146. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
[Omitted here is a table on Algerian-U.S. Trade.]
ALGERIA-US RELATIONS: MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE
President Bendjedid will be the first Algerian head of state to make an official visit to the United States since Algeria’s independence in 1962. Bendjedid almost certainly sees his visit as the capstone of his attempts to gain international recognition as an Arab and a Third World leader. He also will be looking for Washington’s approval of his cautious but consistent efforts during the past several years to move Algeria away from its earlier radical image. In addition, he will use his meetings with US officials to reaffirm Algeria’s commitment to expanding ties with the United States. The Bendjedid regime is particularly sensitive to what it believes is a lingering perception in Washington that Algerians are radicals, support terrorism, and are too closely aligned with the Soviet Union. He will want to focus discussions on economic development and regional stability. [portion marking not declassified]
Political Interests
Bendjedid is likely to stress Algeria’s role as negotiator on various Middle East issues. He will point to Algeria’s efforts to mediate the Iran-Iraq war, to bring together Syria, Jordan and pro- and anti-Arafat groups, and to effect the release of US hostages in the Middle East. The Algerians believe that the Hussein-Arafat agreement merits serious consideration, but Bendjedid is likely to remind US officials that Syrian participation is essential for the success of any peace proposal. Bendjedid almost certainly believes that Arab recognition of Israel’s right to exist is inevitable. He will encourage Washington to recognize the right of Palestinian self-determination. [portion marking not declassified]
Bendjedid may ask for US assistance in prodding Morocco to look for a peaceful settlement of the Western Saharan dispute. Bendjedid believes that his willingness to meet with Moroccan King Hassan in 1983 and his proposal earlier this year—that Western Sahara would control its internal affairs while Hassan would be its titular ruler and [Page 325] represent the Saharans in international organizations—are clear signs that Algeria wants a negotiated solution. The Algerians view Morocco’s construction of the berm in Western Sahara and its intransigence in recent talks as evidence that Hassan is interested only in a military solution. [portion marking not declassified]
Bendjedid will support Washington’s concerns about Qadhafi’s destabilizing activities in North Africa and the need to counter Libyan influence in the region. Algiers is particularly iritated by the Moroccan-Libyan union, which it sees as being directed against it and would like to see the agreement’s demise. At the same time Bendjedid is unlikely to support Washington’s efforts to isolate Libya, so as not to provide Qadhafi with any excuse for meddling inside Algeria. [portion marking not declassified]
Security Issues
Algeria’s commitment to diversify its sources of military equipment and upgrade its military technology is an important element in the rapprochement with Washington. Algiers also sees diversification as a way to shake off the close identification it has had with the Soviet Union and to enhance its nonaligned credentials. [portion marking not declassified]
Algerians are generally cautious in their military planning and are not likely to ask for equipment that they do not need or cannot assimilate into their inventory. For the moment, the Algerians are interested in US military training and equipment to maintain and enhance Soviet materiel already in place. The Algerians hope the visit will strengthen the prospects of Congressional approval for Algerian purchases of defense items under the Foreign Military Sales program, to which Algeria has just been added. In the long term, depending on Algerian perceptions of Washington’s response to this request, Algiers could ask for US fighter aircraft, tanks, helicopters, and armored personnel carriers. [portion marking not declassified]
Economic Assistance
Unlike most Third World leaders visiting Washington, Bendjedid will not ask for financial aid. Despite a soft oil market, the Bendjedid government has handled the sharp drop in oil and gas sales with a sensible austerity program and has maintained an excellent international credit rating. Algeria is still committed to socialism, but Bendjedid and his advisers have placed greater emphasis on decentralization and opening up the economy to the private sector. Algeria will seek US help in developing sectors of the economy that were neglected by previous regimes, such as agriculture and water resource management. The issue of US purchases of Algerian liquefied natural gas may be raised, according to the US Embassy, but the Algerians realize that their insistence on maximum prices precludes any significant increase in sales. [portion marking not declassified]
- Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–87–0008, 1985 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 3, Algeria (Jan–Dec). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency. Information as of April 1 was used in its preparation.↩