Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

19133.

Washington, January 24, 1981, 0519Z

SUBJECT

• Hedda-Draper Tour d’Horizon.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Tunisian Ambassador Hedda called on Deputy Assistant Secretary Draper January 21 to discuss bilateral military issues, Libya, and possible Middle East initiatives under new administration. After presenting copy of congratulatory message from Bourguiba for delivery to President Reagan,² Hedda came to point of call—suggestion that high level Tunisian military delegation of three to four persons visit U.S. soon to exchange information with U.S. counterparts. Hedda proposed late February or early March for visit, which he hopes will include stops at various agencies in Washington as well as elsewhere in country. Draper suggested that March might be best, since new U.S. team should be in place by that time. He indicated also that we would do what we could to facilitate such a visit.

3. Hedda confirmed, as indicated earlier this week by Tunisian Military Attaché, that GOT wants to pin down squadron of F–5’s originally slated for Sudan.³ Draper felt this should be possible, since other government considering squadron now appears to be interested in different aircraft. Hedda said GOT also wants M–60s.⁴ Draper noted that M–60 line could be shut down at any time and that in any case orders placed now could only be filled in three years because of backlog. Hedda insisted that GOT could not wait that long and jokingly suggested that they had better send Minister of Defense rather than high level team. Draper said that Hedda should discuss question of M–60 availability with General Graves at DOD.

4. Hedda asked whether there have been any changes in USG position on Libya in view of events in Chad.⁵ Draper noted that some developments were positive. We are pleased that African nations themselves are becoming concerned and that OAU involvement is being considered. He said it was too early to be authoritative but, speaking personally, he was confident that, as far as U.S. relationship with Tunisia is concerned, new administration will want to maintain strong ties. It may be interested in taking tough stance toward Libya. Hedda pointed to Mzali speech⁶ as indication that GOT is trying to cool atmosphere between two countries. He sees encouraging signs from Algeria, which he feels is worried about Libya-Polisario connection and Qadhafi’s idea of sub-Saharan state. Finally, he noted that though French reaction was initially slow, it has now become very tough.

5. Moving on to Middle East question, Hedda asked whether incoming administration plans any new initiatives. Draper again cautioned that the new administration still had to develop specific policy guidelines. Speaking personally, he anticipated—on basis of Secretary Haig’s testimony—that no major new initiatives should be expected until after Israeli elections,⁷ particularly in view of fact that Sadat believes he cannot accomplish anything more with Begin’s government. Hedda asked about Jordanian option.⁸ Draper said that we were taking a very cautious and noncommittal stance. It was a sensitive issue for Hussein. If it were ever to be explored seriously by any party, this would take place after Israeli elections and much would depend on relations between Arafat and King Hussein. Hedda asked about rumor he had heard that two very high level U.S. officials would soon be going to Middle East. Draper said he has heard nothing about such a visit, which would depend on new Secretary. Speaking as close friend of Arab League Secretary General Klibi, Hedda suggested that we build contacts with Arab League. Draper confirmed our great respect for Klibi and noted that we do have continuing contact with him, but repeated earlier position that it would be very difficult for us to receive Klibi in Washington or to arrange meeting for him with new Secretary.

Haig

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810036–0344. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Jerrilynn Pudschun (NEA/AFN); cleared by Coon; approved by Draper.
2. See Document 286.
3. In telegram 14723 to Tunis, January 20, the Department reported: “Tunisian MilAtt Azzabi called at Dept late 16 January in some excitement to report that GOT had decided to buy squadron of F–5E/F Interceptors.” It indicated that the Minister of National Defense had provided a copy of a telex, which asked Northrup Grumman to accept the order for the squadron “previously been destined for Sudan if it is still available.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810029–0056)
4. In telegram 812 from Tunis, January 30, Bosworth reported: “Over the past several days we have had a series of discussions with Ministry of Defense officials, including two meetings between Minister of Defense Baly and myself, on Tunisia’s plans for the modernization of its defense forces. The Minister has confirmed that Tunisia wishes to buy as soon as possible 12 F–5 Interceptors and 54 M–60 tanks. These two purchases would meet Tunisia’s top priority needs.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810046–0351)
5. See footnote 10, Document 187.
6. Reference is to Mzali’s December 29, 1980, speech to the Tunisian National Assembly. Telegram 3835 to DOD, January 7, repeated the text of telegram 35 from Tunis, January 5, in which the Embassy included the following passage from his remarks: “We are working to establish relations marked by deep friendship and cooperation with Libya.” The Embassy reported, however, that privately “Tunisia entertains no illusions” about Libya’s “power play in Chad.” Should Qadhafi “turn his attention to Tunisia,” Tunisian officials were “prepared to stall Qadhafi by talking about steps toward unity short of full fusion between the two countries.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810009–0992)
7. According to a January 10 New York Times article, during which he discussed his impending confirmation hearings, Haig “refused to discuss future policy in the Middle East, except to say that any changes in the Camp David agreement had to be the result of intense consultation.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “Haig Stand Reflects a Fading of Détente,” p. A1) The parliamentary elections in Israel were scheduled to be held in June.
8. Reference is to the so-called “Allon Plan” of 1967, which, in the wake of the Six Day War, proposed a line of fortified Israeli settlements along the Jordan River and the demilitarization of the remainder of the West Bank. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968, footnote 4, Document 213.