Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

187. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

19287.

Washington, January 24, 1981, 2237Z

SUBJECT

• Secretary Haig’s Meeting With Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and Military Security Head Ahmed Dlimi, January 22.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. In his first meeting with foreign representatives after being sworn in, Secretary Haig received Moroccan delegation January 22 consisting of Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and Military and Security Head Ahmed Dlimi. Also at meeting were DAS Draper and Country Director Coon (NEA), Secretary’s Special Assistant Goldberg and interpreter Sophia Porson.

3. Meeting opened with Secretary Haig stating he was aware of the importance of positions Guedira and Dlimi held in Morocco. He said he had long been an admirer of King Hassan, considering him a true and reliable friend of the West. He solicited their thought on North Africa (including Chad and Libya), problems with the Soviets, the Islamic Conference and any other area the visitors might want to touch on.

4. Guedira launched into a lengthy explanation of purpose of visit, starting with observation that King Hassan was touched that the Secretary had agreed to see his representatives on first day in office. Guedira stressed that admiration Haig had expressed for Hassan was thoroughly reciprocated, that King knew about Haig and was confident he would work for the best interests of the U.S. and also for traditional friends of U.S. Purpose of visit, Guedira continued, was not to plead Moroccan cause since Morocco was convinced that under Haig’s leadership, the already good bilateral relations will improve. Rather, King had considered it useful and necessary to coordinate his policies with new U.S. administration in view of grave problems facing the world. King felt he needed a sense of the direction that the new administration’s thinking was taking regarding certain problem areas considered urgent. Guedira then described King Hassan’s role as head of the Jerusalem Committee in the Islamic Conference and the meeting Hassan had called last December of the committee to prepare proposals for Taif. However, King Hassan, who will present the report, does not simply want to repeat it verbatim but rather to present it in his own terms. Last week he sent messages to various Arab leaders to gain their views as a basis for helping him make as complete and objective a presentation at the Islamic Conference as possible. Guedira had been the King’s emissary for this purpose and had met with King Khalid and Prince Fahd in Saudi Arabia, with the Amirs of Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, with King Hussein of Jordan, with Assad of Syria, and with Yassir Arafat. He now wanted U.S. views, recognizing that new administration might not yet have had time to work its strategy out in detail. The whole point was, he concluded, that the King wanted to do everything he could to make the IC meeting realistic and effective rather than a simple exercise in demagoguery. Guedira then defined the main issues as (a) Afghanistan; (b) Iran/Iraq war; (c) Middle East (including Jerusalem which gives Arab/Israeli problem a Muslim dimension in addition to a purely Arab one); and (d) Libya and its annexation of Chad.

5. The Secretary then responded:

A. Afghanistan: Secretary said we continue strenuously to oppose Soviet occupation there and anticipate increasingly vigorous efforts to make such Soviet activity increasingly unacceptable to the Soviets. Secretary said he was not in a position to say what specific steps President might decide USG should undertake. However, U.S. posture will be more vigorous and hopefully more effective than it has been in the past.

B. Iraq/Iran Conflict: Secretary said that U.S. has taken a hands off and balanced view. No one should misread the recent return of the prisoners² as signalling a prospective change in our attitude toward the regime in Iran. As to Iraq, President Reagan’s view, and his own, is that U.S. interests will be served by a steady improvement in relations, and by efforts to help move Iraq into the family of the more moderate Arab states. Secretary expects more vigorous initiatives toward these ends. Established states in the area must worry not only about revolutionary activity but most particularly about the exploitation by the Soviet Union of these revolutionary movements. We all hope, he continued, that some day the leaders in Iran will share views that the rest of us hold. This is not now the case. Secretary added that he saw no indication that this could be possible as long as the present situation prevailed. Unfortunately, recent events in Iran have placed a security burden on the moderate Arab states that the Shah used to carry in the past.

C. Middle East: Secretary said that President Reagan had endorsed and continued to support the overall framework of the Camp David Accords.³ We were aware of Morocco’s constructive role in seeking Middle East peace. Secretary said he did not anticipate, in the short term, any unusual activity in the peace process. He personally believed that the climate required some adjustment before substantial progress could be realized. He expressed concern that Sadat not be exposed to unusual pressures and added that the U.S. will not become the proponent of new solutions—the Jordanian option, for example. Any such departure will require consultation with the parties concerned. The Secretary concluded that he did not see any particular enthusiasm on the part of any party for such changes or new concepts.

D. Libya: Secretary noted that he had been actively concerned with the former crisis in Zaire⁴ and had supported French action in Chad two or three years ago.⁵ He had been disappointed that the French did not remain vigorous in regard to Chad. He had recently expressed this disappointment to Giscard⁶—and after that French forces had been reinforced in the Central African Republic. The Secretary said he believed that the matter of Qadhafi and Soviet-sponsored activity in North Africa was a grave problem for international peace affecting U.S. interests. President Reagan shared his concern. He observed that the new administration would need some time to discuss this situation with friends of U.S. but emphasized the urgency of issue.

