Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

114823.

Washington, April 12, 1988, 2014Z

SUBJECT

• Algeria and the Hijacked Kuwaiti Aircraft.

Ref:

• Algiers 2113.²

1. Entire text is secret.

2. We appreciate the rapid tranmission of information contained in reftel. You took the right line in informing Khediri that the U.S. fully supports Kuwaiti policy of opposing concessions to the hijackers and regards the hijackers as murderers who should be brought to justice.

3. In addition to those ideas, please convey the following additional points to Khediri as soon as possible:

— The United States will not remain silent in the event that a deal occurs in which the hijackers go free. To the contrary, we will explain as fully as possible in public what happened, who was involved and the implication of such a deal, e.g. that everyone is more vulnerable because the hijackers have eluded justice.

— This incident absolutely must end in such a way that the hijackers do not escape or go free as a result of any deal. It would be unconscionable if they would go unpunished. This fundamental position does not mitigate our genuine concern for the hostages. This concern, however, is balanced by the need for efforts to discourage hijackings and the taking of hostages in the future.

— If the terrorists were to go free, Algeria’s commitment to countering terrorism would be questioned. More importantly, serious complications in our bilateral relationship could emerge.

— Therefore Algeria should urge all involved parties to hold the plane in Cyprus.

4. We agree that it would be useful to have Embassy personnel at the airport should the plane come to Algeria. However, we believe that Embassy personnel should not repeat not be present at the airport command post or in any way be in a position which appears to suggest an operational role. An Embassy presence at the airport, apart from the Algerian command post, would be appropriate. We have tried to assume a low profile throughout this incident and would want to continue to do so in Algiers. We have also found that during these crisis periods it is generally more useful to have the Ambassador at the Embassy and other officers at appropriate sites. In addition to keeping our profile low, such an arrangment permits more authoritative communications with Washington and between the Embassy and senior GOA officials.³

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Stephen Grummon (S/CT); cleared by Ussery, Joseph Lake (S/S), Gregory Delawie (S/S–O), and Bremer; approved by Armacost. Sent for information Immediate to Nicosia and Kuwait City.
2. In telegram 2113 from Algiers, April 12, the Embassy reported that Khediri informed Johnstone that the GOA had granted permission to land the aircraft, which had been hijacked on April 5 en route from Bangkok to Kuwait City, in Algiers “in response to personal request of Kuwaiti Emir to President Bendjedid.” The Embassy continued: “Algerian offer is unconditional and prior release of hostages is not repeat not a prerequisite. So too, Algerians have refused to accept any preconditions imposed by hijackers.” The Embassy also noted that Khediri “said that Algerians have made it clear to Kuwait that they would try to negotiate release of hostages in return for safe transit (to wherever) for hijackers. Kuwaitis were asked to not criticize Algeria if such a deal came to fruition and they agreed.” Johnstone “reiterated U.S. position, namely that U.S. supports firm Kuwaiti policy and opposes concessions to hijackers. (Khederi said Kuwaitis made it clear they would not release any of their 17 prisoners under any circumstances.) Ambassador said U.S. regards hijackers as murderers who are trying to release other murderers and that if at all possible they should be captured and brought to justice.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880311–0448)
3. In telegram 2130 from Algiers, April 13, Johnstone indicated that he had “carried out reftel instructions to the letter, but I confess to being a little perplexed by the tone of indignation and threats of retaliation contained therein. I urge that we not rush into any hasty public statements or actions to carry out our threats.” He also contended “the instructions contained reftel subordinate the safety of the hostages to the objective of punishing the hostage takers” and recommended that “we put our position on the record but in moderate and thoughtful tones which acknowledge the dilemma involved.” To do otherwise, he contended, would “seriously complicate” U.S.-Algerian relations. (Department of State, Bureau of Counter-Terrorism Records, Papers of L. Paul Bremer II as Ambassador to The Hague and Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism: Lot 89D283, Kuwait 422 Hijacking 1988)