Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

20. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

1258.

Algiers, March 22, 1983, 1700Z

SUBJECT

• Bendjedid in Tunisia: Implications for Northwest Africa.

Ref:

• (A) Algiers 1147,²
• (B) Algiers 1227,³
• (C) Tunis 2299.⁴

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Algerian reaction to Tunisia visit of President Bendjedid has been extremely positive. The treaty of fraternity and loyalty, as well as the border agreement, are viewed not only as an important bilateral development, but also as a major step forward in the normalization of regional relations. This visit—following on the heels of the Bendjedid-Hassan summit—is seen as a concrete manifestation of Algeria’s blossoming good neighbor policy (ref A), with implications for the greater Sahelian region as well as the Maghreb. Special emissaries have already been dispatched to neighboring countries (ref B), a clear signal of Algerian intention to engage the totality of its regional partners (Libya excluded) in the quest for enhanced stability and cooperation in Northwest Africa.

3. The Tunisian visit has been very well received by the populace at large who consider improved relations as both natural and desirable. Unlike many themes in GOA foreign policy which leave the common man cold, rapprochement with Tunisia and Morocco generates excitement. There is certainly a factor of Maghrebian kinship in this reaction, but there is also the expectation of relaxed travel restrictions and easier access to neighboring markets where consumer goods are plentiful.

4. There is also a strong economic element in GOA determination to push ahead with its good neighbor initiatives. Regional cooperation is viewed as a potentially important factor in Algerian economic development. Such cooperation should flow naturally from normalization of relations; even if it does not, improved regional stability will have provided a more favorable environment for Algeria’s own development programs.

5. The Western Sahara remains the principal obstacle in this search for regional harmony. Algeria and Tunisia have called publicly for application of the resolutions adopted at the 1981 Nairobi summit. In fact, the Algerian approach is not so much aimed at reinvigorating the implementation committee as at “transcending” the problem. As explained to us by Director for International Political Affairs Kerroum, the central idea is to establish first a general atmosphere of growing cooperation and harmony at the wider, regional level. Concessions on the Western Sahara should then become easier as contributions to the advancement of this regional objective, rather than as outright concessions to the opposing party in the conflict.

6. From the Algerian perspective, Bendjedid has taken most of the risks thus far. He is determined to pursue GOA efforts to promote regional cooperation, but looks to Morocco to take the necessary first step toward a peaceful resolution of the Saharan problem. Algeria is ready to assist in whatever way it can, but remains insistent that the two parties to the conflict find some ways of talking to one another. Kerroum said that Algeria was not likely to agree to the restoration of diplomatic relations—which Morocco would like to do immediately—until Morocco had made some positive move with regard to the Sahara.

7. We agree with ref C that Qadhafi is odd man out. Although probably not the principal reason behind Algeria’s good neighbor offensive, Libyan containment is an important by-product of the process and recognized as such by the GOA. There are some who now expect increased Libyan agitation in retaliation for Qadhafi’s exclusion. Libya’s expected treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union may also be explained in part by Qadhafi’s increasing regional isolation.

Newlin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830158–0037. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Bamako, Niamey, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis.
2. In telegram 1147 from Algiers, March 15, the Embassy reported: “After meeting with King Hassan February 26, President Bendjedid will go to Tunisia March 18 for a long-awaited visit. In so doing, Bendjedid will lay the last stone in the foundation of Algeria’s reinvigorated good neighbor policy. This initiative supports two objectives: first, building regional stability which will allow Algeria to focus tranquilly on its own internal development, and second, creating a unified front against Libyan adventurism.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830143–0662)
3. In telegram 1227 from Algiers, March 21, the Embassy reported that the “Algerian Press Service (APS) announced noon March 21 that special emissaries would carry messages from President Bendjedid to neighboring countries. APS says messages deal with ‘results of President Bendjedid’s trip to Tunis and regional matters.’” The Embassy commented: “Not surprisingly, the two heavyweights are sent to Morocco and Mauritania thereby fueling speculation that the messages deal, at least in part, with next steps on the Western Sahara.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830155–0509)
4. In telegram 2299 from Tunis, March 22, the Embassy reported that “President Bendjedid’s visit appears to have been a great success from the Tunisian point of view. Bendjedid’s pragmatic approach to cooperation suits the Tunisians well, and they pulled out all the protocol stops for him. Two agreements were signed, on a final demarcation of the border, and the second a treaty of brotherhood, in which the two sides agree to respect each other’s political independence and promise not to allow their territory to be used against the other. It is too early to say that a new age has dawned, but the big loser is obviously Qadhafi.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830157–0993)