Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

225. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

5063.

Rabat, June 6, 1984, 1309Z

Dept. Pass SecDef, CINCUSNAVEUR London UK, CINCUSAREUR Heidelberg GE, CINCUSAFE Ramstein AB GE, USDOCO South Naples IT, USCINCEUR Vaihingen GE—to be treated as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Secretary Weinberger’s Meeting With King Hassan. Ref: Rabat 4683 (Notal).²

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

2. Summary: During discussions May 17–18 with King Hassan in Fez, Secretary Weinberger reviewed a broad range of bilateral military assistance and related issues, and had the opportunity to discuss a variety of regional security matters. King Hassan talked at length about recent developments in Morocco’s relations with Libya and Algeria. He asked for U.S. support for a Moroccan-Portuguese mutual defense treaty. Discussion of bilateral matters focused on U.S. military and economic assistance to Morocco, and the need for an increased percentage of grant aid over the next few years. The Secretary expressed support for increased levels of assistance in FY 85 and FY 86, and for a more favorable mix of grant aid vs. loans. End summary.

3. Secretary Weinberger met with King Hassan late May 17 and early May 18 in two separate sessions, preceding and following dinner hosted by the King in the Secretary’s honor at the Royal Palace in Fez. King Hassan was joined by Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani and Royal Counselor Reda Guedira; Secretary Weinberger was accompanied by Ambassador Reed, ASD/ISA Armitage and interpreter Alec Toumayan. The pre-dinner private meeting lasted 25 minutes, with an additional private meeting of 30 minutes following dinner.

4. Secretary Weinberger opened the conversation by noting that the third Joint Military Commission (JMC) meeting, which had begun the same day in Rabat, was going well, and that its results would no doubt be a further step forward in U.S.-Moroccan relations.³ King Hassan agreed, and said that he understood the meaning of the Secretary’s simultaneous visit to Morocco, and appreciated the broader political understanding which it represents. In this context, The King commented that he had received a Libyan delegation led by Colonel (Hafiz) Mas’ud that same morning. The Libyans had asked Hassan about the reason for the Secretary’s visit, which the King explained. Hassan said that the Libyans had left reassured and “fully understanding” the reasons for the Secretary’s visit. Turning to the mission of the Libyan delegation, the King explained that they had come because the Libyans felt that Morocco might have been involved in last week’s “coup attempt” in Tripoli.⁴ Some of those arrested carried Moroccan passports. “I told the Libyans that those were passports issued before July, 1983.” (Comment: The current rapprochement between Libya and Morocco dates from July, 1983, when Qadhafi visited the King in Rabat.⁵ End comment.)

5. The Secretary noted that the U.S. remains concerned about Libyan activities around the world, and that during the recent crisis at the Libyan People’s Bureau in London,⁶ the Libyans had made threats against U.S. diplomats there and elsewhere. The U.S., he stressed, continues to watch the situation carefully. The Secretary then referred to his last meeting with Hassan,⁷ when the King had expressed a desire to cut off Libyan arms shipments to the Polisario, and asked Hassan whether Qadhafi had in fact stopped all arms shipments into the Sahara. Hassan said that arms shipments from the Libyans had come to a complete stop. He then reported that Prime Minister Thatcher had asked him to act as intermediary during the London crisis and that, as a result, Hassan had talked with Col. Mas’ud (who he referred to as commander of Libyan forces during Qadhafi’s first incursion into Chad). Libya had later given assurances to the British about the safety of British citizens remaining in Libya, in which, Hassan suggested, Prime Minister Thatcher could be confident. Commenting on the Libyan economy, The King said that U.S. measures had been successful: “Qadhafi has no liquidity, no dollars. He has had to barter for everything with oil.” The King urged the U.S. to keep the pressure on. The Secretary asked whether reports of internal opposition in Libya could be considered reliable, to which the King replied that the situation appeared very serious. Commenting on recent developments, he said that the commando unit involved not only had infiltrated across the Tunisian border, but had also succeeded in seizing a building opposite the barracks where Qadhafi resides. The plan was revealed, however, when a driver who picked up three hitchhikers noticed they had sand on their boots. The driver informed the local police, who arrested the three. They were carrying a full list of accomplices in Libya, which the police then rounded up. Hassan commented that the Libyans consider the event as a warning. There will be other similar attacks in the future, they believe.

6. The Secretary congratulated the King on the successful conclusion of the recent Congress of Moroccan Jewish communities held in Rabat. The King said that it was now up to Israel and, in particular, Jews in the U.S. to “help and understand us.” In this regard, the King noted that Congressman Stephen Solarz, who had participated in the Rabat meeting, had seemed to reverse his position on Morocco, and had promised to lobby for Morocco with Democrats in Congress. The Secretary commented that Solarz is a key figure in Congress.

7. Turning to the Secretary’s meeting with Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani earlier the same day (reftel) the Secretary said that the meeting had been very useful. The U.S., he said, would endeavor to secure more military and economic assistance for Morocco. In an aside, the Secretary commented that Congressman Solarz would be very useful in this regard. The Secretary then delivered President Reagan’s letter of May 14 to the King,⁸ [3 lines not declassified]. The King recounted an anecdote from Moroccan Air Force Inspector Colonel-Major Kabbaj, dating from a visit to the USS Saratoga during a joint exercise, when a U.S. Officer had told Kabbaj that the conflict in the Western Sahara marked the first time a regular army had defeated a guerrilla force. The officer claimed that the U.S. military had originally believed that Morocco could not win. The Secretary replied that the U.S. had, in fact, been worried because of the resupply problem, but that everything had worked out well. Recent victories demonstrate Morocco is safe and strong.

