Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

219. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State¹

659–AR

Washington, August 1, 1983

(S/NF) MOROCCO: POTENTIAL THREATS TO THE REGIME

(S/NF/NC/OC) Summary

Morocco currently is beset by numerous internal difficulties that pose potential threats to King Hassan’s regime. Above all, a number of serious economic problems have brought the kingdom to the brink of financial crisis. Bad harvests caused by recurrent droughts, declining phosphate revenues, and a sharp cutback in generous financial assistance from Saudi Arabia have combined to produce large current account deficits. Morocco’s poor short-term financial situation undercuts the government’s ability to obtain new credits. The economic burdens add to other societal problems, including a growing population of unemployed young people with little hope for a secure future. On the political front, the country’s many parties generally are disgruntled over the regime’s manipulation of this year’s elections.

Despite these difficulties, the regime has assets working in its favor, including the legitimacy of the monarchy as an institution, the national consensus over the Sahara issue, the political parties’ stake in the present system, and Hassan’s ability to control the political process. The military appears to be loyal, apolitical, and content with the current conduct of the Sahara war. Even if events go badly for the regime, it can and will resort to its effective apparatus of repression, which will maintain it in power at least in the short term.

The King’s expedients in coping with short-term problems will damage long-term stability, however. The monarchy’s prospects for survival are weak because the King is not creating institutions to keep the country on an even keel after he dies. The divisions within the political elite stymie the political process in Morocco. In addition, the regime may face the challenge of a strong Islamic fundamentalist movement in the 1990s. Finally, Morocco’s limited economic potential will undermine the regime’s ability to stave off an extended confrontation with the movement of social forces against it.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1983 (08/01/1983–12/31/1983). Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon. No drafting information appears on the report.