Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

229. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

8140.

Rabat, September 18, 1984, 1854Z

SUBJECT

• September 17 Audience With King Hassan.

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Monday evening, September 17, during wedding festivities for his daughter, King Hassan granted joint half-hour interview to me, Ambassador at Large Walters, and former Ambassadors Neumann and Duke.

3. The King began by saying that he understands the difficulties that the Moroccan-Libyan union agreement² has caused for U.S.-Moroccan relations and that he especially understands that this is potentially difficult for President Reagan in this election year. He said that he hopes the President and the American Government will understand that Morocco had never before found itself as diplomatically isolated as was the case this past summer. Hassan said that he had seen an opportunity to break out of that isolation and had grasped it. He said that his decision to sign the accord with Libya related to his own sense of timing and his estimate of Moroccan national interests and of how they could best be served. He noted that as King of Morocco he must do what he considers to be in the country’s best interests. He said that he is naturally sorry that his decision has turned out to be difficult for some but that he felt that the opportunity which he had seen was one that he simply could not pass up. The King continued that he is working on Qadhafi to turn him into an “oppositionist” if need be, rather than a terrorist. Noting that he, too, is an oppositionist when the occasion demands, Hassan said that he wants Qadhafi to move in the direction of responsible opposition toward policies and events with which he disagrees rather than remain in his longtime posture of strident, disruptive behavior.

4. Turning to yesterday’s announcement in Paris of the troop disengagement in Chad,³ Hassan said that President Mitterrand had called him Monday morning to say that “everything has been concluded and will be announced today.” The King said that troop withdrawal will occur between September 25 and November 1. While disclaiming paternity for the French-Libyan agreement, Hassan appeared nonetheless to be trying to leave the impression that Morocco had played some kind of facilitative role, if even only a minor one. In disclaiming paternity he said that “my only genius” was to bring Mitterrand here to Morocco at the right time and to persuade him that the moment was ripe for Mitterrand’s brother to visit Libya.

5. The King then launched into a lengthy dissertation on Arafat. He pointed to a recent Arafat interview with “Der Spiegel” in which Arafat allegedly said that he is ready to recognize Israel and go to the negotiating table directly with Israel. (Comment: We have not seen this interview. End comment.) Hassan said that Arafat has asked him to reconcile him (Arafat) with Qadhafi. Hassan then said that “I am taking full credit for managing Arafat and I hope your President will recognize that.” Hassan implied that he would appreciate some kind of message from the President and Secretary expressing sympathy and support for his role in this regard.

6. The King noted that he will send Royal Counselor Guedira to Tripoli next Monday⁴ to begin working out terms of reference and the structure of the union with Libya. Guedira and his counterparts on the Libyan side will attempt to work out the distribution of duties under the accord. The King then said, somewhat curiously, that Morocco and Libya may identify some issues in their union that they do not agree on and that these could be taken to the International Court of Justice. (Comment: We would speculate that the King may have been trying to signal that this could be a way of dragging out and delaying further elaboration of the union and its structure. End comment.)

7. The King then returned to the personality of Qadhafi, saying rather sharply that he wished the Americans generally and our media in particular would stop referring to Qadhafi as a terrorist and giving him a high public profile, thus making him appear bigger and more important than he really is. The King quipped quietly that Qadhafi is crazy and perhaps is even a terrorist in some respects, but said that it suits nobody’s interest to puff Qadhafi’s own sense of self by calling him such. Hassan continued that Syria’s Assad, not Qadhafi, is America’s real problem: “He is a much bigger problem for you than Qadhafi.” Hassan said bluntly that it is Assad who is the terrorist—“he murders more people but just doesn’t say very much about it.” The King then pointedly said that the death of U.S. Marines should be laid at Assad’s door since he is the one who controls the Shias in Lebanon.

Reed

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840593–0121. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Paris and Ndjamena. Sent for information to Algiers, Tunis, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Damascus, and Cairo.
2. See Document 226.
3. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.
4. September 24.