Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

251. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

12186.

Rabat, December 24, 1985, 1258Z

NEA for Assistant Secretary Murphy from Ambassador. Subj: Letter of Instructions/Goals and Objectives. Refs: A) State 285089;² B) State 118267.³

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Secretary Shultz’s September 16 letter to me, repeated in ref (A), contained Secretary’s initial instructions, goals and objectives for my mission to Morocco. There follow my comments on those instructions, as well as some reflections on how we should pursue those objectives here, as requested ref (B). I hope that in formulating a final goals and objectives statement for this Embassy for the next 12 months, the Department will take into account these comments on the limits of the possible and on modalities for achieving our objectives.

3. Policy objectives:
I concur that the four specific objectives listed in paragraph (2) of the Secretary’s letter are central to U.S.-Moroccan relations and appropriate for this mission. Regarding objective number (1), “inducing the GOM to reconsider its Unity Accord with Libya” Washington and this Embassy need to think through, and perhaps have a further dialogue on: (a) what would in fact constitute success in achieving that objective; (b) the current impediments to achieving total, fully visible success; and (c) the tactics we should pursue in trying to achieve it.

4. As recent Embassy [less than 1 line not declassified] reporting have clearly indicated, the Union Accord is not flourishing. It is being implemented slowly, largely in relatively non-controversial areas, and there is strong evidence that some senior officials like Prime Minister Lamrani are deliberately slowing it further. Apart from Morocco’s dissatisfaction with Qadhafi, the USG can itself take considerable pride in its own contributions to date to slowing the accord: We have consistently argued against the wisdom, and indeed the morality, of aligning with a terrorist like Qadhafi, and we have left the Moroccans in no doubt that their relationship with us will not be wholly restored until the Union Accord is past history. These efforts have enjoyed substantial success. On the other hand, the accord is unlikely to disappear immediately through any dramatic renunciation by Hassan so long as he believes in its utility in preventing a renewal of Libyan support for the Polisario.

5. Under these circumstances the question arises of what U.S. tactics and strategy should be to bring about final dissolution of the Morocco-Libya union. It seems to me there are two basic alternatives: (1) to continue to apply about the same amount of pressure as we have applied to date in the hope, and indeed expectation, that we can continue to keep Morocco off balance with respect to the union, thus probably ensuring the Union Accord’s prudent and less than total implementation, and its eventual demise; or (2) to put on a full court press with the GOM at the highest levels of our two governments designed to bring a quick end to the accord. Apart from the fact that the desirable latter goal is probably unobtainable in the immediate future, to adopt such a strategy would require our being prepared to answer the almost certain GOM question of whether the U.S. is prepared to support Morocco against Qadhafi. Such a question would have implications for U.S. aid levels to Morocco, for U.S.-Moroccan defense cooperation, or both. (I would note that such GOM figures as PriMin Lamrani and FonMin Filali have since mid-summer hinted that at some point the GOM could conceivably ask us whether we would be prepared to give Morocco financial support to counter renewed Libyan support for the Polisario, should Morocco dissolve the union.) In summary, as the U.S. reflects on how it wishes to pursue our laudable objective of putting as much distance as possible between Hassan and Qadhafi, we need to consider clearly the limits of the possible and how much we might be prepared to pay politically and monetarily to achieve total, visible success.

6. More briefly on other policy goals:

— To pursue appropriate levels of political, military, and economic cooperation, and to promote self-sustaining economic growth and political stability in Morocco (objectives no. 2 and 3 in the Secretary’s letter) will require the continued provision to Morocco of substantial amounts of U.S. economic and military assistance. To pursue those goals vigorously would require much larger inputs than we are now making or are projected. To do any less than we currently plan would risk seriously compromising both objectives. Given the increasingly tight U.S. budgetary situation, it is difficult to argue for greater assistance for Morocco, and yet the Country Team and I believe that objectively greater aid is necessary and warranted.

— Re the Western Sahara (objective no. 4), the U.S. should continue its present policy of quiet encouragement to Algeria and Morocco to negotiate a political solution which could be put to the people of the Western Sahara for endorsement in a referendum or similar device. Since the present seems unpropitious for a break-through, the U.S. should avoid any temptation to take on a mediation role and the attendant risk of getting squeezed between the two main parties and seeing our relations with both suffer.

7. Management objectives:
Simply put, I think our objectives in the management area should be: (1) to maintain effective management controls to ensure that we sustain the official U.S. presence in Morocco at the lowest possible cost; (2) to provide the greatest possible measure of security for our personnel and installations; and (3) to maintain employee morale at the highest possible level.

8. I have thoroughly reviewed our budget, procurement, and related management controls (suggested goal no. 1 in para 8) and believe we have this problem well in hand. It will receive my continuing attention, however. I am happy to report that American and FSN employees attest to extremely high morale; we intend to keep it that way (goal no. 3). With regard to goal no. 2—physical security—we need the Department’s help in ensuring timely financial assistance and hands-on construction supervision and follow-through to ensure that the security enhancement plans that have grown out of the many security enhancement visits from Washington the past two years are carried through to early fruition. Specifically, we need money now to purchase the land for a new Ambassador’s residence that has been made available to us at low cost through intercession by King Hassan. We would also like to see Washington proceed to budget for, and draw plans for, construction on the current Embassy compound of an annex designed to house USAID and USIS.

Nassif

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850922–0744. Secret; Exdis.
2. See footnote 1, Document 249.
3. In telegram 118267 to all Near Eastern and South Asian Posts, April 19, the Department informed the posts that all newly appointed Chiefs of Mission would “receive a letter of instruction from the Secretary defining goals and objectives. Within 120 days of his or her arrival, the Chief of Mission will confirm these instructions or seek modifications.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850270–0645)