8. The King agreed, noting that there was no longer a serious military threat to Morocco. Algeria will not intervene. Three or four years ago he had been worried about Algerian intervention—now he is “just concerned, not so worried.” He added that he is determined to do nothing to provoke the Algerians. “If we do have to fight, however, we have been in the field for 10 years—we are well trained, and we will be more effective.” The Secretary agreed that Morocco’s armed forces are superior to those of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. The Libyans, in particular, have large stockpiles of weapons, but do not know how to use them. The King said that Bendjedid had told Hassan’s recent envoy to Algiers (presumably Royal Counselor Guedira) that “he personally had ordered MIG 25’s to overfly Moroccan territory” and was pleased that Hassan had sent an envoy to discuss the situation. Continuing, the King said that he would not allow a situation to develop which might lead to conflict between Algeria and Morocco.

9. The King concluded the pre-dinner conversation with a brief reference to the possibility that Iran, according to intelligence he had received, might be developing “nuclear facilities.” He said that he understood that the German company which had developed rocket facilities in Zaire was now involved in development of nuclear facilities in Iran, and suggested that the U.S. should look into this possibility.

10. Following dinner hosted by the King, the Secretary raised a series of bilateral questions. He informed Hassan that the “Thunderbirds” aerial demonstration team would visit Morocco July 6 for graduation exercises at the Air Force Academy. The King expressed great pleasure, remarking that he had first seen the team over New York Harbor in 1963. The Secretary then confirmed that the U.S. would soon be able to provide training for Moroccan military bands. A survey team would arrive in June, to be followed by instructors. The King thanked the Secretary and said that Colonel-Major Kabbaj would be especially pleased, since he had long sought to reshape the Air Force Band in the “American style,” which he preferred to that of the French. Third, the Secretary and Ambassador Reed said it was urgent for the King to appoint a coordinator for the weather modification program. The King said that “you have my approval with 11 hours to spare, and I have appointed Kabbaj as coordinator.” (Telex confirmation of the Kabbaj appointment was received by the Embassy within 7 hours.) [4½ lines not declassified] The King pointed out that, until now, Moroccan forces had fought in terrain with deep gullies and canyons. “Now, if the Polisario wants to do anything, it will have to do so on flat terrain.”

11. Turning to multilateral issues, the King said that since the Secretary would be visiting Portugal on May 18–19, perhaps he could carry a message. Hassan said that he had urged the Portuguese to consider a mutual defense treaty with Morocco, and that the Portuguese appear to be well disposed. Spain, on the other hand, seems reluctant to join in such a treaty. [4½ lines not declassified] The Secretary agreed to inform the Portuguese Defense Minister that the U.S. would be favorably disposed toward a mutual defense treaty between Morocco and Portugal.⁹ Portugal, he said, is a loyal friend of the United States. The King said that Prime Minister Soares had told him that, while he was a committed socialist, he was not a communist.

12. The Secretary indicated that the USG looked forward to welcoming Matti Jorio, the Moroccan Ambassador-designate to Washington, in the near future. The King said that Jorio would soon be in Washington. Referring to Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani’s earlier comments, Secretary Weinberger said that the President and he are determined to secure from Congress as much military and economic aid for Morocco as possible. It will be difficult to obtain much more in FY 85 but all efforts will be expended in FY 86 to obtain substantial increases. The State Department is involved in this effort, as well. The President hopes to get agreement from Congress, and to obtain a flexible and more useful combination of grants and loans. The U.S. understands the need to avoid adding to Morocco’s indebtedness, if possible, and therefore will work to maximize grants and military training.

13. The King expressed confidence that the President would be reelected, and that these initiatives would become reality. He reiterated that he fully understood the significance of the Secretary’s visit as an expression of political support for Morocco at an important time. Jokingly, he added that if the U.S. were not in a pre-electoral period, he would gladly decorate the Secretary. Given the politics of U.S. Presidential campaigns, however, that might not be a good idea now. Closing the conversation, Hassan said that he hoped to visit the U.S. for the opening of the Moroccan pavilion at the Epcot Center in September and that he would like to stop in Washington and have lunch with the President while also seeing “old and good friends” of the administration.

14. This message cleared by ASD/ISA Armitage.

15. Nouakchott minimize considered.

Kirby

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840365–1039. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Casablanca, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Tangier, Tunis, and USUN.
2. Telegram 4683 from Rabat, May 24, contains a record of the May 17 discussion between Weinberger and Karim-Lamrani. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840339–0122)
3. A record of the discussions at the JMC is in telegram 4647 from Rabat, May 23. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840335–0601)
4. Not further identified.
5. See Document 22.
6. See footnote 5, Document 41.
7. See Document 221.
8. In his May 14 letter to Hassan, Reagan said he was “delighted” that Weinberger would be able to attend the upcoming JMC, which he considered “an important manifestation of our close working relationship with Morocco and as tangible evidence of our shared goals in regional stability and peace.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Morocco: King Hassan II (820564–8206108)
9. In telegram 5130 from Lisbon, May 25, the Embassy reported that Weinberger passed Hassan’s message to Eanes, who “shared Secretary Weinberger’s assessment that King Hassan is a skilled and intelligent leader.” Eanes also said “he was very interested in the situation in Morocco because of the strategic trilateral relationship that exists between Portugal, Morocco, and Spain. They control the entrance to the Mediterranean and needed to act in concert to keep those waters open in the event of an emergency requiring the rapid deployment of forces to the Middle East.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840007–0321)