Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

2888.

Algiers, July 15, 1982, 1545Z

SUBJECT

• Relocating the PLO.

Ref:

• State 195773.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary, Acting FM Dembri took a hard line in reply to my presentation of points reftel. He said no Arab country could receive the PLO when their wish was to return home. The PLO leadership and fighters in West Beirut were prepared to die and if they perished others would rise to replace them. More time for negotiations was needed. Dembri again urged the U.S. to recognize the PLO and to support the achievement of Palestinian rights. Dembri’s reply may have been largely tactical. End summary.

3. I saw Acting Foreign Minister Dembri at 1500 local and used points reftel verbatim while stressing our view several times that time was growing short if a catastrophe was to be avoided. Dembri began by saying it was clear the State Department had not taken any account of Algeria’s views as expressed earlier. (I denied this and said I thought we both wished to avoid carnage in Beirut and preserve the possibility for a constructive political role for the Palestinians.)

4. Dembri said no Arab country could permit the Palestinians to go further from Palestine when their desire was to return home. The United States should, he urged, recognize the PLO and the right of the Palestinians to their homeland. Secretary-designate Shulz’ remarks before the SFRC were encouraging,³ but the U.S. must go further.

5. The U.S., Dembri said, should exercise pressure on Israel. More time was needed for negotiations. The world would not accept an Israeli diktat. It was not Israel, he said, who was threatened by the Arab states, but the Arab states who were threatened by Israel.

6. I noted it was unrealistic to think of the Palestinians returning under present circumstances and again urged Algeria to help find a haven of refuge for the PLO now in West Beirut. Dembri asserted the leadership and fighters were ready to die and that, if they perished, new leaders and new fighters would rise in their stead.

7. Dembri confirmed FM Ibrahimi had departed for the Non-Aligned meeting in Cyprus. There would be fifty ministers taking part and a total of eighty delegations. The PLO, he thought, would be in the chair. All other prospective meetings would await the outcome of the non-aligned session.

8. Comment: I believe Dembri’s prompt reply was largely tactical. He was, I believe, taking a hard line on the eve of the Non-Aligned meeting which Algeria sees as a major event. He may also have been influenced by the categoric Syrian refusal to accept armed elements expressed to Ambassador Paganelli. We continue to think that Algeria wishes to get the best possible deal for the PLO if it has to leave Beirut. Ideally, this would be recognition by the United States but short of that it could mean enhanced political recognition by the Europeans and others. Finally, Algeria has reacted favorably to Secretary-designate Shulz’ remarks on the Palestinian question and will be anxious to foster what it considers to be a positive new element in U.S. policy toward the Middle East.

9. Dept may wish repeat to addressees reftel.

Newlin

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/24/1982–09/26/1983). Secret; Niact; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. In telegram 195773 to Algiers, July 15, the Department instructed the Embassy to approach the GOA about helping the United States “seek an honorable way for the PLO in Beirut to depart Lebanon in safety,” given that “no Arab country has come forward demonstrating an inclination to receive the 5–8,000 PLO combatants from West Beirut.” The United States believed that “the survival of the PLO as a potentially constructive political force in the region is at stake,” contended that “to prevent further bloodshed, someone must take these fighters,” and sought Algeria’s “views on how this question of a haven or havens for the PLO fighters might be achieved. We are profoundly concerned that, should there be further delay, events may take an uncontrollable course.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])
3. Reference is to Shultz’s July 13 statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his confirmation hearings, in which he declared in reference to the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations: “For these talks to succeed, representatives of the Palestinians themselves must participate in the negotiating process.” (Department of State Bulletin, August 1982, pp. 49–53)