124. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria1

80332.

SUBJECT

  • Secretary Shultz Receives Algerian Ambassador Yaker.
1.
(C) Entire text.
2.
Summary: The Secretary met March 18 with Algerian Ambassador Yaker for a 30-minute review of issues between us. Yaker discussed Algerian efforts to improve relations with its neighbors, reiterating GOA’s traditional call for direct Moroccan-Polisario negotiations. He urged U.S. to adopt a more balanced position on the Western Sahara, to reconsider its policy on contacts with the Polisario and PLO. The Secretary noted that the U.S. position on the PLO was clear and unchanged. On Libya, Yaker said that Algiers does not approve of all Qadhafi’s actions, but wants good relations with all its neighbors. U.S.-Libyan strains are a problem for the GOA. The Secretary responded that Libya could easily improve relations with the U.S. by ceasing its destabilizing activities. Yaker termed the results of the Delhi NAM summit “positive,”2 and said the GOA continues to look to global negotiations for solutions to pressing world economic problems. He also raised U.S. regulatory action on Algerian gas imports, noting the GOA’s strong interest in protecting the integrity of its gas contracts, including pricing provisions. End summary.
3.
The Secretary received Algerian Ambassador for twice postponed bilateral March 18. Under Secretary Eagleburger, DAS Schneider and AFN Director Sebastian sat in.
4.
Yaker opened by reiterating President Bendjedid’s invitation to the Secretary to visit Algeria “when you can.”3 The Secretary responded that he would like to come, could not now say when that would prove possible, but appreciated the fact and spirit of the invitation which reflected a desire, reciprocated, for the improvement of our relations. Yaker responded that Algeria is also working in this sense. The Baldrige visit had been a great success opening new [Page 279] perspectives.4 However, Yaker continued, there are also problems in our bilateral relations. A question has been raised about the cost of imported Algerian gas; the El Paso negotiations have left some scars.5 Algeria has a strong interest in protecting the integrity of its (gas) contracts, including the (price) incentives they contain. Algeria has tried to develop this resource and its import programs are based on its sales. As a result, Algeria’s financial situation is good in that its debts are manageable.
5.
Moving to Algeria’s current regional posture, Yaker said that Algeria has decided to take the initiative to improve its regional relations. It is demarcating borders with its neighbors. Algeria believes that the prospects for rapprochement with Morocco are promising, “providing we find a solution to the problem of the Western Sahara.” The Secretary welcomed these remarks. Yaker then said that Algiers is confident the Saharan problem will be resolved if there are “negotiations between the two parties, Morocco and the Polisario,” to implement the OAU’s cease fire/referendum formula. Yaker then pointed out that President Bendjedid had just arrived in Tunisia where he had been given a good reception. He expected the visit to have a favorable impact on Algerian-Tunisian relations.
6.
Yaker then moved on to conclude that the USG should take all of these developments into account. The U.S. should take a more balanced position towards the Western Sahara and a settlement based on self-determination, he said. We should prefer such a settlement to a military solution which is beyond reach. The Secretary commented that we agree on a negotiated solution and share Algeria’s interest in peace, stability and regional cooperation in North Africa.
7.
Yaker then turned to Libya. U.S.-Libyan relations are a problem for the GOA, he said. “We do not know what to do but are concerned.” Algiers does not approve of everything the Libyan regime does but is striving to have good relations with all its neighbors. The Secretary responded by interjecting that it would be easy for Libya to have better relations with us. All Qadhafi needs to do is to stop destabilizing his neighbors, e.g. Chad. “It’s his behavior that bothers us.”
8.
Yaker then inquired about developments in the Middle East. He reiterated the commitment of the GOA to the solutions developed in Fez as a basis for negotiations.6 He said that Israeli unresponsiveness to Arab proposals was having an adverse impact. He wondered whether U.S. policy was taking adequate account of Lebanon’s need [Page 280] for unity, integrity and sovereignty. The Secretary said that the U.S. had been responsive to the Arab Fez initiative. We had received King Hassan and his delegation;7 had studied the questions sent us and responded; had met repeatedly in capitals. Key to a solution, the Secretary said, lies in direct talks between the Arab countries and Israel. King Hussein is central to this, as are the Palestinians. We do not yet know what Hussein will do or when but believe he will find his way to the table. As for the recent visits of Lebanese and Israeli delegations, they had gone reasonably well, but problems remain. Withdrawal remains our goal. To achieve it, adequate answers will have to be found on the issue of Israel’s security from attack from southern Lebanon. To assure this, a mix of agreed measures will be needed. Some of the job will have to be done by the Lebanese themselves. The MNF and UNIFIL may also play a role.
9.
Yaker asked whether we had contact with the PLO. The Secretary said we do not speak to the PLO. Yaker said his government considered we should, that it would be useful and “highly advisable.” The Secretary responded that the position of the USG was clear. It had been set forth time and time again. Our conditions had not changed. Yaker said that the PLO wanted contact with us and wanted to talk. Algeria thought it would be helpful. This had been the spirit of the PNC which had given Arafat a flexibility he had lacked. Arafat’s position had emerged strengthened.
10.
Yaker then turned to the Gulf war. He said Algiers’ mediation efforts continued but the conditions posed by Iran remained unacceptable to Iraq. Yaker noted that we had received the Iraqi Foreign Minister and wondered what had come of that. He said that Algeria was in close touch with King Fahd and working in consultation with him for stability in the region. The Secretary replied that we have no relations with Iran and that our tie with Iraq is “thin.” The Secretary said he had seen the Iraqi Foreign Minister to discuss bilateral relations and hoped that the GOA’s efforts at mediation would prove successful.
11.
Yaker turned to the Delhi NAM summit. He qualified the results as “on balance, positive.” He thought it possible that global negotiations (GN) would be achieved in stages. The GOA attaches importance to the American position. It thinks that getting GN started would be in our mutual interest even if no new resource flows are immediately triggered. The Secretary said that it was too soon for him to comment on the NAM summit. He said that meanwhile it is good news for the world that the U.S. economy is again expanding. The [Page 281] impact would be felt worldwide in trade and economic development. GN clearly needs further definition, however, the Secretary continued. Can these talks be structured so as to respect the IMF and other international institutions? We have lately seen again the importance of the IMF. Yaker said his government thinks we should be discussing an emergency program for the IMF to increase its lending by 40 percent. There had indeed been positive developments but more needs to be done, given the growing indebtedness of many countries and their unmet development needs. The Secretary said that no single measure will solve the problem. Austerity is needed. Countries must come to grips with themselves.
12.
As the conversation was drawing to a close, Yaker raised two further questions: (a) the consequences of U.S. military cooperation with Morocco and (b) whether the U.S. would favor direct contact with the Polisario. The New York Times, Yaker said, called the Polisario Marxists. This is untrue. “We know them as nationalists,” he said. Yaker added that Algeria intended to replicate with Bourguiba what President Bendjedid had just done with King Hassan.
13.
The Secretary responded stating gratification for these Algerian views. He expressed his appreciation of the importance of the efforts at regional stabilization Algeria was making.
Shultz
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830162–0971. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sebastian; cleared by David Schneider, Eagleburger, Hill, and Robinson (S/S–O); approved by Shultz. Sent for information to Rabat, Tunis, Jerusalem, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Nouakchott, and USUN.
  2. Reference is to the seventh conference of the Heads of State of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), New Delhi, March 7–12.
  3. See Document 123.
  4. See footnote 2, Document 121.
  5. See footnote 2, Document 99.
  6. See footnote 2, Document 115.
  7. See footnote 3, Document 119.