Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

128959.

Washington, April 23, 1988, 0708Z

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting With General Belkheir.

1. Secret—Entire text

2. Your meeting Saturday April 23 with General Belkheir provides an opportunity to press the Algerians for a fuller explanation of how the hijacking of KU–422 was resolved.² Specifically we are interested in answers to these questions:

— What were the precise arrangements which led to the release of the hostages and the hijackers?

— Who are the hijackers?

— Where are the hijackers?

— If the hijackers are still in Algeria, what is the GOA planning to do with them?

— What is Algeria’s assessment of Iran’s involvement in the hijacking?

3. Beyond that we believe that the Algerians should receive a clear account of our views of the incident. You should draw upon the following talking points for your presentation:

— A hijacking presents all interested parties with difficult choices.

— The safe release of hostages is important. It cannot be the sole goal, for that only encourages more hijackings with ever increasing frequency.

— Bringing hijackers to justice is equally important.

— That has not happened yet in the case of the KU–422 hijackers. After hijacking an airliner, murdering two individuals in cold blood and terrorizing the remaining passengers and crew members, the hijackers reportedly may go free.

— Even more worrisome is the fact that one of the hijackers was possibly Hasan Izz-al-Din, who was part of the team which hijacked TWA 847.

— We would be very concerned if the hijackers were to be freed as part of a deal. Given the GOA’s responsibilities, if there is any way to reverse that situation and assure that the hijackers are brought to justice, I urge you to do so.

— For its part the U.S. intends to monitor the situation and will make every effort to apprehend the hijackers.

— We believe that the fundamental principle that hijackers should be brought to justice must be strengthened and made an integral and universally accepted part of any strategy for handling a hijacking situation. Freedom for hijackers is not a solution.

— I bring these issues to your attention in a spirit of frank discussion on an important subject which affects the safety and security of not only the citizens of our two countries but also all other countries. End talking points.

4. If Belkheir’s version of events contradicts that provided by Lakehal Ayat’s, we would be interested in an explanation of why.³

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Counter-Terrorism Records, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as Ambassador to The Hague and Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism: Lot 89D283, Kuwait 422 Hijacking 1988. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Stephen Grummon (S/CT); cleared by Ussery, Marc Grossman (D), Ross, Levitsky (S/S), and David Adamson (S/S–O); approved by Bremer.
2. Early in the morning of April 20, the Embassy learned that a deal had been struck. While the hostages had been released and the “members of Kuwaiti royal family were taken to VIP lounge and immediately whisked away to parts unknown,” the hijackers remained on the plane. The Embassy suggested that the “final deal may have involved some form of confirmation (possibly by videotape) by Kuwaitis that Dawa prisoners are safe, followed by release of hostages and freedom for hijackers. GOA has promised us an official debrief later today. In the meantime GOA sources aren’t talking.” (Telegram 23155 from Algiers, April 20; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880336–0257)
3. In telegram 2385 from Algiers, April 23, Johnstone reported that he had met with Belkheir and that “Belkheir described matter as a no-win situation for Algeria. He vowed that Algeria would never again accept a hijacked airplane even, he added pointedly, if there were 100 Americans on board.” As for the deal, Belkheir said that “the Kuwaitis agreed to a gesture, namely the release of 4–6 prisoners whose terms were about to expire anyway,” but only after the hostages were released. Regarding the whereabouts of the hijackers, Belkheir “disclaimed knowledge saying Lakehal Ayat was on top of this.” After Johnstone said he “deplored a solution which involved freedom for murderers,” Belkheir “rejected notion that capturing hijackers could be given co-equal priority with safety of hostages.” (Department of State, Bureau of Counter-Terrorism Records, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as Ambassador to The Hague and Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism: Lot 89D283, Kuwait 422 Hijacking 1988)