212. Research Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
MOROCCO: ISLAM AND POLITICS [portion marking not declassified]
Islamic consciousness has increased in Morocco since the Iranian revolution in 1979. But this revivalist sentiment has not seriously challenged the dominant political-religious system—which is already conservative in practice—nor have there been broad demands for radical reform. In the near term, King Hassan should be able to control Islamic extremism. [portion marking not declassified]
A small number of militant fundamentalist groups have formed in the past several years, primarily in the major cities where the stress of modernization and recent economic hardships have been felt most acutely. Some extremists seek to wipe the slate clean and establish a “true” Islamic state through violence. Revivalist sentiment seems to have a certain attraction for the country’s many young people, and it is possible that they will gravitate in greater numbers toward Islamic extremism should they become significantly dissatisfied with the government’s handling of key domestic and foreign policies. Closer US-Moroccan ties, initially well received in Morocco, may eventually become the focus of attack from fundamentalists who strongly oppose Western influence. [portion marking not declassified]
The traditions of Morocco and particularly the religious nature of the monarchy will continue to be bulwarks against Islamic extremists. King Hassan’s dual role as religious and secular leader of the country gives Islam and the King preeminence in Moroccan life, making it difficult to challenge the King without seeming to attack Islam itself. Moreover, the tradition of tolerance found in Moroccan Islam, which allows for a wide variety of religious practice within the faith, makes it difficult for extremists to find a rallying cry with widespread appeal. [portion marking not declassified]
Morocco’s traditional religious establishment is closely associated with the monarchy, gives strong support to King Hassan, and is not likely in the foreseeable future to challenge the government. Moroccan religious leaders (ulama) have strong ties to the palace and are often employed in government institutions, which has enabled the King to co-opt and control them. More importantly, Hassan consults the [Page 459] ulama frequently and visibly, allowing religious leaders a voice in matters of policy. This has kept the religious establishment content and has enabled the King to present himself to the public as an observant Muslim. [portion marking not declassified]
Hassan has also used his considerable political skills to keep religious critics off balance. The King, apparently trying to draw Muslim fundamentalists out rather than driving them into clandestine organizations, has thus far elected to deal less harshly with them than with secular critics on the left. To counter religious militancy, the government is encouraging a revival of some of the traditional Muslim brotherhoods and has established government-sponsored religious groups to provide controlled outlets for increased religiosity. The government’s ability to co-opt the fundamentalists greatly reduces the potential threat posed by radical Muslim elements. [portion marking not declassified]
It is questionable, however, whether King Hassan’s designated successor, 19-year-old Prince Sidi Mohammed, has the political astuteness of his father that would allow him to manage religious detractors or other opponents with much deftness. Should heightened religious sentiments persist in Morocco through a succession from Hassan to his son, a variety of exploitable issues might develop which would play into the hands of extremists. Moreover, the King, like the late President Sadat, could fall victim to a religious fanatic. On balance, however, a serious challenge from religious extremists does not appear likely in the foreseeable future. [portion marking not declassified]
[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]
- Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1983 (02/22/1983–03/10/1983). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis and coordinated with the National Intelligence Council. Information as of February 14 was used in its preparation.↩