E. Algeria, Morocco, and the USSR: Secretary added following observations:

— We are grateful to Algeria for its assistance in the hostage affair.⁷ We are aware that Morocco is conducting discussions with Algeria in regard to the Sahara.⁸ We hope that our improving relations with Algeria will serve the interests we share with Morocco. Under no circumstances will our efforts to improve relations with Algeria supplant or jeopardize the historic and long-standing friendship and common purpose we share with Morocco.

— Secretary said he had just approved delivery of the first OV–10 aircraft to Morocco and had instructed the Dept to prepare a letter to Congress which would set in motion the process of responding to the Moroccan request for M–60 tanks.⁹ The Moroccan Embassy, he said, would be officially notified but he wanted his visitors to bring this news to King Hassan personally as soon as possible. (Note: Visitors, per previously arranged schedule, left immediately after meeting for direct flight to Morocco in order to join King Hassan who flew Jan 23 to Islamic Conference in Taif.)

— Secretary said he was aware of Moroccan preoccupation with what his Chinese friends call the “polar bear”. He spoke of need to coordinate U.S. force visits and positioning in locations that best suited common purposes. While noting U.S. not seeking our opportunities to poke the bear in the cage, it must be made clear to the Kremlin that the U.S. will not condone flagrant breaches of international law in period ahead.

6. Guedira showed great satisfaction and added some comments:

A. Iran-Iraq Conflict: Noting that most Arab states, at least those friendly to the U.S., support Iraq, Guedira expressed satisfaction that U.S. evenhanded and neutral posture toward Iran-Iraq conflict would not be affected by hostage release, since the freeing of the hostages has raised suspicions about a possible U.S. rapprochement with Iran. Secretary interjected that it was likely to have the opposite effect. Guedira noted that King Hassan had visited Saddam Hussein and had talked to Saddam Hussein about establishing diplomatic relations with U.S. If U.S. agrees, he is willing to continue these efforts. Secretary replied that he could not set timetables. The process was somewhat complicated by the present conflict, but the long-term direction of U.S. policy would be to seek better relations and to establish diplomatic relations. This sort of thing always requires the development of momentum. There is an increasing convergence of interest between Iraq, the U.S., and the moderate Arab states. The U.S. welcomes this and other such trends, e.g. the growing cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and between Turkey and the moderate Arabs, because they are important in strategic terms.

B. Chad/Libya: Guedira said he agreed that the matter was urgent. Morocco sensed the urgency particularly when Qadhafi declared Libya’s merger with Chad.¹⁰ The Moroccans reacted immediately; King Hassan received Hussein Habre last week. When Habre asked for help, Hassan got in touch at once with Sadat and Nimfiri as well as Prince Fahd. They all gave their consent for all possible Moroccan aid, and the Moroccans have begun to provide this. Morocco hopes, Guedira concluded, that the U.S. will act with it and on its side. Secretary Haig replied that he would have to discuss this with the President, but he expressed satisfaction that Morocco had been willing to act. He stressed that this was a very sensitive issue. He anticipated that in the very near future the situation would be examined with a view to convincing Qadhafi “that he cannot not succeed.”

7. In conclusion, Secretary Haig conveyed again his high esteem and respect for King Hassan. He greatly admired the courage he had demonstrated in the matter of the Shah. He observed that affairs of state must be built on the basis of reliability and that the King had always been a reliable friend.

8. Guedira and Dlimi expressed their appreciation again and conveyed the King’s earnest wish that Haig’s first visit overseas in his new capacity be to Morocco. The meeting lasted fifty minutes.¹¹

Haig

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (01/24/1981–04/17/1981). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Coon; cleared by Draper, Seitz, and Jane Becker (S/S–O); approved by Goldberg. Sent for information Immediate to Jidda, Cairo, Paris, Algiers, Tel Aviv, Moscow, Khartoum, Baghdad, and Islamabad.
2. Reference is to the January 20 release of the 53 U.S. hostages held in Iran since November 5, 1979. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980.
3. See footnotes 5 and 6, Document 111.
4. Reference is to the Angolan attack on the Shaba Province of Zaire in March 1977. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa, Documents 73, 76, and 77.
5. In April 1978, the Government of France sent 2,500 troops to Chad to defend the capital, N’Djamena, from the Libyan-backed FROLINAT forces led by Goukouni Oueddei.
6. No record of the Haig-Giscard conversation was found.
7. See footnote 3, Document 97.
8. In telegram 477 from Rabat, January 21, the Embassy reported: “In a recent interview, Hassan argued that Morocco will have resolved the Sahara conflict militarily by the end of the month, after which there might be negotiations—but not with the Polisario.” However, Hassan also said “there were no negotiations with Algeria now.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810034–1004)
9. Not found.
10. On January 7, a joint Libyan-Chadian communiqué announced the merger. (Ronald Koven, “Libya Announces Merger With Its Neighbor, Chad,” Washington Post, January 7, 1981, pp. A1, A17)
11. Haig informed Reagan about the meeting in a January 22 memorandum. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report (01/22/1981–02/03/1981))