Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

190. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

2013.

Rabat, March 20, 1981, 1955Z

SUBJECT

• General Vernon Walters’ Conversation With King Hassan.

1. (S—Nodis Entire text.)

2. On March 19th, a few hours after my arrival in Marrakech, I was received at the palace by King Hassan II. I delivered President Reagan’s letter to him and he expressed gratitude to the President and Secretary Haig for sending me to see him.²

3. He said that his primary concern in communicating with us was to express his puzzlement and concern at the sudden breakoff by the Algerians of the negotiations he had been conducting with them since 1977. Nearly all of these meetings had taken place at a safe house in Geneva except the last two which had taken place in Paris at the Crillon Hotel. This, at the request of the Algerians. From the beginning the Algerian negotiators had been Mr. Ibrahimi and Colonel (SI) Merbah. They had started under Boumédiène and continued under Chadli. Last October the negotiators on both sides had agreed that they had gone as far as they could without bringing matters to a higher level for decision. They had jointly prepared a working paper for delivery to their respective leaders and it was agreed that the Algerians would contact the Moroccans again within ten days for a meeting between the King and Chadli in Belgium. The Moroccans heard nothing further from the Algerians until the Ta’if Conference. Prince Fahd had asked King Hassan to come on the Thursday before the opening of the conference.³ The King did so and on his arrival the Saudis asked if he would be prepared to meet President Chadli. The King said he would not affront the Saudis by refusing to meet one of their guests and was quite prepared to meet Chadli thinking that they would discuss the working paper prepared by the negotiators. Throughout the conference the matter did not come up again until the following Thursday, the day the conference closed,⁴ when Prince Sultan came to see Hassan “as white as a sheet” and indicated that Chadli would not meet with the King and claimed he had never seen the working paper as he had not had time to see the negotiators, even though two months had passed. The King said that his information was that Chadli wanted to go forward with the negotiations but had been outvoted in the Council of the Revolution by Yahyaaui’s partisans and pro-Soviet and pro-Libyan members. He wondered whether we had any ideas of what were the pressures that had brought about this sudden change in the Algerian willingness to negotiate. He himself was sure it was Soviet and Libyan pressure. Hassan said that he had received the Soviet Ambassador the evening before my arrival. He had told the Ambassador in a general way what had happened and asked the Soviet Ambassador what his government believed were the pressures that had changed the Algerian position, thus “putting the monkey on his back”. The King would greatly appreciate any thought we might have on this sudden change on the part of the Algerians.

4. He then expressed the hope that Secretary Haig might find time to stop in Morocco when he returned from the Middle East.⁵ I said that as far as I knew the Secretary’s schedule was extremely tight and I did not know whether this would be possible or not.

5. King Hassan then discussed the situation in Saudi Arabia. He said that the situation there was one of great concern and he wished me to pass his views on to the President and the Secretary. Khalid the King decided nothing, but nothing was decided without him. Fahd decided everything, but nothing without Khalid. Sultan and Abdallah, as full brothers of the first two, were important but Hassan trusted Abdallah far more than Sultan—and Naif did not really count. Hassan said French greatly distrusted young Turki and he shared that view. Fahd had asked Hassan whether he entirely trusted young Prince Saud indicating thereby in Hassan’s view that Fahd did not entirely trust Saud. [3 lines not declassified]

6. [1 paragraph (5½ lines) not declassified]

7. The King then discussed the recent attempted coup in Mauritania.⁶ He said that Kader and the others were indeed friendly to Morocco, had lived and trained here. They had been given Mauritanian passports with which they had entered Mauritania from Senegal, but they had not told him what they intended to do in the way of a coup. If they had, he would have attempted to dissuade them as the scheme they attempted had no chance of success.

8. King Hassan said that he felt Syrian President Assad was being backed into a corner, largely by his own actions in which the only support he had came from the Soviets and his own tiny Alawi minority. King Hassan said that anything the Secretary could do to stop Sadat’s public attacks on the Saudis would be helpful. Some way should be found to bring them together. Camp David was important but it was not all. There were other things to do.

9. King Hassan said that he had seen Israeli Labor leader Shimon Peres. Peres was relatively reasonable but thought that his ideas should be the line of departure for any negotiation and that might not be entirely acceptable to the other side. Hassan spoke highly of the new Senegalese President Diouf and said that he would be visiting him in Marrakech next week.

10. Hassan agreed that it was a good idea for us to keep in touch with moderate Algerians and did not seem excessively shocked at idea of possible sale of C–130’s to them.

11. The King said that President Reagan had provided inspiration to free men everywhere and Secretary Haig had imparted a new sense of confidence in US foreign policy. He hoped that he could meet with both men some time this year.

12. The King appeared to be in good health, although somewhat more grave and concerned than on other occasions when I had seen him. While we spoke he took a very small pill and placed it on his tongue. He spoke of economic and food problems Morocco would face later this year as a result of the greatest drought of this century. He expressed great gratitude to the President and Secretary for answering his concerns by sending an old friend to see him.

Sebastian

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
2. Not found.
3. January 22. The conference took place in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia, January 25–29.
4. January 29.
5. See footnote 3, Document 3.
6. On March 18, Mauritanian radio accused the Moroccan Government of sponsoring an attempted coup by two exiled colonels. See footnote 2, Document 3.