguiba, Mzali’s position will be threatened by factions within the ruling party, as well as by Libyan President Qadhafi’s meddling in Tunisian affairs.

2. (S/[handling restriction not declassified]) The first “contested” election in Tunisia’s history, conducted on 1 November 1981, was characterized by intimidation of the opposition, claims of election irregularities, and a complete sweep of all seats by the regime’s candidates. This will undermine the credibility of the step-by-step liberalization process that Mzali has hoped would serve to bridge the gap between the ruling establishment and the disaffected younger generation. Although the three groups which challenged the ruling Destourian Socialist Party have some hope of continued legitimate participation in the Tunisian system, the Islamic right was excluded from the election and has little prospect of sanctioned participation in the political process during the Bourguiba era. The strongly secular regime will likely continue to be intolerant of Islamic fundamentalists despite their increasing number and influence. Tunisia’s fundamentalists are not likely to develop sufficient strength to successfully challenge the regime in the near term, although the movement will appeal to elements of Tunisia’s alienated youth, poor, and traditionalists.

3. (S/[handling restriction not declassified]) Economic. The Tunisian economy continues to grow at a fast rate (7.3 percent real GNP growth in 1980), but there are several troubling trends that threaten not only future growth but the relatively high standard of living and social stability that Tunisia has enjoyed since gaining independence. Tunisia will be faced with growing stagnation in the agricultural sector, declining petroleum production (and revenues), growing unemployment, and increasing requirements for defense spending in the eighties. As a result, Tunis will find it impossible to fund social programs at current levels, create sufficient jobs, and maintain adequate foreign reserves. The best, although unlikely, prospect for continuing the rapid rate of economic growth lies in the discovery of significant new oil reserves. In addition to petroleum and agriculture, the health of the Tunisian economy is also dependent on foreign investment, tourism, remittances from workers abroad, and foreign aid, as well as effective government control over the economy. Serious problems in one or more of these areas could stall Tunisia’s economic growth entirely. Accustomed to a relatively high standard of living, well educated Tunisians have developed rising expectations, which are likely to be frustrated by an economic downturn. Such a recession could lead to social unrest with significant political implications.

4. (S/[handling restriction not declassified]) Foreign Policy. Tunisia’s moderate, pro-Western foreign policies contrast with those of Libya, which will remain Tunisia’s primary external threat as long as Qadhafi is in control. Friction between the two began to emerge following Tunis’ abrogation of the 1974 Tunisia-Libya merger accord.² Differences over both ideology and exploitation of offshore oil will continue to sour their relations despite superficial improvement from time to time. Libyan orchestration of the aborted rebellion in the Tunisian town of Gafsa in January 1980³ and apparent Libyan involvement in Tunisian student disorders in February 1981⁴ reflect the Libyan goal of destabilizing Tunisia. Qadhafi’s increasing suspicion of neighboring countries with strong Western ties and his messianic drive for a pan-Islamic state under Libyan leadership bode ill for Tunisia. To counterbalance Libya, Tunisia will continue to develop a security relationship with Algeria and to rely upon France and the United States for military assistance. Frequent French and US naval visits to Tunisia’s major ports give substance and visibility to these relations. While the Tunisians have allowed Soviet naval units limited use of local ship repair facilities, suspicion of Moscow will restrict Soviet-Tunisian relations during the next few years.

5. (S/[handling restriction not declassified]) Officially, Tunis will remain hostile to Israel and sympathetic to the Palestinians, but in the event of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement Tunisia would have little difficulty accepting a permanent Israeli presence in the Middle East. Although Tunisia broke relations with Egypt over the Camp David Accords and now provides the headquarters and president for the Arab League, Tunis will continue to maintain close unofficial ties with Cairo, in large part as a deterrent to Libyan adventurism. Tunis will also seek to maintain close relations with Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan while not alienating any of the radical Arab states.

6. (S/[handling restriction not declassified]) Military. Tunisia’s Western-equipped and -trained Armed Forces will remain too small to effectively deter or counter the military threat posed by Libya despite efforts to expand their size and upgrade the quality of their weaponry. Since the Libyan-backed trouble at Gafsa in 1980, Tunisia has become increasingly aware of the inability of its poorly equipped 25,000-man Armed Forces to defend against potential threats. Significant increases in US military assistance, together with an expanded indigenous effort, will lead to substantial improvement in Tunisia’s military potential. Obsolete and often non-operational systems, such as the M41 light tank or the F–86 fighter, are being replaced with more modern systems, such as the M60 medium tank and the F–5 aircraft. Also, continued receipt of new systems, such as Chaparral and TOW, will provide Tunisia with new air defense and anti-armor capabilities. At best, however, force modernization and expansion efforts will only enable the Tunisians to field a force capable of delaying a Libyan attack long enough for French or US assistance to arrive. In fact, the Tunisians will want to avoid creating a force strong enough to provoke their larger neighbors.

7. (S/[handling restriction not declassified]) The Armed Forces are expected to remain apolitical and loyal to the Tunisian political system. In the event of a serious succession crisis following Bourguiba’s departure from the scene, the Armed Forces would attempt to remain uninvolved. Should serious social disturbances break out, the Army would obey orders to restore calm.

8. (S/[handling restriction not declassified]) Morale problems caused by low pay and inadequate benefits, cronyism, poor leadership, a lack of modern weaponry and a general feeling of neglect will continue to characterize officer and enlisted personnel at all levels. The morale problem is particularly severe in the Air Force where pilots have resigned in large numbers, thereby raising the spectre of not having the necessary pilots to man the US-supplied F–5s when they arrive in the first half of 1984. Although poor morale will continue to undermine efforts to build up Tunisia’s military capabilities, it is not likely to be sufficiently serious to provoke coup plotting among the Armed Forces.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 26, Tunisia. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. [1 line not declassified]. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on December 17 at 12:08 p.m.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976, Document 120.
3. See Document 288.
4. Not further identified.